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**What's in Voters' Minds?
Economic Conditions and Identity Issues in Korean and Taiwanese
Elections**

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What's in Voters' Minds?
Economic Conditions and Identity Issues in Korean and Taiwanese
Elections

by

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Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin
August 2007

To my faithful parents
Byungok Choi and Kyungsoon Hong

to my wonderful husband
Jongseok Woo

and to my God who has guided me all the way

Acknowledgements

I am greatly indebted to those who supported and guided me at every step of my graduate program and dissertation process. I am grateful to have terrific advisors and mentors in Tse-min Lin and Brian Roberts, who provided enormous encouragement and advice throughout my dissertation-writing. I have been lucky to have three superb committee members: Daron Shaw, Ken Greene, and Roderick Hart. Ken Greene deserves special thanks for his painstaking feedback during multiple phases of my project. I extend thanks to professors Zoltan Barany and Patricia Maclachlan who offered me intellectual and moral support.

I would like to thank my friends and colleagues who kept me going throughout my graduate program: Brian Arbour, Danny Hayes, Ayesha Ray, Brenna Troncoso, Matt Cohen, Chia-Yin Wei, Tao-Fang Huang, and many others. I am also grateful to Michael Anderson and Tracy Wuster who read my dissertation several times and provided good comments on the writing. I wish them a best luck in their journey of dissertation writing.

I owe my greatest debt to my family, who have been so loving and supportive throughout my whole life. I am especially thankful for my husband, Jongseok, who has taken care of me with love, encouragement, and advice even while writing his own dissertation. I am also thankful for my parents, Byungok Choi and Kyungsoon Hong, and my mother-in-law, Sunok Choi, who have patiently waited and supported me to realize my dreams with relentless prayers. Finally, I thank God who guides me all the way and makes my life so joyful and grateful.

What's in Voters' Minds?
Economic Conditions and Identity Issues in Korean and Taiwanese
Elections

Publication No. _____

Eunjung Choi, Ph. D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2007

Supervisors: Tse-min Lin and Brian Roberts

This dissertation studies the effect of both personal and national economic evaluations and social identity on individual vote choice in both Korea and Taiwan by utilizing and improving upon information-processing models developed in social psychology. Economic voting literature generally makes a strong claim that economic voting should affect individual voting behavior in all contexts. Information-processing models suggest, however, that attitudes about certain issues must be available and accessible, and that candidates must be distinctive on these issues, in order to have a bearing on individual behavior. I explain the varying effects of economic conditions and social identity on individual vote choice across elections and individuals in the two countries on the basis of changes in the accessibility of attitudes toward economic conditions and social identity and the distinctiveness of alternatives. Empirical findings in this dissertation show that

(1) economic voting has a surprisingly limited explanatory power in both Korea and Taiwan, (2) individual political preferences are shaped less by self-interest or material well-being than by emotional attachment to social identity in a society where ethno-cultural cleavages predominate politics, and (3) individual voters respond differently to short-term economic fluctuations, depending on their levels of education and their lifetime economic experiences. My study provides a new perspective on the nature and influence of economic conditions and identity issues on individual vote choice by accounting for variations in individuals and the political and social context in which they are situated.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

This dissertation is a study of individual vote choice in Korea and Taiwan. I pay particular attention to the effect of economic conditions and social identity on individual vote choice in both countries, where identity politics are pervasive, specifically, regional identity in Korea and national identity in Taiwan. To explain individual vote choice in these countries, I utilize the information-processing approach developed in social psychology. This introduction is composed of four sections. The first section introduces my research questions regarding the influence of economic and identity issues in both Korean and Taiwanese elections. The second section briefly presents a psychological vote choice model of how preexisting social divisions affect the salience of economic conditions and identity issues and thus their effect on individual vote choice. Section three states the significance and contribution of my findings. The final section provides an outline of the body of the dissertation.

I. Research Questions

This dissertation addresses three major research questions: How are both economic conditions and identity issues (regional identity in Korea and ethnic identity in Taiwan) relevant to individual vote choice in Korea and Taiwan? Under what conditions do economic evaluations or identity issues matter more? What types of voters are most likely to be involved in economic voting?

The rational choice model of voting behavior assumes that individual actors make political decisions on the basis of the calculations of costs and benefits among alternatives in order to maximize the utility or self-interest. In particular, a body of rational choice literature has emphasized economic voting (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1978, 1981; Kramer 1971; MacKuen, Erickson, and Stimson 1992). This work argues that voters assess their costs and benefits in terms of either their personal or the national material well-being and decide whether to punish or reward an incumbent based on their assessment (Alvarez, Nagler, and Willette 2000; Eulau and Lewis-Beck 1985; Fiorina 1978; Gomez and Wilson 2001; Lewis-Beck 1983, 1988).

Even though economic voting tends to be a widely accepted model for explaining individual vote choice across countries, there is little consistent and strong empirical evidence to support the economic voting theory. Economic voting suffers from what is known as the “instability dilemma,” which indicates that the effect of economic conditions varies among countries and elections (Alvarez, Nagler, and Willette 2000; Anderson 2000; Fiorina 1978; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000).¹ In the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan election of 2001 (Hsieh, Lacy, and Niou 2003) and the Korean presidential election of 2002, for example, the incumbent parties prevailed despite deteriorating economies. How do we explain these outcomes?

Furthermore, how can we explain the particular significance of regional and ethnic group identity on individual vote choice in Korea and Taiwan after democratization and remarkable economic success? Modernization theory assumes that

¹ See Lewis-Beck (1988) and Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000) for a comprehensive review of controversies on economic voting.

urbanization, universal education, and the development of transportation and communication should diminish regional and ethnic divisions in a society (Inglehart 1997; Lerner 1958). Contrary to the arguments of modernization theory, economic and political development in both Korea and Taiwan resulted in wider regional and ethnic divisions (Cho 1996; Diamond 2001). This project investigates why social identity became salient and thus influenced individual vote choice after democratization and how preexisting social divisions mediated the effect of economic conditions and social identity on individual vote choice in Korea and Taiwan. I suggest that individual political perspectives are shaped not by self-interest or personal material well-being but rather by pre-adult socialization and emotional attachment to social identity in societies where ethno-cultural divisions dominate politics.

Finally, few studies of economic voting have dealt with the heterogeneity of the electorate in regard to economic voting, even though not all individuals care equally about economic conditions or have the ability to recognize the political relevance of personal and national economic conditions (Duch 2001; Gomez and Wilson 2001, 2006). Individuals differ in their economic experience, which results in diverse interpretations of the current economic situations (Higgins and King 1981). People also vary in their ability to manage information. Some people are better than others at integrating various pieces of information on the state of both their personal and the national economy into a coherent political view (Fiske, Kinder, and Larter 1983; Lau and Redlawsk 2001). Therefore, I suggest that individual variation in education and lifetime economic experience modifies the effect of economic condition by making differences in attitude

availability and accessibility regarding economic conditions, which will be defined in the following section. In short, the research questions this dissertation answers will provide a better understanding of the nature and influence of economic conditions and identity issues on individual vote choice in Korea and Taiwan.

II. Information-Processing Approach of Individual Vote Choice

Economic and sociological models do not fully explain whether sociological or economic factors matter more in a particular time and place when these factors compete each other to influence individual vote choice. Utilizing the information-processing approach, this dissertation develops a theoretical framework that explains how two sets of causal factors—economic factors emphasizing economic conditions and sociological factors rooted in social identity—determine individual vote choice in Korea and Taiwan.

The information-processing approach assumes that attitudes must be available and accessible to bear on individual perceptions, judgments, or behavior (Aldrich et al. 1989; Bargh 1988; Fazio and Williams 1986). Under the assumption of the information-processing approach developed in social psychology, I hypothesize that economic conditions and/or identity issues affect individual vote choice only when attitudes about these factors are available and accessible to voters. Availability refers to whether voters have formed an attitude about a particular issue, while accessibility is related to how readily the stored attitude can be utilized for political decisions (Aldrich et al. 1989; Higgins 1989; Higgins and King 1981). Much salience literature also suggests that a

candidate's position and emphasis on an issue mediates the effect of an issue on an individual's vote choice (Campbell et al. 1960; Carmine and Stimson 1989; Page 1978; Page and Brody 1972; Petrocik 1996; Pomper 1972). I argue, therefore, that economic conditions and social identity are more likely to influence individual vote choice when candidates emphasize a distinctive position on identity issues and their differences on economic performance.

To sum up, I suggest that the issue concerns of both citizens and candidates, as well as the distinctiveness of the candidates, shape the nature of a society's political competitions and thus individual vote choice. Therefore, attitudes about economic performance and social identity must be available to an individual's memory. Given that those attitudes are available, accessibility and distinctiveness are the key mediating factors that determine the importance of economic and identity issues to individual vote choice. The more accessible and distinctive the issues are the better chance they have of affecting individual vote choice. An information-processing approach makes it possible to study varying effects of economic conditions and identity issues across elections and for individuals on the basis of changes in the availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness of the individual factors.

My study also argues that preexisting social cleavages based on social identity in both Korea and Taiwan deeply affect whether attitudes about certain factors are available, accessible, and distinctive. That is, after the authoritarian regimes in each country ended, political elites in each country exploited social identity—regional identity in Korea and national identity in Taiwan—to differentiate themselves through the development of

parties on the basis of social identity. Identity politics after democratization created a context that mobilized identity-based voting but muted economic voting. I analyze multiple elections in both countries in order to examine the effect of economic conditions and identity issues on individual vote choice. Therefore, the unit of analysis is the individual voter. This dissertation shows that economic voting has a surprisingly limited explanatory power in both countries, and that preexisting social divisions rooted in social identity can become politicized in ways that trump economic voting.

III. Significance and Contribution

My project is unique and significant in terms of both its theoretical and methodological contributions. Theoretically, this project provides a better understanding of individual vote choices, focusing on psychological processes rather than outcomes. This dissertation offers a new perspective on the nature and influence of economic conditions and identity issues on individual vote choice by taking account of not only the availability and accessibility of an attitude but also the distinctiveness of the candidates and pre-existing social cleavages as a source of issue salience. Additionally, this study examines how far the economic voting model travels by testing the model in the specific contexts of Korea and Taiwan, where the existence of identity issues, economic success, and a one-party dominant system complicates the economic voting model. Methodologically, my research applies both in-depth contextual analysis and rigorous

statistical analysis to Korean and Taiwanese vote choices, whereas quantitative studies have been dominant in previous voting behavior literature.

IV. Chapter Outline

This dissertation consists of seven chapters. Chapter 2 develops a theoretical framework to explain how preexisting social divisions shape individual political perspectives and thus affect the salience of attitudes about economic conditions and identity issues, which influence individual vote choice. I also provide an overview of previous voting behavior models and discuss their limitations in answering my research questions. Finally, I present my hypotheses to be tested against the empirical cases of Korean and Taiwanese elections.

Chapter 3 explains how social divisions between groups shaped the political arena after democratization in Korea and Taiwan. I pay particular attention to how group consciousness affected elite strategy and party systems that, in turn, influenced attitude availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness regarding economic conditions and group identities—specifically, regional identity in Korea and national identity in Taiwan.

Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to the two empirical cases of Korea and Taiwan, respectively. In the two chapters, I build the case for how emotional attachment to social identity rather than economic concerns shape individual political decisions when ethno-cultural conflicts prevail politics in a society. First, I provide evidences of the accessibility, availability, and distinctiveness of economic conditions and group identity

in each country. Second, I introduce the research design, including data, variables, and models, that are used to test the effects of economic evaluations and group identity in each country. Third, I analyze three presidential elections in each country and present empirical results that show the dominance of identity-based voting rather than economic voting. Finally, I provide the implications of my findings on the effect of economic evaluations and group identity in future elections.

Chapter 6 investigates the varying effects of economic conditions among individual voters in Korea and Taiwan. Individuals vary in their levels of education and lifetime economic experience, which influence attitude availability and accessibility of economic conditions, as well as the ability to differentiate the candidates. This chapter shows that people with more education have better cognitive skills that allow them to properly attribute the responsibility of national and personal well-being to government policies. On the other hand, the less educated find it hard to link their personal prosperity to governmental actions. In addition, individual lifetime economic experience under a one-party dominant system also influences the way individuals respond to short-term economic changes.

Chapter 7 summarizes the findings of the previous empirical chapters and offers a comparative perspective on the findings. I also discuss implications of this study on traditional voting models and provide implications for future voting behavior in Korea and Taiwan.

Chapter 2. Information-Processing Approach of Vote Choice

I. Introduction

My dissertation examines both when and how group identity and economic conditions have influenced individual vote choice in Korea and Taiwan. To address this subject, I have elaborated a psychological theory of individual vote choice by revising information-processing models. My theory suggests that voters respond to factors that are more available, accessible, and distinctive than variables that are less so.

This chapter consists of three sections. In the first section, I review previous theories of individual vote choice, specifically sociological, social-psychological, and rational choice models. In section two, I develop a psychological theory of individual vote choice. Finally, in section three I generate several major hypotheses from my theoretical arguments that I will test against several empirical cases of elections in Korea and Taiwan. Research design, including data, measurements of variables, and methods, will be provided in each empirical chapter (Chapters 4, 5, and 6).

II. Various Vote Choice Models

Three main approaches have been forward to explain individual voting behavior. The first is the Columbia model, which focuses on sociological or demographic factors such as socioeconomic status (SES), religion, race/ethnicity, and area of residence as

determinants of political preferences (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948; Berelson et al. 1954). The second is the Michigan model, which emphasizes social-psychological factors, such as party identification, their attitude toward salient issues, and their image of the candidates (Bartels 2000; Campbell et al. 1960; Markus and Converse 1979). The third is the rational choice model, which highlights the calculus of costs and benefits of voting for one party's candidate instead of another (Downs 1957; Hinich and Munger 1997). Even though these models have accounted for general patterns of voting behavior, they have been less than satisfactory in explaining why a specific model has more or less explanatory power in a specific context. This section provides an overview of what previous voting behavior models have explained and what they have not fully accounted for in order to show how my approach can compensate for their shortcomings.

1. The Sociological (Columbia) Model

The sociological, or Columbia, model of voting investigates the pattern of vote choice among different groups of voters distinguished by class, gender, age, education, region, religion, and race (Berelson et al. 1954; Lane and Ersson 1987; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Manza and Brooks 1999). According to this model, political decisions are influenced not only by one's political beliefs but also by one's social position (Berelson et al. 1954). Similarly situated people are expected to vote alike; people who share the same social characteristics usually share some of the same political interests and objectives. This model also finds that voters are most susceptible to the persuasion of

primary groups, such as family, friends, and co-workers, since people consider primary groups to be more trustworthy and have more frequent contact with them. In short, this model assumes that individual political opinions and decisions are shaped by the people around voters. Individuals in each social group thus tend to behave as a “unit,” rather than as individuals.

The sociological model establishes a useful theoretical framework to explain voting behavior, especially group voting. However, by focusing on static demographic variables, this model has been unable to explain drastic electoral changes (Campbell et al. 1960; Kinder and Sears 1985; Dalton and Wattenberg 1993). In other words, the model does not explain changes in group preferences. More importantly, this model has not addressed differences in individual preference within a group or the psychological foundations of group preferences. Finally, it does not explain why the prominence of certain social characteristics varies in different countries and across elections.

2. The Social Psychological (Michigan) Model

The social-psychological model, or Michigan model, was the first to attempt to encompass psychological notions to explain electoral decisions. Campbell et al. (1960) maintain that psychological factors, such as voters’ party identification, attitudes toward salient issues, and the images of the candidates are the main determinants of individual vote choice. Under this model, those factors function as information filters that maintain cognitive consistency by reinforcing one another. Party identification, however, is more likely to affect attitudes toward candidates, issues, and groups, rather than the factors

because party identification, the psychological attachment to a party, persists longer than issues and candidates (Campbell et al. 1960; Markus and Converse 1979). In addition, party identification is considered an easy and reliable, as well as reasonable, cue since parties tend to place themselves on an ideological spectrum and do not deviate much from it (Dalton and Wattenberg 1993; Downs 1957).

Unlike the sociological model, this model provides a psychological foundation of individual vote choice. Furthermore, party identification seems to predict individual voting behavior quite well, at least in the advanced Western countries in which a stable party system exists and most voters recognize the distinct platforms of each party. Particularly, there is little doubt about the significance of party identification in U.S. elections (Bartels 2000; Campbell et al. 1960; Miller 1991). The importance of party identification, however, is difficult to apply across different countries. Not only do many new democracies have unstable party systems, but parties in these countries do not always represent clear ideologies or issues. In short, many voters in such countries are less likely to have firm party identification, and thus party identification will not be an accurate determinant of individual vote choice.

Nonetheless, the social-psychological model provides a new perspective on the significance of other variables, such as social groups, issues, and ideology, on individual vote choice (Lau 1986; Hamill et al. 1985). Social group theorists, for example, pay more attention to group identification rather than objective membership and offer psychological grounds for group voting (Conover 1984, 1988; Koch 1994). Like party identification, group identification, as an individual's psychological attachment to a

group, functions as a perceptual screen through which individuals view politics (Conover 1984). Despite its contribution of integrating a psychological perspective into politics, the Michigan model does not explain how different psychological factors are transposed into the political arena and to what extent they become relevant to individual political decisions in specific electoral contexts.

3. The Rational Choice Model

In the tradition of V.O. Key (1966) and Anthony Downs (1957), the rational choice model emphasizes cognitive and rational aspects of voting behavior. According to this model, voters behave rationally in politics, consciously calculating the costs and benefits of their vote choice in order to maximize their utility. Under this model, rational actors base their political decisions on “issue proximity”—how close voters’ issue positions are to the candidates’ issue positions—or retrospective/prospective evaluations of candidates—how the candidates have performed or will perform (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1978, 1981; Hinich and Enelow 1984; Hinich and Munger 1997; Kramer 1971; Key 1966). In short, this model argues that voters respond to stimuli involving issues, government performance, and the evaluation of candidates and make sophisticated decisions according to their self-interest.

It is well known, however, that many voters are neither interested in politics nor knowledgeable about government structure and political figures, not to mention substantial policy issues (Bowler and Donovan 1998; Butler and Stokes 1974; Converse 1970; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Harrop and Miller 1987; Luskin 1987). Large

portions of the electorate lack both factual knowledge and meaningful beliefs or “true attitudes,” which Converse (1970) calls “nonattitudes.” It is not always easy for voters to figure out and compare candidates’ and parties’ issue positions with their own. Much of the literature on rational choice, therefore, has emphasized economic factors or individual evaluations of incumbent economic performance as the main determinant of individual vote choice (e.g., Downs 1957; Erikson 1989, 1990; Ferejohn 1986; Fiorina 1978, 1981; Norpoth 1996). Because the economic voting model relies on intuition or “gut responses,” it requires very little of voters. Most of the information that voters use for their political decisions is, as Popkin notes, actually obtained as a “by-product” of activities in their daily lives (1991, pp. 22-3). As long as voters know who the incumbents are and how they feel about changes in their well-being, they can make reasonable decisions on politics. This body of work shows, at least with regard to the U.S. and other Western countries, that the better the economy, the more votes go to incumbents, while a poor economy means fewer votes for the incumbents (Alvarez, Nagler, and Willette 2000; Eulau and Lewis-Beck 1985; Fiorina 1978; Gomez and Wilson 2001; Lewis-Beck 1983, 1988; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). Voters punish or reward incumbents on the basis of perceived gains or losses in either their personal or national material well-being.

Economic voting models, however, suffer from a so-called “instability dilemma,” which indicates that the significance of economic conditions on individual candidate preferences varies from country to country and from election to election (Alvarez, Nagler, and Willette 2000; Anderson 2000; Fiorina 1978; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000;

Paldam 1991). Findings on the effects of economic conditions differ depending on the level of analysis (vote share vs. individual vote choice) and kinds of economic indicators (e.g., inflation, unemployment, income, or individual perceptions of national/personal economic conditions). Scholars also disagree on whether voters react to past events more than to future ones, or vice versa.

Lewis-Beck (1988) and Powell and Whitten (1993) explain variations in economic voting by taking account of political institutional variables, which affect “clarity of responsibility” (e.g., coalition complexity) and “incumbent alternatives for dissent” (e.g., a viable opposition party). One of their findings is that the more political parties are in a coalition government, the weaker the economic voting will be. Political institutional factors, however, do not explain election-to-election and individual-to-individual variations of economic voting within a country. Furthermore, the institutional explanations overlook how important economic issues are at the time of elections in individual countries. They instead assume that economic concerns are always important valence issues to most individuals in most places and most elections. Lin (1999), however, criticizes ahistorical studies of economic voting in the U.S. Using a time-varying parameter regression model, he takes historical contexts into account in the economic voting model and finds that the effects of economic events on American elections have changed over time as the society gradually moved from a pre-industrial to an industrial stage. In other words, contrary to the conventional wisdom that economic conditions are one of the strongest predictors of individual voting behavior in most places

and times, it is hard to generalize the effect of economic conditions, even in the United States.

The instability of economic voting in Western countries provides little sense of how this approach might apply to electoral choices in new democracies. Most economic voting studies on nonwestern countries, on Latin America and Eastern Europe, in particular, examine the relationship between economic conditions and election outcomes only during economic crises (Remmer 1991; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Pacek 1994). That is, it is not only hard to generalize the effect of the economic conditions on election outcomes in nonwestern countries but also to compare the effect of economy in those countries with the effect of the economy in Western countries, which have more or less stable economies (Pacek and Radcliff 1995; Pacek 1994).

To sum up, the most common shortcoming of previous voting behavior models is that they do not offer a clear answer for *when* and *why* particular factors become important in determining individual vote choice in specific contexts. There are variations in the explanatory power of specific factors across elections and countries, and as well as among individuals, but voting behavior literature has not sufficiently explained the variations. It is within this context that the information-processing approach becomes useful. The integration of social and cognitive psychology into the study of political behavior makes significant contributions to understanding attitude formation, information-processing, and decision-making (Iyengar 1993). By focusing on how people receive, store, and retrieve political information, social and cognitive psychology can help answer why certain factors have different effects on electoral preferences across

countries and elections and, more importantly, among different individuals. The next section develops a psychological theory of vote choice that suggests that the availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness of attitudes about both economic conditions and group identity are necessary conditions for those attitudes to influence individual vote choice.

III. Information-Processing Approach of Individual Vote Choice: Identity Politics and Economic Conditions

In this section, I argue that there are at least three mechanisms that account for the variations of the effects of economic conditions and group identities on individual vote choice: availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness. Availability is whether or not some particular knowledge of an issue exists in memory and whether people have formed an opinion about that issue (Aldrich et al. 1989; Campbell et al. 1960; Higgins 1989; Higgins and King 1981). Accessibility is defined as the readiness of stored knowledge or attitudes to be retrieved from memory (Aldrich et al. 1989; Higgins 1989). Distinctiveness refers to the extent to which the candidates differentiate themselves from each other in terms of their attitudes toward a particular issue. While the information-processing approach focuses on attitude availability and accessibility, I suggest that economic concerns and group identity have a greater impact on individual vote choice when attitudes toward these objects clearly differentiate the candidates.

Since the publication of *The American Voter* (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960), the social-psychological model of vote choice has contributed to providing

various predictors of electoral choices, such as party identification, ideology, evaluation of incumbent performance, as well as attitudes about particular issues, candidates' personalities, etc. Realizing that voters are far from having complete and perfect information to make well-informed political decisions, social-psychology literature has focused on heuristics or schemas that voters rely on to decide candidate preferences. Social psychologists maintain that people who are not well informed about politics can nonetheless make reasoned choices by using heuristics or judgmental shortcuts (Miller and Malenchuk 1986; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Popkin 1991). This idea goes back to Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) "cognitive heuristics," which posits that low levels of sophistication do not mean low levels of rationality, since there are many alternatives to factual information (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991).

Popkin (1991) provides a comprehensive explanation of how less informed people can make reasoned political decisions. He argues that people learn from their own experiences of daily life, the media, and political campaigns. Even when people have no information at all about a candidate or issue, there is no lack of cues. People rely on the opinion of friends, family, and opinion leaders. He also points out the importance of party identification. Miller and Malenchuk (1986), as well as Popkin (1991), also emphasize candidate schemas. They argue that personality characteristics, such as competence, integrity, and reliability, enable people to make inferences about a candidate's expected performance and internal dispositions. They claim that voting based on personal characteristics is not irrational or superficial but is related to candidates' issue positions and future performances and may be even more stable than voting based on parties or

issues. In short, the study of heuristics suggests that varied categories of variables help voters to make political decisions. Nonetheless, this body of literature has paid little attention to when and how a specific category of variables influences individual vote choice.

Rather than focusing on the general impact of attitudes on behavior, information-processing researchers started to investigate under *what conditions* (or *when*) and *which* (or *how*) attitudes guide behavior (e.g., Bargh et al. 1986; Chaiken 1987; Fazio 1986; Fazio and Williams 1986; Fazio et al. 1982; Fazio, Herr, and Olney 1984; Fazio and Zanna 1981; Zanna and Fazio 1982).² Zanna and Fazio (1982) refer to the *When?* question—identifying variables that moderate the correlation between attitude and behavior—and the *How?* question—the process by which attitudes lead to decision-making and behavior.

Integrating these previous social-psychological model of voting behavior, my research involves both the *when* and the *how* questions, to take into account of both situational variables that mediate the relationship between attitudes and behavior and the processes by which attitudes guide decision-making, specifically vote choice. The crucial assumption of the process approach is that certain attitudes must first be available and then accessible from memory to influence perceptions, judgments, or behavior (Aldrich et al. 1989; Bargh 1988; Fazio and Williams 1986; Fackler and Lin 1995; Fiske and Taylor 1991; Lin 1999). The availability of an attitude is whether people are at least aware of the existence of an issue. The availability is also relevant to the “familiarity” of

² See a brief review by Cooper and Croyle (1984) for debates on the attitude-behavior relationship.

the issues (Campbell et al. 1960). Unawareness or unfamiliarity about economic issues will result in a null effect of economic conditions on election outcomes. Lin's studies on the effect of economic conditions and corruption on American elections, for example, show that American voters did not form attitudes about economic conditions and corruption during pre-industrial periods and the early 1900s and thus these factors did not determine election outcomes (Fackler and Lin 1995; Lin 1999). More information about the economy and corruption, on the other hand, brought economic voting and voting based on corruption. In short, to bear on candidate preferences, attitudes must be available. Without awareness, the accessibility of the issue is zero since there is nothing to retrieve from memory about the issue.

Once attitudes exist, the attitudes must be accessible in order to guide behavior (Fazio 1986; Higgins and King 1981). Accessibility is one of the most important factors in determining the strength of the connections between attitudes and later behaviors. Much of the literature on attitude accessibility measures attitude accessibility using a response time (e.g., Bargh et al. 1992; Fazio 1986; Fazio et al. 1982; Lavine et al. 1996). The more quickly an attitude is expressed, the more accessible it is. According to accessibility theory, the accessibility of an attitude is decided by the frequency and recency of activation, links to other attitudes, and the subjective importance of the attitude (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Higgins and King 1981; Krosnick 1989; Lodge et al. 1991). In other words, an attitude is more likely to influence individual vote choice when it is more recently or more frequently activated, more strongly related to other attitudes, and more important to voters.

In addition, I argue that the degrees of distinctiveness between the alternatives presented to a voter contribute to the explanation of how strongly attitudes affect behaviors. If voters cannot differentiate among the candidates in terms of the candidates' stance on an issue, that issue will not have much influence on electoral choice (Aldrich et al. 1989; Campbell et al. 1960; Key 1966; Page and Brody 1972; Pomper 1972). Candidates generally emphasize issues that could help them and deemphasize issues that might hurt them in elections (Petrocik 1996). If candidates think that taking a clear position on an issue might hurt their popularity, they avoid talking about it or they take the position that most voters already hold. Page and Brody (1972), for example, show that a salient issue, the Vietnam War, could not influence voting in the 1968 U.S. presidential election because both candidates, Richard Nixon and Hubert Humphrey, took ambiguous or similar positions on that issue. Accessible or salient issues at the time of election cannot affect individual electoral preferences unless candidates distinguish themselves from each other on those issues. In short, the determinants of voting behavior in a society are salient issues that allow the voter to clearly discriminate between parties or candidates (Aldrich et al. 1989; Hetherington 1996; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Page and Brody 1972; Petrocik 1996; Pomper 1972). The greater the accessibility of certain issues and the greater the perceived difference between candidates, the greater the influence will be of those issues on individual vote choice.

Therefore, at least three necessary preconditions—availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness—should be met for economic conditions and group identities to have a bearing on individual electoral decisions in Korea and Taiwan. First, these issues must be

available in individuals' memory. Attitude availability of economic conditions or identity issues consists of cognitive and evaluative components in that individuals should have an opinion about the issues and be aware of political relevance of them (Campbell et al. 1960). The political relevance component is related to attribution of responsibility, which assumes that economic conditions influence electoral decisions only to the extent that voters attribute responsibility for conditions to governmental actions (Anderson 2000; Feldman 1982; Fiske and Taylor 1991; Hibbing and Alford 1981; Iyengar 1991; Lau and Sears 1981; Powell 2000; Powell and Whitten 1993). If the electorate does not associate good or bad economic conditions with incumbent candidates or parties, attitudes about economic conditions are not available and thus do not affect individual vote choice. Group identities are available when people are aware of group differences and recognize that a party or a candidate represents a particular group.

The availability of opinions about economic conditions and group identity alone does not guarantee that these issues will have a substantial impact on individual vote choice. The second condition is that the opinion must be accessible, or ready to be retrieved. Accessibility is related to the subjective significance of issues since important issues are more likely to be activated, to be relevant to other important values, and to create intense opinions (Aldrich et al. 1989; Campbell et al. 1960; Higgins and King 1981; Krosnick 1986, 1989). That is, for economic conditions and identity issues to be more accessible, they must bear more importance than other issues for individual voters in Korea and Taiwan.

Third, the distinctiveness of candidates in terms of economic performance and group representativeness is equally important. If voters cannot distinguish among candidates in terms of an issue, that issue cannot influence electoral choice (Aldrich et al. 1989; Campbell et al. 1960; Key 1966; Page and Brody 1972; Pomper 1972). The distinctiveness of voter's choices may not be as important as the other two conditions for voting based on evaluations of incumbent economic performance. Economic voting, retrospective voting in particular, is about rewarding or punishing incumbents according to their economic performance. In other words, voters have little to compare between but instead decide whether to accept or reject the status quo (Fiorina 1981).

Under certain circumstances, however, voters are reluctant to replace incumbents when they have experienced short-term economic recession under the current administration. Voters might not withdraw support for an incumbent when the risk related to voting for the opposition may offset the pay-offs associated with punishing the incumbent (Aldrich and Magaloni 2006; Duch 2001; Magaloni 1999; Przeworski 1991). This is particularly true in countries in which opposition parties have little record to show their capability of handling the economy. In a one-party dominant system, for example, no party but the incumbent has held power. Thus, opposition parties have never been tested as a governing party. Korea and Taiwan were once one-party dominant systems. In both countries, voters knew little about opposition parties, while they had considerable information about the incumbent party. A large information asymmetry between the ruling and opposition parties may prevent voters from voting based on the incumbent's

economic performance by increasing the risk of voting for an opposition party (Aldrich and Magaloni 2006; Magaloni 1999).

For economic conditions to have substantial effects on individual vote choice, therefore, it is necessary for voters to experience the alternation of power between parties. By the same token, for identity-based voting, parties have to identify themselves with particular groups and show that they put their promises to particular groups into policy or practice. As the sociological model explains, however, if the party system is a reflection of social divisions, it is not very difficult for voters to differentiate the parties or candidates. The latter case usually provides the stronger association between parties (or candidates) and groups. In either case, however, group identity has a greater effect on individual vote choice when parties (or candidates) more strongly identify themselves with particular groups. For economic conditions and social identity (regional identity in Korea and national identity in Taiwan) to influence individual vote choice, voters must at least be aware of the existence of these issues or be divided by them. Furthermore, they must consider such issues important, and political parties or candidates must clearly distinguish themselves from each other on these issues.

1. Source of Availability, Accessibility, and Distinctiveness: Social Identity

Without considering social and political contexts, however, we cannot ascertain why certain attitudes are available, accessible, and able to differentiate the candidates. Distinctive social characteristics shape the nature of a society's political competitions and thus affect the factors voters tend to weigh most heavily (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

Using Hays's (1975) "community-society" continuum, for instance, Lin (1999) argues that distinctive characteristics between community- and cosmopolitan-oriented societies bring about a variation in attitude availability. The political perspectives of voters living in a preindustrial society are different from those of voters situated in industrial society. Likewise, I contend that the availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness of attitudes are affected by the existence of divisive social cleavages. Particularly, vote fragmentation on the basis of social identity determines what attitudes are available, accessible, and distinctive in a society.

Social cleavages provide a source of conflicts among groups and voter alignments (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Manza and Brooks 1999). A cleavage refers to a division of social members into different subsets of individuals, groups and organizations among which conflict "*potentially*" exists (Choe 2003, p. 7; see also Rae and Taylor 1970; Flanagan 1973; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Lane and Ersson 1987; Moreno 1999). According to Lipset and Rokkan, contemporary political divisions reflect two historical revolutions: a national revolution and an industrial revolution. Ethnic, regional, and linguistic cleavages emerged out of the national revolution and class cleavages resulted from the industrial revolution.

My dissertation focuses on social divisions along ethno-cultural faultlines. Ethno-cultural cleavages are closely related to emotionally-charged individual identity (Hays 1975; Markus and Mackuen 1993; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Sears 1993; Sears et al. 1980). Thus, the main driving force of ethno-cultural cleavages is symbolic (Hays 1975; McCormick 1974; Lin 1999). Contrary to the self-interest assumption that individuals are

only motivated by immediate material and personal gains, symbolic politics suggests that people are deeply provoked by “remote and abstract political symbols” (Sears 1993, p. 113; see also Sears and Funk 1991; Young et al. 1987). I maintain, therefore, that in a society where ethno-cultural divisions dominate politics individual political orientations are shaped not by self-interest or personal material well-being but rather by emotional attachment to social identity and embedded social values.

The existence of social cleavages rooted in identity—regional identity in Korea and national identity in Taiwan—has influenced elite strategies and party formation, which in turn make attitudes toward social identity and economic conditions more or less available, accessible, and distinctive in both countries. After democratization, political elites in these two countries politicized social identity by building political parties based on region in Korea and national identity in Taiwan. In paying considerable attention to social identity, the so-called “priming” and “agenda-setting,” political elites created the issue that voters thought most about and the criteria by which voters evaluated government and political actors (Iyengar and Kinder 1985, 1987; Iyengar, Peter, and Kinder 1982; McCombs and Shaw 1972). Under this circumstance, attitudes about social identity are chronically available and accessible, while the availability and accessibility of attitudes toward economic conditions tend to be subject to the extent to which social identity is deemphasized and individuals view the difference between parties in terms of economic performance. In short, my study focuses on existing social divisions as sources of issue availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness rather than on election campaigns or individual differences.

2. Heterogeneity of the Electorate

Most behavior models have treated individual voters as homogeneous. Economic voting models are no exception, assuming that the population will respond to economic changes by rewarding the incumbent for good times and vice versa (Duch 2001; Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000; Gomez and Wilson 2001; 2006). Information-processing models, however, imply that the attitude availability and accessibility of economic concerns differ among individuals, as well as across nations. Some people attribute the responsibility for economic fluctuations to the government but others do not. Some people consider economic conditions important, while others give priority to other issues. Furthermore, some voters perceive differences between parties or candidates, while others do not. I posit that, even within a given population, individuals vary in attitude availability and accessibility regarding economic conditions and in the perception of party differences on economic performance because of different levels of political information and lifetime economic experience.

Cross-national variation of the effect of economic conditions raises the question of heterogeneous economic voting behavior (Gomez and Wilson 2006; Lewis-Beck 1983, 1988; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Powell and Whitten 1993). Scholars have paid particular attention to institutional differences to explain the variations across countries. Lewis-Beck (1988) argues that “diffusion of responsibility” and “incumbent alternatives for dissent” modify the effects of economic conditions. In other words, the number of political parties in the governing coalition affects how clearly voters can assign the responsibility for economic conditions. He concludes that more political parties in the

governing coalition leads to weaker economic voting. Powell and Whitten (1993) make a similar argument by stating that “the clarity of responsibility” mediates the linkage between economic conditions and voting behavior. In other words, the easier the attribution of responsibility, the stronger economic voting will be.

Even though institutional differences do not explain heterogeneous economic voting behavior among individuals, the logic of the clarity of responsibility can be applied to individual heterogeneity of economic voting behavior. Most notably, Duch (2001) and Gomez and Wilson (2001, 2006) argue that voters vary in their ability to clearly attribute the responsibility of economic changes to government. While some people acquire a large amount of information and can integrate various pieces of information into a belief system, some people acquire little information and cannot make sense of more complex or various kinds of information (Fiske, Kinder, and Larter 1983; Lau and Redlawsk 2001). Politically well-informed voters can easily link between governmental actions and national and personal economic conditions, while the attribution is much difficult for the less politically informed.

Some scholars argue that sociotropic voting based on evaluations of national economic conditions is stronger among the informed, while pocketbook voting based on evaluations of personal economic situations is more likely among the less informed (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Mutz 1992; Mutz and Mondak 1997). Gomez and Wilson (2001, 2006), however, challenge the conventional wisdom by making the case that pocketbook voting is more common among the informed than among the less informed. They contend that pocketbook voting requires more cognitive

process for voters to connect personal financial situations to government economic policy than sociotropic voting. A nation's prosperity can be easily attributed to government, while personal well-being cannot. I also suggest that sociotropic voting is more prevalent than pocketbook voting among the less-informed. I contend, however, that the well-informed are involved both in sociotropic and pocketbook voting since they can assign the responsibility of both personal and national economic conditions to the government.

Furthermore, levels of political information are overlapped with other individual characteristics. According to Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), the overall pattern of information distribution overlaps in characteristics with the pattern of socioeconomic status. In general, they find that "men are more informed than women; whites are more informed than blacks; those with higher incomes are more informed than those with lower incomes; older citizens are more informed than younger ones" (pp. 156-7). Therefore, interactive relationships between information and economic conditions can be transferred to interaction effects between other demographic characteristics and economic evaluations.

I also expect that an individual's lifetime economic experience will mediate the effect of economic conditions on individual vote choice. Lifetime economic experience has a particular significance in Korea and Taiwan. The two countries experienced one-party dominance under the authoritarian regimes and even after democratization. The dominant parties did not lose their ruling party status until recent elections. People in the two countries experienced remarkable economic development under the dominant parties. It was hard for opposition parties to unseat the incumbent party with strong economic

records. Magaloni (1999), for example, attributes the persistent dominance of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico to its overall good economic performance. Even though Mexican voters suffered serious economic downturns in the 1980s, they did not respond to the economic fluctuation. In other words, individuals who enjoyed prosperity under a dominant party were less likely to punish the incumbent party even when they witnessed a short-term economic decline (Aldrich and Magaloni 2006; Magaloni 1999). This implies that not only long-term prosperity offset a short-term economic loss but also that voting for an untested opposition party seemed too risky to voters. The dominant party system also implies the lack of a viable opposition party. On the other hand, if voters do not witness much economic success under dominant party rule, they do not face heavy risks by voting for an opposition party. Therefore, voters in this situation are expected to be more involved in economic voting.

Information-processing models not only make important contributions to the understanding of attitude formation and decision-making, but also help explain the dynamics and stability of electoral behaviors by paying attention to the interaction between individual predispositions and contextual factors (Iyengar 1993; Taber 2003). My research shows that the distinctiveness of parties or candidates in terms of economic performance plays a significant role in explaining heterogeneous economic voting behavior across elections in both Korea and Taiwan. Meanwhile, identity-based voting tends to be persistent because preexisting social divisions based on identity are chronically available and accessible, as well as distinctive by providing a foundation for party formation and realignment in both countries. These case studies also demonstrate

that the experiences of political change and economic adversity have not strengthened economic voting by themselves, suggesting the limited generalizability of economic voting and the importance of socio-contextual factors such as regional and ethnic identity. Finally, my study suggests that individual differences in education and lifetime economic experience modified the effect of economic evaluations on individual vote choice.

IV. Hypotheses

1. Main Hypotheses:

- H1. Economic conditions have a greater chance to affect individual vote choice when they are more accessible to voters.
- H2. Group identity is more likely to influence individual vote choice when it is more accessible to voters.
- H3. Economic conditions have a better chance to influence individual vote choice when voters perceive differences between the candidates (or parties) in terms of economic performance.
- H4. Group identity has a greater impact on individual vote choice when voters clearly identify the candidates (or parties) with a particular group.

2. Heterogeneity Hypotheses:

- H5. Pocketbook evaluation is more likely to influence vote choice among the more educated, while sociotropic evaluation has a greater impact on vote choice among the less educated.
- H6. Sociotropic evaluation is less likely to affect vote choice among voters who witnessed economic prosperity under a dominant party.

Chapter 3. Democratization, Group Identity, and Economic Conditions in Korea and Taiwan

I. Introduction

Researchers have recognized that issue availability and accessibility play an important role in an individual voter's decision-making process and these two factors have helped to explain which individual campaign issues were important in each election (e.g., Abramson et al. 1994; Aldrich et al. 1989; Fazio 1986; Page 1978; Pomper 1989, 1993). While electoral contexts, such as campaigns and candidates, have been identified as sources of issue salience, voting behavior scholars have not paid much attention to preexisting social divisions that constrain issue development and salience by shaping individual political perspectives within a society.

In this chapter, I demonstrate how social cleavages caused by identity have shaped politics after democratization in both Korea and Taiwan and thus determine the attitude availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness of economic conditions and of group identity—regional identity in Korea and national identity in Taiwan—that affect individual vote choice. I pay particular attention to how social cleavages are transposed into the political landscape and influence elite strategies and party systems that have contributed to determining salient issues in the two countries. The first section of this chapter addresses the rise of regionalism in Korea along with the democratization of 1987 and the development of Korean political parties characterized by personalization and

regionalization, which not only led to volatile party systems but also maintained one-party dominance in Korea. The second section explores the prominence of national identity in Taiwanese politics after Taiwan's democratization in the late 1980s and the development of Taiwanese political parties characterized by one-party dominance.

II. Democratization, Regional Cleavage, Party System, and Economic Conditions in Korea

1. Democratization and Regionalism

Socioeconomic status, the relationship between church and state, and postmaterial issues, beyond region, ethnicity, and personality, tend to structure the party system in many advanced industrial democracies (Dalton 2002; Diamond 2001; Inglehart 1990, 1997; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In Korea, regionalism has been one of the most prominent issues since Korea achieved economic and political maturity. This section introduces various explanations for the prominence of Korean regionalism. More specifically, I examine how existing regional cleavages became a foundation for party building and realignment as mobilized by political elites into electoral politics in Korea.

There are three main explanations for the rise of regionalism in Korea after the democratization of 1987 (Cho 1997; Choi 1999, 2001). The first is the political-economic approach that posits that Korean regionalism grew out of regional discrepancies in economic and political power between the southeast region of Kyongsang and the southwest region of Cholla (Ahn and Jaung 1999; Cho 1993; Choe 2003; Choi 1993a,

1993b; Sohn 1996; Kang 2003). This explanation argues that under the Kyongsang-based presidents from Park Jung-hee to Kim Young-sam (1961 to 1998), people from Kyongsang had political and economic advantages over people from Cholla in both the political and economic domains. Thus, scholars define Korean regionalism as the reaction of the Cholla region to Kyongsang hegemony (Choe 2003; Hwang 1996).

The second explanation is based on rational choice theory. Cho (1996, 1997, 2000) best articulates this position in concluding that regional voting is a result of rational choice by voters, who believe they will get returns in allocation of economic and political resources for electing their hometown candidates (1996, 1997, 2000). Rather than treating Korean regionalism as an emotional and pre-modern phenomenon, Cho argues that if the power structure is organized around the discrepancy between regions, it is reasonable for voters from an excluded region to vote exclusively for their regional candidates.

The third explanation is political mobilization theory, which states that regionalism is mobilized by political parties and politicians who exercise their leadership over their regions (Ahn and Jaung 1999; Cho 1993; Choe 2003; Choi 1999). This approach maintains that Korean regionalism is politically constructed, rather than a result of intrinsic regional differences, which is the case of regionalism in most other countries (Choe 2003; Morriss 1996).

However, these approaches do not fully explain some of the following questions: Why did regionalism become salient only after 1987? Why have other regions, which are as disadvantaged as Cholla, not shown the same strong regionalism that Cholla has shown? Finally, what factors have caused Korean regionalism to shift from competition

among Cholla, Chungchong, Kyongbuk, and Kyongnam to competition between Cholla and the rest (Lee, G. 1998)? To fully explain the rise and nature of regionalism after democratization, one must take account of elite strategic mobilization of regionalism and group consciousness. Regionalism appeared earlier than the 1987 democratization and has grown over the years.³ Early regionalism, however, was different from regionalism after the 1987 democratization for several reasons. Early regionalism, for instance, was not associated with political parties but with individual candidates. Furthermore, it was momentary rather than enduring (Kim and Koh 1972; Lee, G. 1998). On the other hand, current regionalism has not only lasted over 15 years but has also played a critical role in party alignments in Korea.

After Chun Doo-Hwan's authoritarian regime allowed the formation of opposition parties in 1987 and agreed to have a democratic presidential election, political elites, in particular the "three Kims"—Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam, and Kim Jong-pil—mobilized dormant regional conflicts for several reasons. First, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam, as figures in the vanguard of Korean democratization, lost ground on the issue of anti- versus pro-democratization after democratization was achieved by the soldier-turned-politician, Roh Tae-woo. Second, when these two Kims broke from their party to separately run for the presidency in 1987, they could not separate themselves from each other in terms of their political careers and ability to govern. Third, as a divided country between Communist north and anti-Communist south, the South Korean government strictly implemented anti-Communist policies that ruled out any kind of

³ See Table AI-1 in Appendix I for parties' vote shares by region from 1952 to 2002.

progressive party and prevented labor unions from participating in politics. Fourth, Korea was a homogeneous society in terms of language, culture, and ethnicity (Cho 1996; Kim and Koh 1972; Morriss 1996). Finally, relatively little socio-economic inequality was created amid the rapid economic development of the country. All these factors hindered the development of new political issues and ideological differences among parties. Under the circumstances, political elites from different parts of Korea—Kim Dae-jung from Cholla, Kim Young-sam from Kyongsang, and Kim Jong-pil from Chungchong—strategically utilized regionalism to create political cleavages. More important, the split of the two Kims before the 1987 presidential election fragmented political parties, politicians, and citizens by region. Since this time, the power struggle between political leaders from Kyongsang and those from Cholla has made the two regions a battleground in every election since democratization (Choe 2003; Kang 2003; Sohn 1993).

Stronger regionalism in Cholla has been explained by strong group consciousness of the citizens of Cholla, which is defined as “a politicized awareness, or ideology, regarding the group’s relative positions in society, a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group’s interests” (Miller, Gurin, and Gurin 1978, p. 18; see also Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981). This strong group consciousness was constructed by their unique experience in the democratization process, as well as by their charismatic political leader, Kim Dae-jung. Striving for democratization during the transition from the dictator Park Jung-hee to the dictator Chun Doo-hwan, hundreds of college students and citizens in Kwangju, which was a central city in Cholla, were killed by government troops—the so-called Kwangju massacre of 1980 (Lee, C. 1981).

Kwangju and other adjacent towns in Cholla were totally isolated from other regions and from the press. With no help from outside, the citizens of Cholla had to unite to survive, becoming ‘a fate community’ sharing a common destiny (Choi 1999). The identity as Cholla citizens was strengthened by their political leader, Kim Dae-jung, the most prominent political figure who promoted Korea’s democratization. Arrested, tortured, and almost killed by the authoritarian regimes controlled by Kyongsang political and military elites during the 1970s and 1980s, Kim Dae-jung became a symbol of democratization and Cholla.

The grand party merger of 1990 between Roh Tae-woo’s ruling Democratic Justice Party and two opposition parties—Kim Young-sam’s Reunification Democratic Party and Kim Jong-pil’s New Democratic Republican Party—strengthened the group consciousness of Cholla people by leaving out Kim Dae-jung’s Cholla party, the Party for Peace and Democracy. The merger reinstated the perception that Kyongsang’s political and military elites tried to perpetuate their political power by eliminating any possibility of Cholla’s citizens gaining power (Choi 1999; Lee, C. 1981). The merger further divided Korea into “two nations”—the Cholla region and the rest—by leaving out the Cholla party (Lee, N. 1998; Sohn 1993).

In addition, Kyongsang political and military elites created a stereotype of Cholla citizens as rebellious and gang-like and Kim Dae-jung as a traitor supporting the North Korean communist regime. This negative image of people from Cholla and the region’s political leaders elicited hatred and hostility from people of other regions (Lee, N. 1998). Table 3-1 provides evidence of the enmity against people from Cholla. The study shows

that Cholla people were considered the least likable as a spouse or a business partner. Their likeability was even lower than that of people from North Korea. As a result of the political use of regional cleavage, Korean regionalism has divided into Cholla versus anti-Cholla. Because Korean regionalism is both closely related to group identity and emotionally charged, the real stake in Korean politics for most voters has been an emotionally symbolic one, involving political power rather than self-interest or personal material well-being (Kang 2003). The reinforcing feature of candidates and regions implies that the more charismatic the regional leaders or candidates, the stronger the pull of regionalism.

Table 3-1. Likeability of a Person from a Particular Region as a Spouse or a Business Partner

<i>Region</i>	<i>Observation</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>
Seoul and Kyunggi	1158	5.007	1.058
Kangwon	1149	4.899	1.088
Chungchong	1148	4.895	1.097
Kyongsang	1152	4.873	1.166
Cheju	1145	4.707	1.113
North Korea	1133	4.400	1.342
Cholla	1155	4.285	1.451

Source: The Institute for Korean Election Studies, the 15th Presidential Election Study, 1997

2. Kyongsang-Party Dominance and Personal Parties

Political parties play important roles in operating democracies by organizing competition, crystallizing interests, and forcing citizens to ally themselves to a particular interest (Aldrich 1985; Key 1966; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sniderman 2000; Wattenberg 1990). In other words, they institutionalize conflicts and advance stability in government. They also provide shortcuts or symbols that people can easily recognize (Wattenberg 1990; Zaller 1992).

Political parties in Korea, however, are quite different from those in consolidated democracies. Under the authoritarian regime prior to 1987, political parties in Korea were government apparatuses used to provide the government with legitimacy. In other words, even the opposition parties were formed and controlled by the government to rubber-stamp government actions. Since democratization in 1987, political parties have developed into electoral apparatus to help ensure their leaders' election. Political bosses not only formed and dissolved political parties but also built up and broke down coalitions for electoral purposes (Choe 2003; Kim and Koh 1972; Morriss 1996, 1998).⁴ As a result, political parties in Korea have been volatile and have not represented different ideologies or various issues.

In spite of its volatility, the Korean party system was once classified as a one-party dominant system until 1997. Even after the democratization of 1987, Korea did not experience a typical “founding” election in which power shifted from the previous authoritarian regime to a totally new democratic one. The ruling party candidate under

⁴ See Table AI-2 in Appendix I for changes in party system in Korea from 1948 to current.

the previous authoritarian regime won the first democratic presidential election. Each of the ruling parties—from the Liberal Party established by President Syngman Rhee in 1948 to the current Grand National Party (GNP)—has been based in the same region, the southeast of Kyongsang, and has experienced continuity in both ideology and personalities (Solinger 2001). Until the 1997 presidential election, the ruling parties had never lost control of the presidency or Congress.

The main opposition political leaders known as the “three Kims had dominated Korean politics during the last 30 years. The first two Kims fought together for democratization against the military and authoritarian regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan (Morris 1996). Kim Jong-pil was a member of the military coup led by General Park in 1961 and founded the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) under President Park’s regime to control the military and to monitor civilians. He also served as prime minister from 1971 to 1975. Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung cooperated to achieve democratization but could not reach an agreement on a single candidate for the 1987 presidential election, the first “true” democratic election since General Park’s coup in 1961. In order to run for the presidency, the two Kims split from the New Korean Democratic Party (NKDP), and formed their own parties: the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) led by Kim Young-sam; and the Peace and Democracy Party (PDP) by Kim Dae-jung. The split of the two Kims resulted in electoral defeat of the democratic forces against Roh Tae-woo, the ruling party presidential candidate and former military partner of President Chun. The result of the 1987 election also implied the incomplete departure from the previous authoritarian regime and a delay of democratic consolidation.

Even though Roh won the presidency, the governing party failed to get the majority in the Parliamentary election of 1988, which brought the first divided government in the history of Korean politics. The governing party regained its dominance through a merger of political parties. To overcome difficulties under the divided government, President Roh pushed a grand party merger in 1990, a coalition between Roh Tae-woo's ruling Democratic Justice Party and two opposition parties: Kim Young-sam's Reunification Democratic Party and Kim Jong-pil's New Democratic Republican Party. They formed a massive majority ruling party, the Democratic Liberal Party, controlling 217 of 299 seats in the legislature (Oh 1999). The grand alliance evoked criticism from the public since it was seen as an electoral strategy rather than a truly shared policy platform (Oh 1999; Park 1990; Kihl 1991). As a result, Kim Dae-jung's Party for Peace and Democracy, supported mainly by the Cholla region, was left as the only opposition party.

When Roh Tae-woo finished his term in 1992, Kim Young-sam became the candidate of the ruling party and won the 1992 presidential election in a contest against Kim Dae-jung. Kim Jong-pil left the party in 1995 to found his own party, the United Liberal Democrats (ULD). After a short retirement, Kim Dae-jung returned to politics and formed a new party, the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP). President Kim Young-sam also launched his own party, the New Korea Party (NKP), and tried to break himself from the former soldier-turned-president, Roh Tae-woo. Launching these new parties, however, did not indicate changes in key members or constituents but were rather a symbolic gesture for a fresh start. In short, the NKP inherited most of the personalities

and policies from dominant parties of the past, and was based on support from the Kyongsang region.

Even though the 1997 presidential election was a competition between the two Kims—Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil—and Lee Hoe-chang, it was like the previous competitions between the “three Kims” in 1992. The opposition parties—Kim Dae-jung’s Democratic Party (NCNP) and Kim Jong-pil’s Unification National Party (UND)—established an electoral alliance just before the election and agreed to nominate Kim Dae-jung as their presidential candidate. Kim Dae-jung promised he would nominate Kim Jong-pil as the prime minister if he won the election. Even though the two Kims were at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, their personal aspirations for power outweighed their ideological differences. Kim Young-sam could not run for the presidency again but his influence remained strong. To get the most votes from the Kyongsang region, Kim Young-sam’s home, Lee Hoe-chang, the presidential candidate of the NKP, needed Kim Young-sam’s support. However, Lee Hoe-chang relaunched his own party, now named the Grand National Party (GNP), to detach himself from the devastating economic failures under Kim Young-sam’s administration. As a result of both the economic crisis and the coalition among the opposition parties, the ruling GNP failed to gain the presidency and Kim Dae-jung became the first opposition leader to assume the presidency. The GNP, however, still held majority in Parliament.

Until the 2002 presidential election, the “three Kims” exercised a great influence on Korean politics. They formed and rebuilt parties and made and remade coalitions to realize their political goal of winning the presidency. As a consequence, voters faced

different parties every election and recognized individual candidates better than political parties. Parties did not mean much for Korean voters since these parties did not differentiate themselves from each other over issues and ideologies. Since the country's division into Communist north and anti-Communist south in 1948, the extreme leftists lost their footing in the south (Han 1969). In other words, most Korean parties have been positioned in the middle of the ideological spectrum. Ideological differences thus have not been meaningful enough for voters to decide their vote choice. Therefore, most votes in the elections between 1987 and 2002 were cast for the candidate rather than the party. Parties get their support through the popularity of their leader (Lee, G. and Lee, H. 2002). This is partly confirmed by the post-election surveys conducted by the Institute for Korean Election Studies (IKES) in 1992 and 1997 and by the Korean Social Science Data (KSDC) in 2002, which studied the factors that respondents considered when they chose their candidate. At least 44 percent of respondents in each election answered that candidates, including their personal characteristics and political career, were the factor they most considered in their vote choices.⁵

⁵ The meaning of candidates' characteristics is ambiguous. They could indicate personal qualities such as competence, integrity, and reliability, or personal characteristics and charisma such as health, age, wealth, and military experience (Lee, G. and Lee, H. 2002; Miller, Wattenberg, and Malenchuk 1986).

Table 3-2. Factors Respondents Considered For Their Vote Choice in 1992, 1997, and 2002 (%)

<i>Factor</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>2002</i>
Candidates	43.9%	72.8%	63.2%
Characteristics	43.9	49.1	56.7
Political ability or experience	N/A	23.7	6.5
Candidates' parties	13.6%	6.0%	8.5%
Policies/ Issue platforms	29.1	13.7	23.5
Candidates' hometowns	N/A	2.7	1.3
Other	13.4	4.8	3.5
<i>N</i>	<i>1195</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>1326</i>

Source: The data for the 1992 and 1997 results are from the Institute for Korean Election Studies: the 14th Presidential Election Study, 1993 and the 15th Presidential Election Study, 1997. The data for the 2002 results are from the Korean Social Science Data Center (KSDC).

To sum up, the political party system in Korea is characterized by personalization, which creates volatility in parties, as political leaders consider parties their personal property and form and dissolve them for their own convenience (Ahn and Jaung 1999; Lee, G. 1998; Lee, G. and Lee, H. 2002). Despite frequent changes of parties (usually only in name), most Korean voters recognized the connection between the “three Kims” and their respective parties. Electoral collaboration of political elites had also maintained the Kyongsang-party dominant system.

3. The Economy and Regional Identity

Until the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the Korean economy enjoyed remarkable prosperity. As one of Asia’s “Four Tigers,” which also includes Hong Kong, Singapore,

and Taiwan, Korea has adopted the growth- and export-oriented economic strategy and achieved rapid modernization and industrialization since the 1960s. Behind the substantial successes, however, existed tight controls of the government on the economy under the authoritarian regimes of Park and Chun.

After General Park took over the government by coup in 1961, he established the Economic Planning Board (EPB), which planned and implemented a program of rapid industrialization based on exports (Wolf 1962). The Board under the Park's regime launched four Five-Year Economic Development Plans between 1962 and 1981. The first two plans recorded 8.3 % and 11% of average economic growth, respectively, and the third economic plan (1972-1976) reached 16.5% economic growth by turning its interest to heavy and chemical industries and by investing in steel, machinery, shipbuilding, and electronics (Oh 1976). Even though the Korean economy shrank during the oil crisis of the 1970s, the state-led economic plans not only totally transformed Korea from an agricultural to industrial society but also brought 8.1% average economic growth. Succeeding Park, Chun Doo-hwan, the second soldier-turned-president, launched the fifth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan in 1981 to stabilize the economy after Park's assassination in 1979 (Suh 1982). The average economic growth at the time was 8.7%. Both authoritarian regimes employed hostile policies toward labor unions to keep workers' wages low and to stay internationally competitive.

Since the democratization of 1987, the government has focused on liberalization, recording 7.7% average economic growth in the 10 years before the Asian financial crisis of 1997. In 1998 Korea experienced the first negative economic growth in over 18 years

at -6.9 %. Korea recovered from the crisis very quickly, recording 9.5% economic growth in 1999 but growth fell to 3.8% in 2001.⁶ Even with the remarkable economic success, the relatively uneven distribution of economic wealth between the Kyongsang and Cholla provinces during the industrialization of the 1970s and 1980s strengthened the formation of regional identity. The state-led economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s was launched by the military dictators, who were from the Kyongsang province. These authoritarian regimes focused their industrialization projects on their own home province, while systematically marginalizing the Cholla province from economic development. This uneven economic development made the Kyongsang province highly industrialized and wealthy, while the other provinces remained largely agricultural and underdeveloped. The uneven distribution of economic wealth effectively fortified the feelings in Cholla of relative deprivation, which in turn reinforced the cleavage of regional identity.

The significance of regional divisions in Korean society and politics demonstrates that individual political perspectives have been shaped by regional predispositions, which function as an information filter, and thus attitudes toward regional identity are more available, accessible, and distinctive than any other attitudes. Furthermore, the presence of regional political elites and parties make regional identity more accessible and distinctive. Additionally, the one-party dominant system that existed until 1997 and the government-led economic policies made economic conditions available because of easy attribution of responsibility for economic conditions. However, uneven distribution of wealth perceived by the Cholla people contributed to strengthening conflicts between

⁶ Statistics for the annual economic growth are found at the Bank of Korea (<http://www.ecos.bok.or.kr>). See Figure AII-1 in Appendix II for the annual economic growth rate in Korea from 1953 to 2005.

Cholla and Kyongsang, which resulted in the stronger salience of regional identity. Furthermore, one-party dominance undermined the distinctiveness of parties in terms of economic performance. No opposition party had governed Korea until 1997. Voters did not have any information or certainty about the capability of opposition parties in handling the economy. That is, economic conditions were better able to differentiate parties or candidates after the first alternation of power in 1997. Moreover, the Asian financial crisis and generational changes might make economic conditions more accessible.

III. Democratization, National Identity, Party System, and Economic Conditions in Taiwan

1. Democratization and National Identity

Similar to the increasing importance of social cleavages in Korean politics, social divisions, in this case caused by national identity, have been more salient since Taiwan achieved economic maturity and democratization. In this section, I explore how preexisting ethnic cleavages have constrained political competition in Taiwan in ways that have mobilized national identity and influenced elite strategies and party systems.

The ethnic cleavage between Chinese mainlanders—those who came to Taiwan after 1949—and native Taiwanese—those who immigrated to Taiwan before 1949—has been the major division within Taiwanese society due to the disparity of political power between these two groups. After being defeated by the Chinese communists in the

Chinese civil war between 1945 and 1949, the Kuomintang Party (KMT) led by Chiang Kai-shek moved to Taiwan and created a party-state dominated by mainland elites. The KMT excluded native Taiwanese elites and employed suppressive policies against antigovernment activists (Hsiao and Cheng 1999; Lin, Chu, and Hinich 1996; Tien 1996a; Chu and Lin 1996). The brutal suppression of the Taiwanese activists was illustrated in the February 28, 1947 Incident, which killed thousands of native Taiwanese and heightened the division between mainlanders and native Taiwanese (Dickson 1996; Tien 1996a; Ho and Liu 2001; Wang and Liu 2004).

Democratization in Taiwan brought not only a legitimacy crisis for the KMT regime but also a crisis of national identity for the people of Taiwan (Chu 2004, 2001; Chu and Lin 1996). Democratization in Taiwan was directly related to Taiwan's nation-building. During authoritarian rule, the KMT suppressed Taiwanese consciousness and imposed the "One China" principle to legitimize its regime, but democratization opened up space for the discussion over Taiwanese identity (Chu 2004; Chu and Lin 1996; Wang and Liu 2004; Wu 2004). With the democratization of Taiwan, the identity of Taiwanese as a political form of ethnic identity was translated into political cleavages, especially after the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the first opposition party established in 1986, proclaimed itself as the Taiwanese party and set the goal of self-determination (Alagappa 2001; Chu and Lin 1996). While ethnicity indicates a person's origin, national identity in Taiwan is associated with whether individuals identify themselves with Taiwanese or Chinese. National identity is not innate but is socially and politically

constructed, which means it is subject to manipulation through elite strategies used to win political power (Chu 2004; Dittmer 2004, Wu 2004).

The DPP linked democratic reform to the intertwined issues of national identity, Taiwan's statehood, and the redistribution of power from the mainland elites to native Taiwanese (Chu 2001, 2004; Chu and Diamond 1999; Chu and Lin 1996; Lin, Chu, and Hinich 1996). The DPP mobilized national identity for similar reasons Korean opposition parties exploited regional identity. First, unlike in many Latin American and Eastern European countries, democratization in Taiwan was triggered by a top-down pro-democracy reform initiated by Chiang Ching-kuo and his successor Lee Teng-hui (Rigger 2004a). KMT leaders gradually achieved political liberalization. Therefore, even though several important bottom-up movements existed, the opposition party could not use the pro- versus anti-democratization cards to mobilize votes. Second, continuous economic prosperity through land reform in the 1950s and export-oriented industrialization of the 1960s decreased the disparity of income distribution, which removed the possibility for the opposition party to exploit conflict over the distribution of wealth (Hsiao and Cheng 1999; Chu and Lin 1996; Lin, Chu, and Hinich 1996). Third, prominent social issues that could cut across the broad support of the KMT did not exist. Social welfare expansion, the so-called Welfare State platform introduced by the DPP in the early 1990s, was co-opted by the KMT, which brought in a universal health insurance plan in 1995 and a national pension plan in 2000 (Chu and Diamond 1999; Diamond 2001). In short, exploiting social divisions by national identity was a strategic choice undertaken by the DPP to undermine the KMT's wide-ranging support across social classes and to unite the

opposition forces, or *tangwai* (Chu and Lin 1996; Dittmer 2004; Lin, Chu, and Hinich 1996; Schubert 2004).

2. From One-Party Dominance to a Competitive Party System

This section examines how conflicts over national identity have changed party systems in Taiwan from one-party dominant to competitive and how political elites and parties have exploited the issue to take electoral advantages. Although Taiwan was a democracy by 2000, the ruling KMT party had never lost control of the presidency or the parliament (the Legislative Yuan) at the national level. In other words, the former authoritarian party, which retreated to Taiwan after losing the battle with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the mainland in 1949, had been the only ruling party through repeated democratic elections until 2000 (Chu 2001; Chu and Diamond 1999; Diamond 2001). Organizational and clientelist ties with their key constituencies under authoritarian rule made it possible for the KMT to mobilize broad support. The KMT's ability to co-opt most democratic reform issues initiated by the opposition party and its indigenization (or Taiwanization), as well as persisting economic prosperity, contributed to continuous KMT dominance after democratization (Chu 2001; Chu and Diamond 1999; Dickson 1996; Tien 1996a).

However, democratization and the indigenization of the KMT through the power transition from a mainland elite to a native Taiwanese leadership did not occur without damaging the KMT's hegemonic status. Taiwan's transition to democracy launched a new era of party competition. The political reforms of the 1980s under Chiang Ching-

kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek, lifted martial law and the ban on political parties, allowing an opposition force called *Tangwai* (anti-KMT elites) to establish the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986 (Dickson 1996; Hsieh 1996; Clark 2001; Tien 1996a). The DPP opened up the discussion over the issue of Taiwanese identity by advocating Taiwanese identity and “One Taiwan.”

The indigenization of the KMT and conflicts over Taiwanese identity intertwined with the issue of Taiwan’s independence from China also contributed to a more competitive party system by creating internal strife within the KMT.⁷ Particularly, the issue of Taiwan’s independence has been the most important factor in party formation and realignment in Taiwan after democratization (Cheng and Hsu 1996; Ho and Liu 2001; Hsiao and Cheng 1999; Schubert 2004). The KMT underwent several intraparty splits after Lee Teng-hui, who is a native Taiwanese, succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988. Lee Teng-hui’s success in the power struggle and in the further indigenization of the party isolated a group of mainlanders within the KMT (Tien 1995, 1996a). The disenchanted KMT leaders led by Chao Shao-kang defected to launch the New Party (NP) in 1993. The NP mobilized mainlanders who were suspicious of Lee’s commitment to the unification with China, as well as younger middle-class voters (Clark 2001; Hsieh 1996; Lin, Chu, and Hinich 1996; Tien 1996b, 1995). The formation of the NP signaled changes in the party system by undermining the KMT’s dominance and enhancing the DPP’s chance to seize power (Cheng and Hsu 1996). The KMT started to lose its

⁷ See Table AI-3 in Appendix I for changes in party system from 1949 to 2004.

dominance in the Legislative Yuan election of 1995, getting 46.1% of the vote share, while the NP became a significant third party (Cheng and Hsu 1996; Clark 2001).⁸

After the 2000 presidential election, there was another intraparty split within the KMT. James Soong, who was the Governor of Taiwan Province, established the People First Party (PFP) after losing the 2000 presidential election to the DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian. Soong opposed Lee's policies over constitutional reform, and the removal of the Governorship of Taiwan province in particular, which the NP perceived as a further separation from China (Diamond 2001). Soong ran for the 2000 presidential election as an independent candidate after losing the KMT presidential nomination to Lien Chan. Another disruption in the party system occurred when Lee Teng-hui formed the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) in 2001. Lee Teng-hui came back to politics after a brief retirement because of his dissatisfaction with the KMT's policy over Taiwan's independence. After Lien Chan assumed the leadership of the KMT from Lee, he tried to distance his policy on independence from Lee's by emphasizing unification with China (Schubert 2004; Wu 2002). That is, newly formed parties, such as the PFP and the TSU also joined national identity conflicts. If we place each party on the independence-unification continuum, the NP has taken the most pro-unification stance, followed by the KMT and the DPP (Hsiao and Cheng 1999; Hsieh 1996). The TSU has taken the most pro-independence stance.

The party system in Taiwan seemed to move toward a multiparty system after democratization, but the parties were actually divided into two camps based on their

⁸ See Table AI-4 in Appendix I for vote shares by party in Legislative Yuan elections from 1992 to 2004.

views on Taiwan's future as part of China. In the 2004 presidential election, electoral coalitions among parties showed the possibility of two-party system: the pan-green—a coalition of KMT and PFP—and the pan-blue—a coalition of DPP and TSU, advocated pro-unification and pro-independence, respectively. In short, enduring social divisions over national identity, as well as potential military threats from China, shaped political competitions in Taiwan by influencing concerns of voters and political parties.

3. Democratization and Economic Conditions

As a one party-state, the KMT played a crucial role in Taiwan's economic development during their authoritarian rule and even after democratization. Like Korea, Taiwan, as one of Asia's "Four Tigers," followed a strategy of growth and export-oriented industrialization, which achieved fast and constant economic growth recognized as a "miracle" by the world (Hsiao and Cheng 1999). KMT's industrialization of Taiwan can be divided into four stages: (1) a focus in the 1950s on economic rehabilitation through the import substitution increasing agricultural and industrial production; (2) an emphasis during the 1960s on export-oriented industrialization by developing labor-intensive industries; (3) a continued emphasis during the 1970s on export-oriented industries but an increased attention to electrical machinery and the computer industry; and (4) a focus during the 1980s to 1990s on economic liberalization and globalization (Hsiao and Cheng 1999; Maguire 1998). Through state-led economic policies, Taiwan experienced rapid and unprecedented economic growth, recording average growth rate of 9.03 from 1952 to 1979. The economic growth rate slowed down from 10.31 in the 1970s

to 8.17 in the 1980s and to 6.51 in the 1990s.⁹ However, even the low growth rates were quite high for a country achieving industrial maturity since the tendency to slow down and stabilize is not unusual for advanced economies (Chen 2001; Diamond 2001). Furthermore, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 did not have much impact on Taiwan's economy in comparison with neighboring countries such as Korea (Cheng and Liao 1998; Diamond 2001).

With the first handover of power in the executive branch in 2000, however, Taiwan's economic fortunes declined rapidly. After the DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian won the 2000 presidential election to become the first president from an opposition party, Taiwan experienced unprecedented negative economic growth of -2.18 in 2001. Chen Shui-bian not only had little experience in handling the economy but also a poor understanding of the Taiwanese economy (Chu 2001; Wu 2001). While the KMT's economic policies had focused on the high-tech industry, which had been the cornerstone of Taiwan's economic growth since the 1970s, the new government turned its attention and support to the agricultural industry (Chu 2001). Economic conditions did not improve in 2002 and 2003. Taiwan's stock market plummeted, unemployment soared, and exports dropped precipitously (Rigger 2003, 2004; Wu 2001, 2002).

As was the case in Korea, a pre-existing social cleavage has prevailed Taiwanese politics. The political and economic differences between native Taiwanese and mainlanders were transposed to conflicts over national identity, which operated as a perceptual screen imposing a constraint on other attitudes. More importantly, parties have

⁹ See Figure AII-2 in Appendix II for the annual economic growth rate in Taiwan from 1951-2006.

formed on the basis of their positions on national identity, either “One China” or “One Taiwan,” making the national identity issue accessible and distinctive. The one-party dominant system until 2000 also made parties less distinctive in terms of economic performance, since opposition parties did not have any record to show their ability to handle the economy. That is, economic conditions could better differentiate parties after the 2000 presidential election, when the opposition party candidate became the president for the first time.

Chapter 4. How Do Korean Voters Decide?

I. Introduction

Information-processing models suggest that attitudes must be available and accessible in order to influence individual behavior. Under these models, the accessibility of attitudes is the key mediating factor determining the connection between attitudes and behavior. The more accessible an attitude is the more likely it is to affect individual vote choice among available attitudes. I emphasize, however, that candidates must be distinctive in terms of an issue for an attitude about the issue to bear on individual vote choice. Furthermore, previous information-processing approaches have focused on differences between individual voters and campaigns as sources of attitude availability and accessibility. In this chapter, I pay attention to the existence of ethno-cultural cleavages, regional identity in particular, in Korea. I argue that when social conflicts over personal or social identity dominate politics, individual political attitudes are shaped by emotional attachment to identity rather than personal/national material interest. Accounting for the distinctiveness of candidates and social cleavages, this chapter provides a better understanding of how Korean voters make their political decisions and when economic conditions and regional identity become important in specific elections. This chapter addresses two main questions through an examination of three Korean presidential elections (1992, 1997, and 2002): How are economic voting and regional

identity-based voting relevant to individual vote choice in Korea? And, under what conditions do economic evaluations or identity issues matter more?

Before answering these questions, I first discuss the availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness of economic conditions and regional identity in Korea. Second, I provide research design, introducing variables and models specific to the Korean case. Third, using multinomial and binary probit regressions, I analyze the effect of economic evaluations and regional identity on Korean voters' preferences over candidates. Finally, I discuss the implications of how economic conditions and regional identity might affect future Korean elections as political and economic circumstances change.

II. Economic Conditions and Regional Identity: Evidence of the Availability, Accessibility, and Distinctiveness in Korean Elections

1. The Availability, Accessibility, and Distinctiveness of Economic Conditions

For economic conditions to play a key role in individual electoral decisions, they have to be both highly available and accessible. Furthermore, candidates must show clear differences in their ability to handle the economy. An attitude, as an object-evaluation association, is available when voters have an opinion about an issue and are aware of its political relevance (Campbell et al. 1960; Fazio et al. 1984). Therefore, the availability of economic conditions can be measured through the attribution of responsibility for economic conditions. The attribution of responsibility indicates whether voters form an opinion about economic conditions and then relate their evaluations to politics by

attributing credit or blame to incumbent parties or politicians. Unless voters attribute responsibility to the government for economic success or failure, voters cannot evaluate candidates in terms of economic conditions (Feldman 1982, 1985; Hibbing and Alford 1981; Kiewiet and Rivers 1984; Weatherford 1978).

A 1992 post-election survey in Korea asked the respondents: “Do you agree with the statement that the government cannot solve the poverty problem whatsoever?” A similar survey conducted after the 1997 election asked: “Which party do you think is responsible for the economic crisis of 1997?” Table 4-1 below indicates that more than half of the respondents in 1992 and 1997 thought that the government or political parties had a responsibility for poverty or economic crises. In 1992, 52 percent of the respondents answered that the government could solve or control poverty problems. Similarly, 58 percent of the respondents in 1997 attributed economic failure to one of the political parties in the legislature. These results imply that attitudes about economic conditions were available to many Korean voters.

Table 4-1. Attribution of Responsibility for Poverty and Economic Crisis in 1992 and 1997 (%)

<i>Poverty (1992)</i>		<i>Economic Crisis (1997)</i>	
Government responsibility	52.5%	Blame one of parties	58.2%
No government responsibility	47.5	It is hard to blame any party	41.8
<i>N</i>	1187	<i>N</i>	1195

Source: The Institute for Korean Election Studies, the 14th Presidential Election Study, 1993 and the 15th Presidential Election Study, 1997.

A high accessibility of attitudes toward economic conditions is another necessary condition for economic evaluations to affect individual electoral preferences. Accessibility refers to the readiness with which a stored attitude is utilized for political decisions (Higgins and King 1981). The accessibility of an attitude is subject to the frequency of activation, links to other attitudes, and subjective importance to individual voters (Aldrich et al. 1989; Fazio 1989; Higgins and King 1981; Krosnick 1988, 1989). To analyze the accessibility of economic conditions, I examine the responses to the question of the most important issue that the country faces, because the more important an attitude the more often it will be activated and linked to other attitudes (Krosnick 1989).

Table 4-2. The Most Important Issue that Korea Faces, 1992, 1997, and 2002 (%)

<i>Issue</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>2002</i>
Economy	46.3%	81.4%	70.4%
Inflation	35.3	39.0	34.0
Economic Growth	11.0	10.4	15.5
Employment	N/A	6.4	20.9
Economic Crisis	N/A	26	N/A
Political and Regional Integration	15.8	2.2	6.3
Corruption	14.4	4.5	5.1
Regime Change	12.4	2.4	1.5
National Security and Unification	3.7	1.5	1.5
Others	7.4	6.9	15.2
N	1191	1188	1486

Source: The Institute for Korean Election Studies, the 14th Presidential Election Study of 1992 and the 15th Presidential Election Study of 1997. The Korean Social Science Data Center, the 16th Presidential Election Study of 2002.

Table 4-2 shows that more than 46 percent of the respondents in a post-election survey of each presidential election thought that an economic issue, including inflation, economic growth, or employment, was the most important problem the country faced. Particularly, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 made economic issues more accessible. More than 80 percent of the respondent listed one of the economic issues as the most significant problem in 1997, including 26 percent of the respondents who answered that overcoming economic crisis was the most important problem. The results of the 2002 survey also indicate that people tended to be more concerned about the employment issue due to a decrease in job security after the economic crisis. While the importance of economic issues has been increasing, fewer and fewer people have reported one of the other issues, such as political and regional integration, corruption, or national security, as the most important problem. Tables 4-1 and 4-2 both suggest that attitudes toward economic conditions were not only available but also highly accessible to most Korean voters.

The distinctiveness of candidates and parties in terms of economic performance is the final and key factor in determining whether economic conditions will influence individual vote choice. In other words, economic issues must be translated into electoral competitions for personal and national economic evaluations to influence electoral choices. Thus, candidates or parties must not only discuss economic issues but also present different positions on these issues. Unlike other issues, however, economic performance issues require relatively little comparison between the ruling party and the opposition parties. Depending on their evaluations on personal and/or national economic

conditions during an administration, voters either reward or punish the ruling party (Eulau and Lewis-Beck 1985; Fiorina 1978; Lewis-Beck 1983, 1988). Strong economic voting, however, can exist only when opposition parties have been in power. Even though one-party dominance makes it easy for voters to attribute responsibility for economic conditions, as Magaloni (1999) argues, it also provides uncertainty or asymmetric information on long-time opposition parties. Due to the uncertainty of an alternative party's ability to handle economic problems, voters may not punish the governing party unless the cost of sustaining the status quo outweighs the payoff from changes. In other words, voters cannot distinguish parties on the basis of economic performance under a one-party dominant system and thus cannot easily vote against the incumbent for short-term economic downturns.

Korea experienced a one-party dominant system until 1997, witnessing no alternation of power between parties. Occurring in the middle of an economic crisis, the 1997 presidential election produced the first opposition party president. Therefore, Korean voters in the presidential election in 2002 had information they did not have in 1992 and 1997 about both parties' ability to handle the economy and could distinguish the parties on the basis of their economic performance. The distinctiveness of economic conditions has varied across elections. I expect to find no evidence of economic voting in 1992 and 1997, while I expect to see evidence of economic voting in 2002, when Korean voters were experienced both parties in power and had more information about the previous opposition party.


2. The Availability, Accessibility, and Distinctiveness of Regional Identity

The availability of regional identity is measured by whether voters are aware of group differences based on region. In other words, regional identity is available when voters have formed a group consciousness, which is a politicized awareness of a group's relative position in society. Group consciousness affects the individual's reaction to in-groups and out-groups (Conover 1988). Through an affective calculus of likes and dislikes toward groups, people attribute attitudes to groups and emphasize the difference between their own groups and other groups (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Conover 1988; Iyengar and McGwire 1993). Therefore, I measure the attitude availability of regional identity using a study of the likeability of people from different regions and individual experiences of discrimination as a member of particular region—Cholla, Kyongsang, or Other.

Figure 4-1 shows that people from the Cholla region were considered least likeable by people from other regions. The likeability of people from North Korea was even higher than the likeability of those from Cholla. The likeability difference between Cholla and each of other regions, including Kyongsang, is statistically significant. In addition, the 1997 and the 2000 post-election surveys asked whether the respondents experienced unequal treatment in job promotion and employment, monetary loss, humiliation, and isolation because of their home region. Citizens of Cholla reported being more likely to experience discrimination and isolation, as Table 4-3 indicates. Few people reported they had been unequally treated simply because of their home region. However, the mean differences between Cholla and other regions, as well as between Cholla and

Kyongsang, are statistically significant in both years, while the difference between Kyongsang and other regions is not statistically significant. These data show that people were aware of regional differences, especially between Cholla and the rest.

Figure 4-1. Likeability of People by Region (1 to 6)



Source: The Institute for Korean Election Studies, the 15th Presidential Election Study of 1997.

Table 4-3. Individual Experiences of Discrimination as a Particular Regional Member in 1997 and 2000 (1 to 5)

<i>Region</i>	<i>Mean (Std.) in 1997</i>	<i>Mean (Std.) in 2000</i>
Cholla	.933 (1.339)	.467 (1.050)
Kyongsang	.205 (.706)	.152 (.586)
Other Regions	.257 (.707)	.157 (.585)
N	1165	1100

Source: The Institute for Korean Election Studies, the 15th Presidential Election Study of 1997 and the Korean Social Science Data Center, the 16th Legislative Election Study of 2000.

The second necessary condition for regional identity to affect individual vote choice is accessibility. The more important regional identity issue is to voters, the more accessible the issue becomes. However, less than 3 percent of the respondents in both surveys of 1997 and 2002 admitted to having considered candidates' home regions when they decided their vote. Table 4-2 also shows that few people (16% in 1992, 2.2% in 1997, and 6.3% in 2002) reported that political and regional integration associated with regional identity was the most important problem that Korea faced between 1992 and 2002. Does this therefore mean that attitudes about regional identity are not accessible? Not necessarily. If we examine the history of election outcomes in Korea, it is clear that regions have been one of the most important determinants in all presidential elections from 1987 to 2002.¹⁰ Candidates from the parties based on the Cholla region gained absolute support from Cholla voters. More than 80 percent of Cholla voters voted for their regional party candidates. More than 60 percent of Kyongsang voters, meanwhile, cast their ballots for their regional party candidates.

The subjective importance of regional identity to voters is not the only measure of its accessibility. We can also examine how closely regional identity is linked to other attitudes. When regional identity is associated with many other attitudes, it is more frequently activated and thus more accessible. Table 4-4 indicates that regional identity for voters from Cholla and voters from Kyongsang, in particular, were meaningfully correlated with attitudes toward party identification, likeability of candidates, and issue positions. Candidates, parties, and issues tend to be intertwined, since assessments of

¹⁰ See Table AI-1 in Appendix I for presidential candidates' vote shares by region from 1987 to 2002.

candidates are usually influenced by the more enduring forces of parties and issues (Campbell et al. 1960; Miller, Wattenberg, and Malenchuk 1986). This seems to be more so in Korea than in other countries even though candidates have been more stable than parties or issues in Korea. Since democratization in 1987, regional political leaders have established their own parties based on their home regions. During election campaigns charismatic political leaders and parties have activated and reinforced regional identity.

Table 4-4. Pairwise Correlations between Regional Identity and Other Attitudes in 1992, 1997, and 2002

	<i>Cholla</i>			Kyongsang		
	1992	1997	2002	1992	1997	2002
Ruling-party orientation¹	-.30**	-.26**	.26**	.26**	.22**	.15**
Opposition-party orientation¹	.39**	.41**	-.16**	-.27**	-.30**	.12**
Likeability of ruling party candidate	-.45**	-.32**	N/A	.29**	.25**	N/A
Likeability of opposition party candidate 1	.54**	.58**	N/A	-.34**	-.36**	N/A
Likeability of opposition party candidate 2	-.05	-.20**	N/A	-.09**	.11**	N/A
Issues²	-.24**	.29**	.18**	.15**	-.22**	-.13**

Note: 1. Korean voters have been more likely to associate themselves with either the ruling parties or the opposition parties because of frequent changes in party names and coalitions.

2. Issues include the grand party merger of 1992, economic crisis of 1997, and unconditional aid to North Korea.

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

Finally, the distinctiveness of regional identity is clear in that parties were formed by regional leaders who mobilized regional support. The main parties have been based in the two rival regions of Cholla and Kyongsang. Regional identity is more distinctive

when candidates' home regions and parties' regional bases overlap, providing easier and stronger connections between the candidates and their regions. Table 4-5 shows whether a candidate's home region and the party's regional-base are the same in recent Korean elections. Two regional leaders, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam, ran for the presidency in 1992, representing their own regional parties, while only one regional leader, Kim Dae-jung, campaigned for election in 1997. None of regional favorite sons was on the ballot in the 2002 presidential election. These facts imply that regional identity provided more distinctiveness between the candidates in the 1992 and the 1997 elections than in the 2002 election.

Table 4-5. Presidential Candidates' Home Regions and Parties' Regional Bases in 1992, 1997, and 2002

<i>Year</i>	<i>Candidate</i>	<i>Home Regions</i>	<i>Party's Regional Base</i>
1992	Kim Young-sam	Kyongsang	Kyongsang
	Kim Dae-jung	Cholla	Cholla
	Chung Ju-yung	Kwangwon	No regional base
1997	Lee Hoe-chang	Hwanghae	Kyongsang
	Kim Dae-jung	Cholla	Cholla
	Rhee In-je	Chungcheong	No regional base
2002	Roh Moo-hyun	Kyongsang	Cholla
	Lee Hoe-chang	Hwanghae	Kyongsang

Note: Bold indicates a match between the candidate's home region and the party's regional base.

In short, attitudes about regional identity have been available, accessible, and distinctive across recent elections even though the candidates were less distinctive in terms of

regional identity in 2002 than in 1992 and 1997. The presence of charismatic regional leaders makes regional identity more accessible and distinctive. Therefore, I expect stronger regional voting in 1992 and 1997 than in 2002, as expressed in the following:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Economic Voting</i>	<i>Regional Identity Voting</i>
1992	No	Yes
1997	No	Yes
2002	Yes	Yes but weak

The remainder of this chapter examines whether economic conditions and regional identity influenced Korean voters' preferences through empirical analyses of Korean presidential elections. I begin with introducing the data, dependent and independent variables, models, and estimations. Second, I present either multinomial or binary probit regression results on the effects of both economic conditions and regional identity for each election. Finally, I discuss the significance and implications of economic and regional-identity voting for future elections in Korea.

III. Research Design: Data, Variables, and Models

The presidential elections of 1992, 1997, and 2002 provide the cases to analyze the effects of economic evaluations and regional identity on electoral preferences in Korea. The datasets are available in the Korean Social Science Data Center (KSDC).¹¹ For the vote choice models, the dependent variables are individual vote choices. Controlling variables and their measurements are discussed in the following section.

¹¹ <http://www.ksdc.re.kr>

1. Independent Variables and Measurements:

The variables considered in my models are sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations, lifetime economic experience, regional identity, party identification, candidate likeability, and particular issue positions. In addition to economic evaluations, I have also included any political or economic scandals in order to capture the unique characteristics of each election, as well as demographic factors. The variables of major interest are retrospective sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations by individual voters. Sociotropic evaluation refers to the individual perception of the national economic conditions, while pocketbook evaluation denotes individual perception of personal economic situations. Sociotropic evaluation is measured by how individuals evaluate changes in the national economy over the previous two years, while pocketbook evaluation is measured by how individuals perceive the changes in their personal or family financial situations over the previous two years. These two evaluations are measured on five-point scales, with 1 indicating “better-off” and 5 indicating “worse-off” than two years prior. Respondents who viewed national and/or personal economic conditions as being worse are expected to be more likely to vote for a challenger.

Lifetime economic experience is another economic variable to be considered. Along with short-term economic evaluations, life-time economic experiences shape voters’ electoral preferences, especially in one-party dominant countries (Aldrich and Magaloni 2006; Magaloni 1999). The Korean party system had been one-party dominant until the election of 1997, when Korean voters first experienced an opposition party’s coming to power. Due to this circumstance, opposition parties did not have any record of

accomplishment to show their ability to govern or handle the economy, which caused voters to be uncertain about their potential performance (Aldrich and Magaloni 2006; Magaloni 1999). People who had experienced good economic fortune with the dominant party in power, moreover, were not likely to vote for opposition parties, even when the economy had been poor recently. Unless they had confidence in an opposition party and experienced an economy poor enough to offset previous positive economic experiences, they would continue to vote for the incumbent party. Therefore, the better economy a respondent experienced while the dominant party was in power, the less likely he or she would be to vote for a challenger in spite of recent poor economic performance. To measure long-term economic experiences with the dominant party, I use the GDP growth from 1954 onward, published online by the Bank of Korea.¹² Following the formula used by Aldrich and Magaloni (2006), I compute the average economic growth experienced by each individual from age 10, year by year, weighting these economic experiences so that early years, when individual attitudes about politics develop, are more heavily weighted.¹³ I assume that respondents who were born before 1944 have the same lifetime economic experience.

Regional identity is another major variable of interest that helps explain individual vote choice in Korea. Most societies have social cleavages that divide members into different groups and organizations among which potential conflict exists (Choe 2003). Some, but not all, social cleavages are exploited by political parties, which

¹² www.ecos.bok.or.kr (accessed September 10, 2006).

¹³ $\sum_{t=1}^T growth_t \times 0.9^{t-1} / \sum_{t=1}^T 0.9^{t-1}$, where t=1 is GDP growth at age 10.

translate cleavages into political competition and bring about actual conflict between different groups within the society. Political elites most often decide which cleavages become political (Andersen and Heath 2003; Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Under circumstances in which few secondary organizations exist, political elites can play a major role in defining the issue of party support (Chhibber and Torcal 1997). Korean political elites mobilized regional conflicts, in particular between Cholla and Kyongsang, after democratization. For the purpose of my research, therefore, I categorize respondents into three groups: those from Kyongsang, those from Cholla, and those from all other regions.

Party identification (PID) in Korea is slightly different from PID in the United States. PID in Korea is a psychological attachment to either the government party or opposition parties, but not an attachment to any specific party.¹⁴ Due to the volatility of political parties, Korean voters do not develop stable party identification.¹⁵ What has been persistent is the division between government-party and opposition-party orientations. Until the regime change of 1997, the government-party orientation was dominated by issues emphasizing stability, economic growth, and national security, while the opposition-party orientation endeavored to improve democracy, human rights, and social justice (Choe 2003; Kang, W. 1998). To analyze Korean elections, therefore, I substitute government-party and opposition-party orientation for party identification. They are coded as three different dummy variables: government-party orientation,

¹⁴ Jung-bin Cho (1993) argues that government-party and opposition-party orientation is closer to belief system or ideological orientation than to party identification.

¹⁵ See Table AI-2 in Appendix I for Korean party changes.

opposition-party orientation, and neither. Respondents who identify with one of the three variables are marked as 1, otherwise they are marked as 0.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, personalization is one characteristic of Korean politics. In other words, the likeability of individual candidates plays an important role in Korean elections (Choi and Lee 1980; Cho 1996; Lee and Lee 2002). The importance of candidate likeability results from the volatile party system and the role of political leaders in the changing party system. Voters have faced different parties in almost every presidential election, but they have known which party belonged to which leader. That is, it is much easier for Korean voters to recognize candidates than political parties. Candidate likeability is measured by the differences between the incumbent party's candidate likeability and each opposition party's candidate likeability in 1992. Since it is impossible to calculate likeability differences between candidates from the 1997 survey data, I use dummy variables to measure candidate likeability: 1 for respondents who liked a certain candidate most and 0 otherwise.

While political parties and candidates in Korea have not usually advocated policy alternatives, some issues have provoked strong emotions and intense debates. One of the main issues has been Korean reunification and the relationship with North Korea, which has had an impact on Korean politics since the 1950s. The issue was particularly important during election periods when the government party took advantage of threats from North Korea, the so-called "northern wind involving guns,"¹⁶ to mobilize anti-

¹⁶ North Korea threatened to attack South Korea by bringing about small gun fights at the time of elections. The authoritarian regimes and ruling parties used to take advantage of threats from North Korea for their elections, persuading voters to rally around the flag.

communist fears (Park 1999, p.139). I placed respondents' positions on unification into three categories: unification by taking over North Korea, unification on the initiative of South Korea, and unification on an equal footing. Each category is coded as a dummy variable. Unfortunately, the 1997 and the 2002 data did not ask respondents about their positions on unification. I replace respondents' unification issue positions with their ideological orientations as a proxy in 1997 and 2002.

In my analysis, I also consider political scandals or other important events in order to capture idiosyncratic and short-term forces in each election. The 1992 presidential election was held just after the three-party merger of 1990, which was a coalition between Roh Tae-woo's ruling Democratic Justice Party and two opposition parties—Kim Young-sam's Reunification Democratic Party and Kim Jong-pil's New Democratic Republican Party. These parties formed a massive majority ruling party, the Democratic Liberal Party. The merger evoked criticism from the public, especially citizens in Cholla, due to the exclusion of Kim Dae-jung's Cholla-based Party for Peace and Democracy. As a result, the merger further divided the country into Cholla versus other regions. Each respondent's opinion about the three-party merger is measured by a five-point scale from strongly disapprove to strongly approve. For the 1997 election, I account for the Asian financial crisis, one of the top issues of the time. More than 26 percent of respondents picked overcoming the economic crisis as the most important problem the nation faced. Economic crisis is coded 1 for respondents who blamed the incumbent party for the crisis and 0 otherwise. Unlike previous elections, there were several important political events related to national security issues during the 2002

election. One was the death of two middle-school girls, killed in December 2002 by American soldiers stationed in Korea during their military training. This incident aroused anti-American feeling and renewed the demand for reform of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and a pullout of American troops from South Korea. Each respondent's opinion about SOFA reform is measured by a five-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. In addition, I include respondents' opinion about two other issues—aid to North Korea and abolishment of national security laws—that were hotly debated during the election. These are measured by using the same method as the opinion about the SOFA reform.

The final variable group captures demographic characteristics of respondents, specifically age, level of education, and family income. Age is measured by a respondent's actual age. Level of education is categorized into four groups: elementary school or less, middle school completed, high school completed, and college or more. Family income is measured by a nine-point scale from \$700 to more than \$4000 per month.

2. Models

In many situations the dependent variable in a regression equation is not continuous but a discrete choice, such as vote choice in elections. Models involving dependent variables of this kind are called “discrete choice models” or “categorical models.” These models are typically based on the principle of utility maximization leading to the choice of A over B if the utility A exceeds that of B. When the dependent

variable involves binary or dichotomous choices, one of the two nonlinear models—logit and probit—are commonly used. The multinomial logit (MNL) or probit (MNP) models are used for more than two unordered nominal dependent variables.

I use the MNP model to analyze the 1992 and 1997 presidential election, which had more than two candidates, while I use the probit model for the 2002 presidential election, which had only two candidates. The logit and probit models are quite similar, apart from the difference between the logistic distribution and the normal distribution, which means that the logit and probit estimates are similar. The MNP and MNL models, however, substantially differ in one important assumption. The MNL model assumes Independence of Irrelevant Alternative (IIA), that the probability to choose one candidate over the other does not change because of a third-party candidate. In other words, the MNL model compares two candidates at a time, as the binomial logit model does, even though a third candidate exists (Alvarez and Nagler 1998). This seems to be an unreasonable assumption in elections involving multiple candidates. On the contrary, the MNP model allows for both individual-specific and alternative-specific variables and does not impose the IIA assumption, by admitting the possibility of non-independence among the choice dimensions (Alvarez and Nagler 1998). As a result, the MNP estimates provide more consistent and efficient estimates than the MNL estimates for elections with more than two candidates.

Like other discrete choice models, both the MNP and probit models assume that the probability of selecting a given choice is the probability that the utility for this choice exceeds the utility of all other alternatives. The coefficients for the incumbent party

candidate are normalized to zero. Therefore, a negative coefficient indicates a higher probability of voting for the incumbent party candidate in each column, while a positive sign indicates a higher probability of choosing the opposition party candidate.

IV. Empirical Analyses

1. The 1992 Presidential Election

The 1992 Korean presidential election was mainly a competition between Kim Young-sam (hereinafter KYS) and Kim Dae-jung (hereinafter KDJ), who were former allies in the fight for democratization in Korea. KYS joined the three-party merger of 1990, which was called an “unholy alliance” since he compromised his political identity as a “pro-democracy fighter” for his electoral goal of the presidency (Oh 1999; Park 1990). KYS was then nominated as the ruling party candidate, while KDJ remained as the candidate of the main opposition party (the Party for Peace and Democracy, PPD). Businessman Chung Ju-yung (hereinafter CJY), the owner and founder of Hyundai, Korea’s largest conglomerate, or *chaebol*, challenged the “two Kims” on the grounds of his success in business and his relationship with North Korea in the private sector. KYS won the election by receiving 42 percent of the popular vote.¹⁷ He gathered most of his votes from his hometown province, Kyongsang, and from Kim Jong-pil’s (hereinafter KJP) stronghold, Chungchong, as a result of the three-party merger.

¹⁷ See Table AI-5 in Appendix I for the election result.

Table 4-6 presents the multinomial probit regression results of the 1992 Korean presidential election. Sociotropic evaluation, one of the primary interest variables, is statistically significant only in the equation of KDJ and KYS. Unlike the findings of much economic voting literature, however, the sign of sociotropic evaluation is negative. That is, voters who perceived that the national economy had worsened were more likely to vote for the incumbent than for the challenger. The direction of the sociotropic evaluation might be explained by the uncertainty of the opposition party or the ruling party's economic issue ownership. Under the dominant ruling party, Korean voters had never experienced a serious economic decline, which gave the ruling party a strong case for economic success. Since the first military president, Park Chung-hee, took over the government in 1961, the economy achieved consistent growth. The Korean economy recorded 5.95 percent average annual growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita between 1962 and 1982 (Bank of Korea 1995). When the second and the third soldiers-turned-presidents, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, took control of the government between 1981 and 1992, the economy kept thriving, marking 8 percent growth rate of GDP per capita. Thus, voters might have had both little desire for change and also a belief that the ruling party would be better at handling the economy than the opposition parties, which had no experience in governing. The coefficient of pocketbook evaluation in the competition between KDJ and KYS shows the expected direction but is not statistically significant. Neither sociotropic nor pocketbook evaluation affected individual vote choice between CJY and KYS.

Table 4-6. MNP Estimates for the 1992 Election

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Kim Dae-jung (KDJ)/ Kim Young-sam (KYS)</i>		<i>Chung Ju-yung (CJY)/ Kim Young-sam (KYS)</i>	
	M.L.E. (S.E.)	Δ	M.L.E. (S.E.)	Δ
<u>Economic Variables</u>				
Sociotropic	-.346(.129)**	-.070	-.039(.127)	
Pocketbook	.111(.143)		-.192(.165)	
Lifetime economic experience	.281(.157)		-.002(.151)	
<u>Regional Identity</u>				
Region 1(Cholla)	1.342(.344)**	.333	-2.037(1.284)	
Region 2 (Kyongsang)	-.665(.299)*	-.125	-.236(.259)	
<u>Control Variables</u>				
Incumbent partisanship	-.295(.298)		-.311(.297)	
Opposition partisanship	.665(.311)*	.127	.905(.416)*	.055
Likeability difference 1(a)	-1.146(.139)**	-.237	.242(.177)	
Likeability difference 2 (b)	.168(.126)		-1.164(.446)**	-.073
Unification by South Korea	-.384(.275)		.099(.245)	
Unification by cooperation	-.570(.485)		-.027(.423)	
Age	.001(.014)		-.001(.014)	
Education	.043(.151)		.207(.169)	
Family income	.073(.069)		-.041(.063)	
Three Party Merger	-.372(.128)**	-.073	-.157(.129)	
Constant	-1.166(1.819)		-.112(1.718)	
Log Likelihood	-276.782			
N	938			

Note: 1. Coefficients for incumbent Kim Young-sam are normalized at zero. 2. Marginal effects (Δ) indicate the change in the predicted probability of Y at the means of the independent variables and discrete change of dichotomous variables from 0 to 1. 3. (a) Likeability difference between KYS and KDJ. 4. (b) Likeability difference between KYS and CJY.

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

The lifetime economic experience with the dominant ruling party did not seem to matter much in explaining individual vote choice between KDJ and KYS, as well as between CJY and KYS, in 1992. The positive sign of the coefficient in the equation of KYS and KDJ indicates that the better the economic experience a voter had with the dominant party, the more likely he or she was to vote for the challenger, KDJ. In other

words, continuous economic prosperity did not seem to guarantee the status quo. When we look at the effects of economic variables, Korean voters did not look like typical economic voters in this election.

Voters from Cholla had a greater probability to vote for KDJ than KYS in the equation of KYS/KDJ, while Kyongsang voters were more likely to vote for KYS than for KDJ. Being from Cholla or Kyongsang, however, did not affect the choice between CJY and KYS. These different results between the two equations support the distinctiveness hypothesis. The two candidates, KDJ and KYS, clearly represented regions, the Kyongsang and Cholla regions, respectively, while CJY did not represent any specific region. In other words, voters from both Cholla and Kyongsang saw clear differences between KDJ and KYS in terms of their origins, while voters from both regions did not see regional difference between CJY and KYS. The larger effect of Cholla than of Kyongsang in the choice between KDJ and KYS is also noteworthy (see the marginal effects: .333 vs. -.125). It may result from the feelings of frustration or isolation of voters from Cholla who were left out of the coalition of the three parties (the variable called Three Party Merger). The alliance strengthened the perception people from Cholla have had for over 30 years that Kyongsang's political and military elites tried to perpetuate their political power by eliminating all possibility of Cholla's citizens gaining power (Choi 1999; Lee C. 1981). As a result, Cholla citizens united to support their political leader, Kim Dae-jung. On the other hand, voters from Kyongsang had a smaller stake than Cholla voters because they had been beneficiaries of Kyongsang regimes and would get more benefit from the coalition party. Opinions about the three-

party-merger had an independent effect apart from the regions but were also associated with respondents' origins. Respondents from Kyongsang were most likely to support the merger, while respondents from Cholla voters were least likely to support it.¹⁸

Another interesting finding is that opposition-party oriented voters were more likely to vote for the candidates from the opposition parties than voters who did not have party orientation, whereas ruling-party-oriented voters did not vote based on their party orientation. This might be due to the ambiguity of KYS's position in the ruling party, since he had been a long-time opposition party leader and had only joined the ruling party in 1990. Even though KYS joined the grand conservative coalition, he was quite different from his allies, Roh Tae-woo and Kim Jong-pil, who had served the authoritarian regime under President Park, the first soldier-turned president. KYS was still perceived as one of the opposition leaders who led Korean democratization. In other words, KYS might not have been a clear choice for ruling-party-oriented voters. This could explain some of the anomaly seen in the effect of sociotropic evaluation. Voters did not have a clear target to blame for the bad economy since there was no clear incumbent candidate but opposition-minded KYS backed by the experienced ruling party might have been attractive to voters.

Finally, in both equations, the larger likeability differences between the incumbent candidate and the challengers decreased the predicted probability of voting for the challengers. In other words, the more voters liked KYS, the more likely they were to vote for him. The large marginal effects of the likeability differences seem to show that Korean voters considered the character or personality of the candidates as one of the

¹⁸ See Table AI-6 in Appendix I for the difference of means test on regional differences in the opinion about the three-party merger of 1992.

important factors. A voter's issue position on the country's reunification with North Korea did not influence individual vote choice since the candidates' positions on this issue were very similar, promoting peaceful reunification on the initiative of the South Korean government. None of demographic variables is statistically significant.

To summarize, no ordinary economic voting was evident in the 1992 Korean presidential election. Against the expectation of punishing the incumbent party candidate for poor economic performance, Korean voters who perceived the national economy as worse were more likely to vote for the incumbent party candidate. In addition, regions, opposition party orientation, and candidate evaluations (or likeability differences) were significant factors in determining voters' electoral choices in both equations. These variables not only independently influenced individual electoral decisions but also had a reinforcing impact upon each other (see Table 4-4). Voters from Cholla tended to be opposition oriented and to like KDJ more than voters in the other regions, while voters from Kyongsang were more likely to be ruling-party oriented and to like KYS more than voters in other regions.¹⁹ That is, regional identity in Korea may have affected individual vote choice not only directly but also indirectly, shaping individual attitudes toward issues (e.g., the three party merger), candidates, and parties. Closely linked to other attitudes, regional identity has been chronically accessible. As a result, in the competition between the regional candidates, voters considered region because region differentiated the candidates. Regionalism was significant enough to outweigh economic evaluations. In the competition between a regional candidate and non-regional candidate, voters took

¹⁹ See Table AI-7 in Appendix I for the difference of means test on regional differences in PID.

into account factors that distinguish the alternatives. That was usually the candidate's likeability, since there was no issue in 1992 that differentiated the candidates significantly. In short, voters depended on accessible issues that provided clear alternatives.

2. The 1997 Presidential Election

The 1997 presidential election was held amid an economic crisis that hit several Southeast Asian countries. The administration of President Kim Young-sam had to seek an emergency loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to avoid the collapse of the economy and to overcome difficulties in the financial and currency markets. The Korean economy had not experienced severe economic trauma in more than 30 years.

Lee Hoe-chang, who was a former judge and prime minister, succeeded President Kim Young-sam in the ruling party and changed the party's name to the New Korean Party (NKP) as a way to detach himself from the infamous economic failure of Kim's administration. The NKP held the first primary election to nominate its presidential candidate and Lee Hoe-chang (hereinafter LHC) won the nomination. One of the primary candidates, Rhee In-je (hereinafter RIJ) defied the decision, however, and ran for the presidency through a new party, the New Politics Reform Party (NPRP). On the other hand, the opposition parties—Kim Dae-jung's Democratic Party (DP) and Kim Jong-pil's Unification National Party (UNP)—established a coalition just before the election and agreed to nominate Kim Dae-jung as their presidential candidate. Unlike the 1992 presidential election, the 1997 election was characterized as a break-up of the ruling party

and a marriage between the two opposition parties (Lee, G. 1998). The election was critical in that it turned the ruling party out of power in a free and fair election for the first time since Korea was democratized. Kim Dae-jung (KDJ) finally captured the presidency, defeating the ruling party candidate, LHC, by 1.6%.²⁰

Table 4-7. MNP Estimates for the 1997 Election

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Kim Dae-jung (KDJ)/ Lee Hoe-chang (LHC)</i>		<i>Rhee In-je (RIJ) /Lee Hoe-chang (KHC)</i>	
	M.L.E. (S.E.)	Δ	M.L.E. (S.E.)	Δ
<u>Economic Variables</u>				
Sociotropic	.149(.114)		.023(.116)	
Pocketbook	-.002(.108)		.118(.111)	
Lifetime economic experience	.021(.139)		.095(.142)	
<u>Regional Identity</u>				
Region 1 (Cholla)	1.364(.407)**	.200	1.351(.428)**	.103
Region 2 (Kyongsang)	-.568(.227)*	-.165	-.060(.219)	
<u>Control Variables</u>				
Incumbent partisanship	-.744(.273)**	-.143	-.703(.274)**	-.063
Opposition partisanship	.665(.239)**	.107	.736(.245)**	.076
Likeability of LHC	-1.636(.315)**	-.314	-1.512(.349)**	-.129
Likeability of KDJ	1.816(.334)**	.472	.385(.374)	
Likeability of RIJ	.107(.306)		1.588(.310)**	.398
Ideology	-.049(.093)		.037(.094)	
Age	-.004(.012)		-.019(.012)*	-.271
Education	-.069(.130)		-.126(.138)	
Family income	-.046(.047)		.008(.049)	
Blame for economic crisis	.655(.230)**	.130	.559(.207)**	.040
Constant	-.453(1.681)		-1.350(1.688)	
Log Likelihood	-441.669			
N	930			

Note: 1. Coefficients for incumbent party candidate Lee Hoe-chang are normalized at zero. 2. Marginal effects (Δ) indicate the change in the predicted probability of Y at the means of the independent variables and discrete change of dichotomous variables from 0 to 1. 3. (c) is a dummy for likeability of Lee Hoe-chang. 4. (d) is a dummy for likeability of Kim Dae-jung. 5. (e) is a dummy for likeability of Rhee In-je.

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

²⁰ See Table AI-8 in Appendix I for the election result.

Respondents' economic perceptions of both the national and their personal economy had no significant effect on individual vote choice in this election. Even long-term economic experience did not influence individual electoral preferences. Voters who attributed responsibility for the economic crisis to the incumbent party, however, were more likely to vote for the challengers (see the variable, blame for economic crisis, in Table 4-7). Voters punished the incumbent party for the severe economic failure. As there had been only one ruling party until the 1997 election, it seemed to be clear who was responsible for the economic fiasco. That is, respondents did not respond to their perceptions of short- or long-term economic conditions but considered the unprecedented economic catastrophe for their electoral decisions. One thing to note is that even though Korean voters were under a so-called crisis, other variables, such as regional identity and the likeability of candidates, played larger roles in determining individual vote choice in 1997 (see the marginal effects, Δ). This implies that economic problems were of great concerns to voters but had a smaller impact on voters' electoral preferences since the candidates did not present distinct policy alternatives (Lee, G. 1998).

As with the 1992 presidential election, voters from Cholla were much more likely to vote for KDJ than those from Kyongsang were to vote for LHC. Cholla voters, however, were inclined to vote for RIJ in the competition between RIJ and LHC, while voters from Kyongsang did not show a meaningful difference in their preference between RIJ and LHC. This can be explained by Cholla voters' opposition orientation and hatred for the incumbent party candidate, LHC. As KYS and CJY did not provide voters from Kyongsang with definite regional distinctions in 1992, the two candidates, LHC and RIJ,

were not distinctive to Kyongsang voters in terms of regional identity in 1997. RIJ was one of the ruling party candidates and appealed to swing voters, including some voters from Kyongsang and young voters, by campaigning to end old politics dominated by the “three Kims” and hopeless regionalism. That is, for both voters from Kyongsang and for many non-regional voters, the competition between LHC and RIJ was not about regions but about new faces and new politics. Thus, as the negative coefficient of age indicates, the younger a voter was, the more likely he or she was to vote for RIJ than for LHC. Age did not influence individual vote choice between KDJ and LHC.

Opposition-party orientated voters were more likely to vote for either KDJ or RIJ than respondents who did not have party orientation, while the ruling-party oriented were more likely to vote for LHC. Ruling-party oriented voters did not show significant differences in their electoral preferences between the ruling party candidate, Kim Young-sam, and the opposition party candidate in the 1992 presidential election. Compared with Kim Young-sam in 1992, LHC seemed to be better recognized as a ruling party candidate, as LHC used to be a prime minister during the Kim Young-sam administration. The likeability of candidates in 1997 still influenced voters’ candidate preferences more than the economy on individual vote choice. Under the circumstance where no clear issue or ideological differences exist between the candidates, it may be inevitable that individuals vote based on candidates’ personalities. Korean voters did not take account of their ideology or social status measured by their education and family income when they made their electoral choice in 1997.

In short, sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations were not statistically significant in contrast to the expectation that when economic crisis exist, economic conditions will be more accessible and thus more likely to influence vote choice. Furthermore, lifetime economic experience under the ruling party did not greatly influence individual vote choice. Voters who blamed the incumbent party for the financial crisis, however, punished the incumbent party candidate. Even the effect of the economic crisis was smaller than the effect of regional identity. In other words, the candidates were distinguishable more by regional identity than by economic performance.

3. The 2002 Presidential Election

The 2002 presidential election was unique for several reasons. First, the “three Kims,” who had dominated Korean politics and intensified regionalism for 30 years, had retreated from politics by 2002. As a result, new political figures had emerged. The change began with the 2000 National Assembly election, which brought new faces to the political arena. Many newly elected representatives had been heavily involved in democratization protests during the 1980s and 1990s and were characterized as young and progressive. Furthermore, Roh Moo-hyun, a human rights lawyer who was active in the democratic and labor movements, appeared as a presidential candidate of the incumbent party, the New Millennium Democratic Party (NMDP). Second, generational replacement helped cause the changes in parliamentary representatives and in influential political figures. In other words, the younger generation known as the “386 generation”—who were born in the 1960s, attended college in the 1980s, and actively participated in

democratization protests in the late 1980s—not only constituted a significant voting block but also emerged as new political elites by participating in government (Lee, H. 2003).

Finally, several important issues emerged, such as aid to North Korea and Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) reform, that provoked and divided the public along the issue positions and ideology, unlike previous elections in which had no substantial issues existed. When Kim Dae-jung was in power, he declared clear principles of inter-Korean relations, known as the “sunshine policy,” which separated politics from economics and engaged North Korea (Park 1999; Yoon 2000). Kim Dae-Jung was the first president who consistently pursued an engagement policy toward the North. Conservatives and the opposition party criticized the government’s one-sided policy by arguing that it only benefited the North (Ha 2001). Furthermore, Roh Moo-hyun, who was the incumbent party candidate in 2002, was more progressive than the other presidential candidates, expressing anti-Americanism and other perceived radical views (Lee, H. 2003). When two Korean middle-school girls were killed in 2002 by an American armored vehicle in a military exercise, anti-Americanism became another influential issue in the election. Many Koreans demanded more autonomy and an equal relationship between the U.S. and Korea by reforming the current SOFA. In short, these issues had the potential to overshadow factors that had dominated Korean elections by offering clear differences between candidates. In other words, the presence of new factors might reveal different patterns of voting behavior in 2002 from the 1992 and the 1997 presidential elections.

In 2002, only two main candidates ran for president: Roh Moo-hyun, the ruling New Millennium Democratic Party candidate, and Lee Hoe-Chang, the opposition Grand National Party candidate. A third candidate, Chung Mong-jun, the sixth son of Chung Ju-yung, the founder of Hyundai, withdrew his candidacy after consenting to a public opinion poll that asked Korean voters to choose between Roh and Chung for the single candidacy.²¹ Despite economic adversity, Roh defeated Lee by 2.3 percent, receiving significant support from the Cholla region.²²

The 2002 election could have provided an opportunity to test whether the experience of the 1997 economic crisis and generational change facilitated economic voting in Korea. Unfortunately the survey data in 2002 did not include economic evaluation questions. Instead, I use a variable that taps retrospective evaluations on general performance of Kim Dae-jung's administration.

With the retirement of old politicians, generational change, and the development of new issues, the pattern of voting behavior seemed to change in the 2002 election. Ideology, age, and issues such as aid to North Korea became statistically significant for the first time in Korean elections. That is, unlike in the previous elections, regional identity intertwined with candidate likeability and party orientation was not the only important factor that determined individual vote choice. Particularly, as candidates took

²¹ Using a public opinion poll is an unusual way to select a nominee for any elected positions. However, Chung and Roh agreed to hold a public opinion poll for the single candidacy even though they were not in the same party. They were afraid of splitting votes between them, which might result in Lee Hoe-chang's victory. Chung Mong-jun campaigned for Roh but pulled out his endorsement of Roh a few hours before the official end of the campaign.

²² See Table AI-9 in Appendix I for the election result.

clear positions on aid to North Korea, they made it easy for voters to cast their ballots on the basis of that issue.

Table 4-8. Probit Estimates for the 2002 Election

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Lee Hoe-chang (LHC)/ Roh Moo-hyun (RMH)</i>	
	M.L.E. (S.E.)	Δ
<u>Economic Variables</u>		
Retrospective	.380(.049)**	.140
Lifetime economic experience	.057(.051)	
<u>Regional Identity</u>		
Region 1 (Cholla)	-1.123(.166)**	-.332
Region 2 (Kyongsang)	.421(.094)**	.158
<u>Control Variables</u>		
Incumbent partisanship	-.183(.116)	
Opposition partisanship	.401(.102)**	.150
Ideology	.371(.049)**	.136
Age	.011(.004)**	.004
Education	.066(.059)	
Family income	.005(.021)	
SOFA reform	-.070(.037)	
Aid to North Korea	-.224(.035)**	-.082
National Security Law	-.065(.035)	
Constant	-2.621(.574)**	
Log Likelihood	-538.290	
LR χ^2	602.925**	
Pseudo R^2	.359	
% Predicted Correctly	79.7%	
% Reduction in Error	50.0%	
N	1244	

Note: 1. Coefficients for incumbent party candidate Roh Moo-hyun are normalized at zero. 2. Marginal effects (Δ) indicate the change in the predicted probability of Y at the means of the independent variables and discrete change of dichotomous variables from 0 to 1.

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

The general evaluation of job handling affected individual vote choice in the expected way. A respondent who evaluated Kim Dae-jung's administration as poor was more likely to vote for the challenger than for the incumbent. The interpretation of the effect, however, should be cautious. The variable included evaluations not only on economic performance but also in other areas, such as improvement in the relationship with North Korea (e.g., KDJ's sunshine policy that appeases North Korea by offering aid) and in domestic problems (e.g., economic reform).

Even with a broader indicator of retrospective evaluation, regional identity was still an influential factor. Ohn (2004) has argued that regionalism was even stronger in 2002 than in any other elections. My results also show that compared with the marginal effect of regional identity in the previous elections, the marginal effect of Cholla regional identity was still significantly large in 2002. How can stronger regional voting in 2002 be explained, despite generational replacements in both the public and political elites and the rise of conflicting issues? Both candidates in the 2002 election were not from the regions their parties traditionally represented. The only constant was parties based on regional affiliation. The higher regionalism in 2002 can be explained by the fact that there were only two main presidential candidates, rather than three or more (Kang, W. 2003). Kim Young-sam shared his support from Kyongsang with Chung Ju-yung in 1992 and Lee Hoe-chang shared Kyongsang votes with Rhee In-je in 1997. However, Lee Hoe-chang did not have to compete for voters from Kyongsang in 2002. Kim Dae-jung's popularity in Cholla, as well as the region's animosity against Lee Hoe-chang, contributed to one-sided support for Roh Moo-hyun by voters from Cholla. That is, the power struggle

between the two regions, Kyongsang and Cholla, and the hostility against rival regional leaders prevailed over substantial issues, causing the perpetuation of regionalism (Kang, D. 2003).

Other explanations could be that regional parties best represented regional interests or that the new issues actually divided regions further by coinciding with regional cleavages. For a new cleavage to replace an existing political one, the new cleavage must cut across the traditional one so that different political groups form coalitions on different dimensions and produce a partisan realignment (Lin, Chu, and Hinich 1996). As Table 4-9 shows, however, the new issues tended to further divide the country by region. Voters from Cholla were prone to support unconditional aid to North Korea, which was initiated by Kim Dae-jung's sunshine policy. They also supported abolishing or reforming the National Security Law, which strictly prohibited any pro-communist activity. On the other hand, voters and candidates from Kyongsang tended to be opposed to these two issues. In other words, these new issues reinforced the existing cleavages rather than crosscutting and realigning the electorate. This suggests that we cannot simply attribute the surprisingly strong regionalism in 2002 to Korean voters' irrational loyalty to their regions or regional leaders (Kang, W. 2003).

Table 4-9. Regional Differences on Various Issues in 2002

<i>Region</i>	<i>Aid to North Korea</i>	<i>National Security Law Reform</i>
	Mean (Std.)	Mean (Std.)
Cholla	3.565(1.264)	3.406(1.221)
Kyongsang	2.812(1.311)	3.128(1.309)
Other Regions	3.024(1.373)	3.121(1.345)
F-TEST	F=28.84 (p =.000)	F=5.25 (p =.005)

Note: All paired mean differences are statistically significant in the case of Aid to North Korea, while only the mean difference between Cholla and Kyongsang in National Security Law Reform is statistically significant.

While age affected individual vote choice, other demographic variables, such as education and family income, still did not. The older a voter was the more likely he or she was to vote for Lee than for Roh. In short, regional voting prevailed in the 2002 presidential election, as regional identity became more accessible and distinguishable along with the development of new issues that reinforced regional identity. However, the significance of other factors, such as general performance of the incumbent, issues, and ideology, implies that as long as candidates differentiate themselves on those matters, voters take such factors into account when they choose their candidates.

V. Salience of Candidates, Party Orientations, and Regional Identity

The findings on the three Korean presidential elections of 1992, 1997, and 2002 indicate tenuous evidence of economic voting. There seems to be little evidence of pocketbook voting and economic voting based on lifetime economic experience in Korea. Sociotropic evaluation was statistically significant in 1992 but Korean voters did not

behave as typical economic voters who punish the incumbent for a bad national economy. Voters who evaluated the national economy as worse were more likely to vote for the incumbent party candidate in 1992. In 1997, respondents chose their candidate based on their attribution of responsibility for the economic crisis rather than on their subjective perception of economic conditions. This implies that Korean voters responded to the economic crisis but not to short-term economic evaluations. The results of the 2002 election show that voters considered the current administration's performance on various national affairs, including the economy, when deciding their vote choice. This suggests that Korean voters may be more involved in economic voting in future elections, since they have now experienced both the ruling and opposition parties in power, which makes it possible for voters to compare the economic performances of the parties.

While the impact of economic conditions on electoral choices seems to be flimsy, there are several variables that consistently have affected Korean voters' preferences, including candidates' likeability, party orientation (PID), and regional identity. Interestingly, these variables are highly correlated. Compared to respondents in any other region, fewer respondents from Cholla were closer to a government-party orientation, while more respondents from Kyongsang were closer to government-party orientation until 1997.²³ This changed as the government party changed in 1997. That is, after 2002, government-party orientation indicated previous opposition-party orientation, and vice versa. More respondents from the Cholla region aligned themselves closer to a government-party orientation, while more respondents from Kyongsang identified

²³ See Table AI-7 in Appendix I for t test.

themselves with an opposition-party orientation. All the information from party-orientation, region, and political leaders strengthened voters' predisposition toward their regional identity.

To summarize, region of origin was a powerful factor that shaped individual political decisions in Korea through the 2002 election. Regional identity not only had a direct impact on individual vote choice but was closely associated with issue positions and party identification, which also influenced individual vote choice. The different experience of individuals as members of a particular region in the process of economic and political development has constructed unique identities, which, as a perceptual screen, have formed distinct attitudes toward political leaders, parties, and issues.

VI. Conclusions

This chapter discussed the question of whether economic conditions and regional identities were available, accessible, and distinctive enough to bear on individual vote choice in Korea in the three presidential elections between 1992 and 2002. Many Koreans have thought that economic issues (e.g., inflation and economic growth) are one of the most important concerns and that the government is responsible for poverty or economic conditions (see Tables 4-1 and 4-2). In spite of the importance of economic issues, the significance of economic evaluations in elections seems to be modest. Considering the results of multinomial probit regressions in 1992 and 1997, my vote choice models found little evidence of traditional reward-punish voting, while regional identity and candidate

likeability had a persistent impact on Korean voters' electoral decisions. Attribution of responsibility for the economic crisis of 1997 influenced vote choice in that election, but the effect was smaller than other determinants, such as regional identity, candidate likeability, and party orientation. As regional identity has been chronically accessible and linked to other attitudes (e.g., party orientations, candidate likeability, etc.), it has overshadowed the effect of economic evaluations on individual vote choice. Emotional attachment to social identity rather than personal/national material well-being tends to shape individual political preferences when social cleavages rooted in identity exist. Finally, the results of the 2002 presidential election imply that unless an issue emerges that can crosscut regionalism, there will not be much change in the electoral behavior of Korean voters.

Chapter 5. How Do Taiwanese Voters Decide?

I. Introduction

In this chapter, I address my research questions by analyzing three presidential elections in Taiwan (1996, 2000, and 2004). In this chapter, I ask the following questions: How are both economic conditions and identity issues relevant to individual vote choice in Taiwan? And under what circumstances do economic conditions or national identity matter more? Based on the assumption that attitudes must be available, accessible, and distinctive to bear on individual electoral choices, I begin by studying whether economic conditions and national identity have been available in Taiwanese elections and the degree of their accessibility and distinctiveness. Second, I present my research design, using either multinomial or binary logistic regressions and introducing variables and models specific to the Taiwanese case. Third, I analyze the effect of economic evaluations and national identity on individual candidate preferences in the elections of 1996, 2000, and 2004. Finally, I discuss how pre-existing social divisions based on national identity influenced the distinctiveness of alternatives in these elections and thus produced varying effects of the same factors in each election. I also provide implications of the empirical results on the effects of economic conditions and national identity in future Taiwanese elections.

II. Economic Conditions and National Identity: Evidence of the Availability, Accessibility, and Distinctiveness in Taiwanese Elections

1. The Availability, Accessibility, and Distinctiveness of Economic Conditions

For economic conditions to bear on individual vote choice, attitudes about economic conditions must be available to individual voters. In other words, voters must form an opinion about economic conditions and relate that opinion to politics. Like in other one party-states, a single party, the Kuomintang (KMT), controlled the economy in Taiwan for six decades by targeting a particular industry or sector for growth and encouraging the private sectors to invest resources in that industry in each economic development stage. As the KMT never lost its dominance in any government institution until the late 1990s, Taiwanese voters clearly recognized who was responsible for all economic changes (Hsieh, Lacy, and Niou 1998). Even though both Taiwan and Korea witnessed one-party dominance, the attribution of responsibility for economic conditions was easier in Taiwan than in Korea. The succession of the ruling parties in Korea was very complicated, while the KMT was the only ruling party in Taiwan from 1949 to 2000. The Taiwanese were particularly known to attribute responsibility for stock market fluctuations to the government (Wu 2001). The 2001 legislative election survey by Taiwan Election and Democratization Studies (TEDS) asked who had the greatest impact on government policies. More than 60 percent of the respondents named the president, the legislative body, or the premier, which implies that many Taiwanese voters attributed

responsibility for the national economy to national political figures. In short, attitudes toward national economic conditions have been available to Taiwanese voters.

Table 5-1. The Most Important Issue that Taiwan Faces Now, 1996, 2000, and 2004 (%)

<i>Issue</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2004</i>
Economy	24.1%	34.2%	35.9%
Economic Growth	24.1	23.3	24.3
Unemployment	N/A	10.9	11.6
Identity Issues	32.4	24.5	22.8
Ethnic Harmony	5.8	3.1	3.2
Cross-Strait Relation	26.6	12.2	13.7
Independence/Unification	N/A	9.2	5.9
Black-and-Gold Politics	N/A	5.8	.2
Crime	32.4	5.9	4.9
Others	11.1	29.6	36.2
N	1396	1409	1823

Source: Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., An Interdisciplinary Study of Voting Behavior, 1996 and 2000, and The Taiwan Election and Democratization Studies (TEDS), 2004.

In order to affect voters' choices, attitudes about economic conditions must also be accessible. Economic conditions must be one of the issues at "the top of the head" so that voters can easily retrieve their opinions about economic conditions when making their political decisions (Zaller 1992, p. 1). Because the subjective importance of economic conditions indicates more frequent activation and links to other attitudes, I examine how important economic issues were to Taiwanese voters. As Table 5-1 indicates, approximately 30 percent of Taiwanese respondents reported that the economy

was the most important problem Taiwan faced over the three elections, compared with 46, 70, and 81 percent in the Korean cases. This disparity can be explained by the format of the question. While the Korean election survey questions demanded the respondents choose from a list, the questions posed to Taiwanese respondents were open-ended. Many Taiwanese respondents answered that various issues could be the most important problem. Considering the survey format, however, a larger proportion of the Taiwanese respondents reported that economic issues—economic growth and unemployment—were most important, showing that economic conditions were accessible to Taiwanese voters more than any other individual issue in 2000 and 2004. Identity issues, including the issue of ethnic harmony, cross-strait relation, and Taiwan's independence, were considered the most important issues in 1996 and the second most important issues in 2000 and 2004. Crime was another important issue in 1996 but its importance was significantly reduced in 2000 and 2004.

The final and key condition for economic conditions to have a bearing on individual vote choice is the distinctiveness of candidates and parties in terms of economic performance. In other words, candidates or parties must show their ability to handle the economy, and voters must perceive the difference between the alternatives with respect to economic performance. As the KMT had never lost power in any branch of government until the 2000 presidential election, however, opposition parties did not have an opportunity to prove their willingness or ability to carry out their policy promises. Taiwanese voters, therefore, had little information about the opposition party's capability to handle the economy before the year 2000, when the main opposition party,

DPP, took over the presidency. Taiwanese voters could better recognize the difference between KMT and DPP on the basis of economic performance after the 2000 election, when voters had experienced both parties in power. In short, candidates and parties were less distinctive in terms of economic performance in the 1996 and the 2000 presidential election than in 2002.


Economic conditions were both available and accessible to voters in Taiwan in the elections discussed in this chapter. The distinctiveness, however, has varied over the three elections as Taiwan experienced a power transition from the dominant party to the opposition party in 2000. I expect no economic voting in 1996 and 2000 since voters could not easily reject the known party in favor of the unknown due to a short-term economic recession unless payoffs from the changes indisputably outweighed the status quo (Key 1966). On the other hand, I expect evidence of economic voting in 2004 since attitudes toward economic conditions were not only available and accessible but also distinctive.

2. The Availability, Accessibility, and Distinctiveness of National Identity

The availability of national identity refers to whether voters in Taiwan are aware of their national identity and its political relevance. The availability of national identity defined as psychological attachment to a political community or sovereign state is measured by asking whether Taiwanese individuals identify themselves with Taiwanese, Chinese, or both (Ho and Liu 2001; Schubert 2004; Wang and Liu 2004). Taiwanese identifiers tend to perceive that they have different political and cultural identity from

Chinese, while Chinese identifiers do not. Another group of Taiwanese relates themselves politically to Taiwan but culturally to China thus obtaining a dual identity (Chu 2004; Wang and Liu 2004). Figure 5-1 shows that most respondents to the surveys by the Election Survey Center of National Chengchi University expressed their national identity as either Taiwanese, Chinese, or both, while those who chose “Non-response” were around 11% between 1992 and 2004. Furthermore, considering that all non-responses do not mean “no opinion,” it can be concluded that an even higher percentage of respondents had formed opinions about their national identity.

Figure 5-1. Changes in Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese (1992-2004)



Source: Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., important political attitude trend distribution.

For national identity to influence individual vote choice, opinions about national identity must be accessible so that individual voters are ready to utilize the opinions for electoral decisions. The accessibility of national identity is measured by subjective importance, since important attitudes tend to be more accessible. However, Table 5-1 indicates that few respondents reported that national identity (or ethnic harmony) was the most important problem Taiwan faced (5.1% in 1996, 3.1% in 2000, and 3.2% in 2004). Another way to measure the accessibility is to examine whether national identity is linked to other attitudes. When an attitude is connected with other important attitudes, this is more likely to be activated. The issue of national identity is closely related to, and perhaps even inseparable from, the issue of cross-strait relations and the independence/unification (Ho and Liu 2001; Lin, Chu, and Hinich 1996). Therefore, if we treat these three issues together, national identity was the most or second most important issue to Taiwanese between 1996 and 2004.

Table 5-2 shows that national identity is significantly associated with the issue of independence-unification, party identification, and candidate likeability, which remind of identity differences. Respondents who closely identified themselves as Chinese tended to support Taiwan's unification with China. They also felt closer to either the KMT, the New Party (NP), or the People First Party (PFP) and liked Lien and Soong more than Chen. On the other hand, respondents who more closely identified with Taiwanese were more likely to support Taiwan's independence and to associate themselves with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) or the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). They also tended to like Chen more than the other candidates. In short, national identity is closely

associated with party identification, likeability of candidates, and the issue of Taiwanese independence/unification, all of which make national identity more accessible.

Table 5-2. Pairwise Correlations between National Identity and Other Attitudes in 1996, 2000, and 2004

<i>Other Attitudes</i>	<i>National Identity</i>		
	1996	2000	2004
Independence	-.025**	-.329**	-.350**
Unification	.299**	.377**	.299**
Status quo	-.079**	-.062**	.084**
KMT	.128**	.188**	.337**
DPP	-.252**	-.281**	-.415**
NP	.200**	.018**	-.005
PFP	N/A	.229**	.219**
TSU	N/A	N/A	-.139**
Likeability of Lien Chan	N/A	.050**	.276**
Likeability of Chen Shui-bian	N/A	-.269**	-.386**
Likeability of Soong James	N/A	.316**	.339**


Note: National identity in 1996 and 2000 is 3-point scale: 1 for Taiwanese identifiers, 2 for dual identifiers, and 3 for Chinese identifiers. National identity in 2004 is 5-point scale: 1 for Taiwanese identifiers, 2 for Taiwanese and Chinese identifiers, 3 for dual identifiers, and 4 for Chinese and Taiwanese identifiers, and 5 for Chinese identifiers.

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

The final and key element that mediates the effect of national identity is the distinctiveness of candidates in relation to national identity. The first opposition party, the DPP, proclaimed itself as the party of Taiwanese natives to differentiate itself from the KMT, which was dominated by elites from mainland China. In spite of the KMT's indigenization effort since the 1970s, different views on Taiwan's future (independence

or unification with China) were inseparable from national identity and magnified differences between parties with respect to national identity. The issue of independence/unification differentiates Taiwanese political parties by structuring and changing the party systems in Taiwan, and thus has become the most important issue in the competition of political parties (Cheng and Hsu 1996; Chan 2005; Schubert 2004). Therefore, the more clearly parties position themselves on the independence/unification spectrum, the easier voters distinguish parties in terms of national identity.

Figure 5-2. Independence-Unification Stances by Party



Source: Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., important political attitude trend distribution.

Note: A 3-point scale from independence (one) to unification (three) was used in 1996 and 2000. An 11-point scale from independence (zero) to unification (ten) was used in 2004.

Figure 5-2 indicates that Taiwanese voters clearly recognized the different positions of political parties on national identity in each election. All paired mean differences are statistically significant.²⁴ Voters perceived that the DPP (or the “pan-green camp”) was pro-independence and supported “One Taiwan,” while the KMT and other KMT splinters (or the “pan-blue camp”) were pro-unification and embraced “One China.” Even though the parties have not changed their fundamental stance on national identity, they have emphasized or deemphasized the issue of Taiwanese independence for electoral purposes. The candidates in 1996 and 2000 seemed less pronounced in their stances on the independence/unification, while the candidates in the two camps in 2004—the pan-blue and pan-green—made their views on the Taiwanese independence clearer. While 30% to 46% of the respondents reported either “don’t know” or “ambiguous” on each candidate’s position on the issue in 1996 and 2000, only 15% to 18% of the respondents selected either one in 2004. Particularly, during the 2000 presidential campaign Chen Shui-bian, the DPP candidate in 2000, tried to modify his image as a pro-independence hard-liner and embrace a moderate position (Alagappa 2001; Diamond 2001). Lien Chan, the successor of Lee Teng-hui, seemed to inherit Lee’s ambiguous stance on national identity. Respondents viewed Soong more pro-unification than Lien. However, the mean difference between Lien and Chen is still statistically significant. The NP and the PFP, which have splintered from the KMT, have been perceived as strong pro-unification parties across the three elections. In 2004, the two-way competition between one candidate from the pan-blue camp of pro-unification parties and the other

²⁴ See Table AI-11 in Appendix I for detail.

from the pan-green coalition of pro-independence parties, made it easy for voters to recognize the difference between the candidates in regard with national identity.

All the evidence suggests that national identity has been available, accessible, and distinctive to Taiwanese voters throughout the three presidential elections. However, I expect stronger national identity voting in the competition in 2004 than in 1996 and 2000 because the two-way competition provided clear alternatives between parties in terms of national identity in 2004, as expressed in the following:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Economic Voting</i>	<i>Identity Voting</i>
1996	No	Yes
2000	No	Yes
2004	Yes	Yes

The following section studies the effects of both economic conditions and national identity on Taiwanese voters' electoral preferences through empirical analyses. First, I present the data, variables, and models that I use to test my expectations for the effects of economic conditions and national identity. Second, I provide either multinomial or binary probit results. Finally, I discuss the implication of the empirical results.

III. Research Design: Data, Variables, and Models

In this section, I analyze three presidential elections (1996, 2000, and 2004) to examine the effects of economic conditions and national identity. The data for the 1996

presidential election come from An Interdisciplinary Study of Voting Behavior directed by John F.S. Hsieh between August 1995 and July 1996. The 2000 presidential election data were also collected by the An Interdisciplinary Study of Voting Behavior (August 1999 to July 2000) project conducted by Yih-yan Chen. The dataset for the 2004 presidential election comes from the Taiwan Election and Democratization Studies (TEDS) directed by Shiow duan Hawang (December 2003 to May 2005). The dependent variable is individual vote choice.

1. Independent Variables and Measurements:

My model considers the following variables: sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations, lifetime economic experience, party identification, national identity, and demographic factors. The measurements for retrospective sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations are similar to the measurements used in the Korean cases above. Sociotropic evaluation is measured by individual perceptions of changes in the national economy over the past year, and pocketbook evaluation is measured by individual perceptions of changes in their individual's personal or family financial situation over the previous year measured on 5-point scales from better-off to worse-off.

Individual lifetime economic experience is second economic variable. As discussed in the Korean cases, it is important to take into account lifetime economic experience in a dominant one-party system. One-party dominance was more pronounced in Taiwan than in Korea. While there was a confusing succession of the dominant parties in Korea, Taiwan was a one-party state led by the KMT for four decades. The KMT

never lost its power in any government branch between 1949 and 2000. Therefore, the asymmetry of information between the dominant party and the opposition parties was more severe in Taiwan than in Korea. As Aldrich and Magaloni's study (2006) on Mexican and Taiwanese elections show, voters who experienced good economic fortunes under the KMT rule might be less likely to punish the KMT for short-term economic downturns. In other words, this variable is also expected to have an interactive relationship with short-term economic evaluations. To measure long-term economic experience, I use GDP growth from 1952 forward, published online by the National Statistics of the Republic of China.²⁵ I apply the same formula that I employed in the Korean cases by following Aldrich and Magaloni's formula (2006). I assume that respondents who were born before 1942 have the same lifetime economic experience.

National identity is the second main interest variable. As a psychological attachment or a feeling of belonging to a political community, national identity indicates an individual's identification with a particular territory, history, culture, and political system. National identity is measured by whether a voter identified himself or herself as Chinese, Taiwanese, or both. As discussed above, national identity is inseparable from the issue of Taiwan's independence from China, and those who identify as Taiwanese tend to support Taiwanese independence, while those who identify as Chinese promote unification with China. Thus, many scholars tend to treat the issue of independence/unification as an alternative measure of national identity (Hsiao and Cheng 1999; Hsieh 1996; Wang and Lin 2004). The issue of independence/unification, however,

²⁵ <http://eng.stat.gov.tw>

captures individual political opinions on Taiwan's future status but not individual affection to a particular culture and political community (Wang and Liu 2004). Therefore, asking whether a voter considers himself or herself as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both is a better measurement of national identity because it includes a psychological attachment to both culture and political community. National identity is measured by a three-point scale from Taiwanese, to both, to Chinese in both 1996 and 2000, and by a five-point from Taiwanese, Taiwanese and Chinese, both, Chinese and Taiwanese, to Chinese in 2004.

Party identification (PID) in Taiwan is replaced by dummy variables that indicate support for a particular party. Political parties in Taiwan cannot be positioned on the ideological spectrum from liberal to conservative but rather tend to be formed by political leaders who pursue the presidency or have different positions on Taiwan's independence issue (Cheng and Hsu 1996). In the 1996 presidential election, there were three main political parties—Kuomintang (KMT), Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and New Party (NP). Right after the 2000 presidential election, James Soong, then-governor of the Taiwan Province, defected from the KMT to launch the People First Party (PFP). Because the 2000 presidential election survey was conducted after the PFP was formed, the respondents could choose among KMT, DPP, NP, and PFP for their party identification. Finally, after Lee Teng-hui briefly withdrew from politics in 2000, he came back and founded the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) in 2001. In the 2004 presidential election, parties were divided into two camps: the pan-green, a coalition of KMT and PFP that advocated unification, and the pan-blue, a coalition of DPP and TSU that supported independence.

The final category of variables captures demographic characteristics of respondents by including age and education, measured in years and highest attainment, respectively.

2. Models

I employ the multinomial probit (MNP) model to analyze the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections, which had more than two candidates, while I use the probit model for the 2004 presidential election, which had only two candidates. The incumbent party candidate is the baseline so that a positive sign suggests a higher probability of voting for the opposition party candidate in each column.

IV. Empirical Analyses

1. The 1996 Presidential Election

The 1996 presidential election is significant in that Taiwanese voters elected their president through a competitive and democratic election for the first time. In addition to the DPP candidate, Peng Ming-min, the KMT candidate, Lee Teng-hui, faced two more independent candidates, Lin Yang-kang and Chen Li-an, who were both former KMT leaders. Lee Teng-hui's visit to Cornell University in 1995, which was viewed by China as an effort to pursue Taiwan's independence, brought about Chinese military exercises in the Taiwan Strait and military threats in 1995 and 1996. The military threat affected the economy, resulting in a high unemployment rate and plunging stock market (Cheng

1997; Tien 1996b). Despite an economic slowdown and tensions across the strait, Lee Teng-hui was elected by winning more than 50 percent of the popular votes.²⁶

Table 5-3. Multinomial Probit Estimates for the 1996 Presidential Election

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Peng/Lee</i>		<i>Lin/Lee</i>	
	M.L.E. (S.E.)	Δ	M.L.E. (S.E.)	Δ
<u>Economic Variables</u>				
Sociotropic	.046(.114)		.404(.131)**	.033
Pocketbook	.183(.129)		.021(.147)	
Lifetime economic experience	-.062(.176)		-.468(.200)*	-.038
<u>Identity</u>				
National Identity	-.426(.183)*	-.021	.136(.168)	
	-2.089(.183)**	-.130	-.671(.286)*	-.036
<u>Control Variables</u>				
KMT	1.907(.247)**	.202	.326(.355)	
DPP	.312(.622)		3.478(.395)**	.725
NP	-.017(.009)		.007(.008)	
Age	.269(.084)**	.011	.229(.088)**	.017
Education	-1.408(1.714)		-.965(1.854)	
Constant				
Log Likelihood	-296.761			
N	890			

Note: 1. Coefficients for incumbent Lee are normalized at zero. 2. Marginal effects (Δ) indicate the change in the predicted probability of Y at the means of the independent variables and discrete change of dichotomous variables from 0 to 1.

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

The empirical results in Table 5-3 show that voter evaluations of national and personal economic conditions were not an important factor in choosing between Lee and Peng. On the other hand, sociotropic evaluation had a substantial effect on individual vote choice between Lee and Lin. Uncertainty about the opposition party candidate

²⁶ See AI-12 in Appendix I for the election result.

prevented voters from selecting their candidate (Lee or Peng) on the basis of retrospective economic evaluations. On the other hand, Lin's experience in the KMT government lessened the uncertainty about his ability to handle the economy.²⁷ Therefore, voters could punish the incumbent Lee for the worsened national economy by choosing Lin.

Lifetime economic experience also did not influence individual vote choice between Lee and Peng, while it did affect the choice between Lee and Lin. Voters who experienced a high average economic growth were more likely to vote for the incumbent Lee than the challenger Lin. In short, economic factors were not a significant concern for individuals' electoral decision between Lee and Peng, while both lifetime economic experience and short-term economic conditions had a significant impact on choosing between Lee and Lin.

National identity was one of the determinants of individual vote choice in 1996 between Lee and Peng, but not between Lee and Lin. Even though China's threats against Lee's election and Lee's promotion of Taiwanese identity tended to blur the difference between Lee and Peng, voters still perceived that the KMT was the party of the Chinese and the DPP was the party of the Taiwanese. As Lin defected from the KMT, Lin's ticket was not much different from the KMT in terms of national identity.

Party identification and level of education also significantly influenced individual electoral choice. Considering that the issue of independence/unification, an alternative indicator of national identity, has been the most important underpinning of party

²⁷ Lin Yang-kang was served as Vice Premier of the Republic of China from 1984-1987 and President of the Judicial Yuan from 1987-1994 among others.

formation and realignment in Taiwan, the significance of PID might also indicate that voters considered each party's official position or reputation on national identity. Even though Lin ran as an independent, he was endorsed by the NP, perceived as an adamant Chinese party. Finally, the more highly educated were more likely to vote for the challengers.

In short, national identity, not economic concerns, was the most significant factor that determined individual vote choice between Peng and Lee when voters clearly differentiated the candidates in terms of national identity. On the other hand, Taiwanese voters responded to short-term economic changes in the nation and lifetime economic experience when they did not view much difference between Lin and Lee in terms of national identity but had information about or confidence in the opposition party candidate's experience with the economy.

2. The 2000 Presidential Election

The presidential election of 2000 was a three-way competition between the KMT party's Chan Lien, the DPP's Chen Shui-bian, and the independent James Soong, who defected from the KMT to run for the presidency. This election brought about the first alternation of power in the Taiwanese presidency when Chen Shui-bian won the election, defeating Chan Lien by 16 percent and Soong by less than 2 percent.²⁸ This election epitomized the completion of the Taiwanization of politics and provided greater confidence in the Taiwanese democratic system (Alagappa 2001). Table 5-1 shows that

²⁸ See Table AI-13 in Appendix I for the election result.

more Taiwanese people cared about the economy in 2000 than in 1996, while fewer people were concerned about national identity issues, including ethnic harmony, cross-strait relations, and Taiwan's independence in 2000 than in 1996. At the time of election, 62 percent of the respondents reported that the national economy was worsening.²⁹ In other words, if voters considered their evaluations of macro economic conditions, the incumbent party candidate, Chan Lien, should have been hurt. Evaluations of the national economy, however, did not affect individual vote choice. On the other hand, life-time economic experience with the dominant party KMT had a significant effect on individual vote choice both between Chen and Lien and between Soong and Lien. Voters who had had a good economic experience throughout the KMT's rule were more likely to vote for the KMT candidate, Chan Lien. The significant effects of lifetime economic experience in 1996 and 2000 suggest that Taiwanese voters were more likely to respond to long-term economic conditions rather than short-term economic changes probably due to the fact Taiwanese voters had a long experience with a one-party dominant system. Voters who witnessed a good economy under the KMT rule might not readily unseat the incumbent because of a short-term economic decline.

²⁹ See Table AI-14 in Appendix I for the distribution of responses on individual evaluation of the national economy.

Table 5-4. Multinomial Probit Estimates for the 2000 Presidential Election

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Chen/Lien</i>		<i>Soong/Lien</i>	
	M.L.E. (S.E.)	Δ	M.L.E. (S.E.)	Δ
<u>Economic Variables</u>				
Sociotropic	-.093(.091)		.094(.087)	
Lifetime economic experience	-.314(.128)*	-.012	-.384(.122)**	-.076
<u>Identity</u>				
National Identity	-.276(.136)*	-.106	.442(.130)**	.165
<u>Control Variables</u>				
	-2.528(.225)**	-.197	-1.520(.189)	
	1.760(.235)**	.447	-.287(.270)	
KMT	-6.359(.851)		2.404(.366)**	.681
DPP	-7.602(.165)		1.384(.726)	
PFP	.011(.008)		-.003(.007)	
NP	-.087(.037)*	-.006	-.085(.034)*	-.015
Age	4.403(1.179)**		3.538(1.111)**	
Education				
Constant				
Log Likelihood	1084			
N	-609.305			

Note: 1. Coefficients for incumbent party candidate Lien (KMT) are normalized at zero. 2. Marginal effects (Δ) indicate the change in the predicted probability of Y at the means of the independent variables and discrete change of dichotomous variables from 0 to 1.

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

While national identity influenced individual vote choice between only the DPP candidate and the KMT candidate in 1996, it affected vote choice both between Chen Shui-bian and Chan Lien and between James Soong and Chan Lien in 2000. The more a voter identified himself or herself as Taiwanese the more likely she or he was to vote for the DPP candidate, Chen, than the KMT candidate, Lien. On the other hand, the more a voter considered himself or herself as Chinese, the more likely she or he was to vote for Soong than Lien. The marginal effect of national identity in the choice of Chen/Lien is smaller than that in the choice of Soong/Lien (Δ: -.106 vs. .165). Chen tried to

deemphasize national identity and tone down his extreme pro-independence stance since voters were afraid of any drastic change or uncertainty in the cross-strait relation (Alagappa 2001; Diamond 2001; Wu 2001). The incumbent party candidate, Lien, could not position himself far from the popular incumbent's moderate (even pro-independence) position on national identity. Respondents believed that Lien favored the status quo (30.05%) or had an ambiguous policy (35.74%) rather than supported unification (27.28%). Chen's strategic campaigns and Lee Teng-hui's pursuit of a separate national identity lessened the differences between the DPP's and KMT's candidates. On the other hand, Soong and Lien were more distinguishable in terms of national identity. Soong preferred the status quo, but his long-term vision for Taiwan was for "One China" (Diamond 2001; Schubert 2004). Furthermore, Lee Teng-hui's campaign against Soong contributed to a clear distinction between Lien and Soong (Diamond 2001).

As in 1996, party identification significantly affected electoral preferences in 2000. Those who identified with the KMT were more likely to vote for Lien than Chen but did not show a clear preference between Soong and Lien. Likewise, voters identified with the DPP were more likely to vote for Chen than Lien but did not perceive much difference between Soong and Lien. PFP-identified voters were much more likely to vote for Soong than Lien, while they did not make a clear choice between Chen and Lien. Level of education also influenced individual vote choice. More educated voters were more likely to vote for the incumbent party candidate Lien than either Soong or Chen.

In sum, while individual evaluation of the short-term national economy was not an important factor in the 2000 election, lifetime economic experience with the dominant

party significantly affected Taiwanese voters' electoral decisions. In other words, good economic experiences under the KMT hindered economic voting based on individual perceptions of short-term national economic conditions. National identity provided a clear distinction between Lien and Soong, as well as between Lien and Chen. Chen's moderation and Lee's effort to establish a separate identity, however, tended to blur the difference between Chen and Lien, while setting Lien apart from Soong.

3. The 2004 Presidential Election

The 2004 presidential election was a competition between two camps: the "Pan-Blue" and the "Pan-Green," which were perceived as supporting different views on national identity and cross-strait relations. The pan-blue was a coalition among the KMT, the PFP, and the NP, which favored Chinese identity, as well as the unification with China. On the other hand, the pan-green was an alliance of the DPP and the TSU and was an adamant supporter of a separate national identity for Taiwan. The incumbent Chen Shui-bian ran for reelection, representing the pan-green camp, against the challenger Lien Chan, who led the pan-blue ticket. In spite of economic and political misfortunes, Chen Shui-bian was reelected but by a margin of just 0.22 percent.³⁰ Many people believed that Chen would have lost the election without an incident on March 19, shortly before election day, in which Chen and his running mate Lu received minor wounds from a shooting. The incident was known to generate sympathy votes for Chen and Lu (Chan 2005).

³⁰ See Table AI-15 in Appendix I for the election result.

After Chen Shui-bian won the 2000 presidential election, Taiwan experienced its worst economy in decades. As Table 5-1 shows, economic problems were the most important issue of the 2004 election. More and more people reported that the economy was the most important problem over the three election periods (24% in 1996, 34.2% in 2000, and 35.9% in 2004). National identity issues were one of the most important issues but a smaller percentage of respondents chose those issues as being the most important, compared with the percentages in previous years (32.4% in 1996, 24.5% in 2000, and 22.8% in 2004). Furthermore, unlike in the previous elections, voters now could compare the DPP's performance handling the economy with the KMT's. Therefore, one might expect significant economic voting, since not only were economic conditions available and accessible, but also the candidates and parties were distinctive in their ability to handle the economy.

As expected, sociotropic evaluation had a significant effect on individual vote choice. Those who perceived national economic conditions as worsening tended to vote for the challenger, Lien. However, there was still no evidence of pocketbook voting. Unlike in the previous elections, lifetime economic experience did not significantly affect individual vote choice. In other words, once voters experienced other parties in power and knew their ability to manage the economy, voters were not afraid of punishing or rewarding the incumbent party for short-term economic conditions. This suggests that voters under a one-party dominant system tend to base their electoral choice on long-term or lifetime economic condition rather than short-term economic condition, while the opposite holds true for voters who have witnessed power alternations between parties.

Table 5-5. Probit Estimates for the 2004 Election

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Lien/Chen</i>	
	M.L.E. (S.E.)	Δ
<u>Economic Variables</u>		
Sociotropic	.254(.088)**	.100
Pocketbook	.008(.120)	
Lifetime economic experience	.067(.078)	
<u>Identity</u>		
National Identity	.355(.057)**	.139
<u>Control Variables</u>		
Party Identification	1.823(.109)**	.715
Age	.001(.007)	
Education	.099(.027)**	
Shooting incident	.182(.151)	.039
Constant	-8.277(.766)**	
Log Likelihood	-259.897	
LR χ^2	1112.832**	
Pseudo R^2	.682	
% Predicted Correctly	90.4%	
% Reduction in Error	79.2%	
N	1182	

Note: 1. Coefficients for incumbent Chen are normalized at zero. 2. Marginal effects (Δ) indicate the change in the predicted probability of Y at the means of the independent variables and discrete change of dichotomous variables from 0 to 1.

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

National identity still had a significant effect on individual vote choice in 2004. The more a respondent considered himself or herself as Chinese, the more likely that individual was to vote for Lien from the pan-blue ticket. As a matter of fact, the two camps were not much different in terms of their positions on national identity by the time of the 2004 presidential election. Both groups supported Taiwanese sovereignty and the “Taiwan First” idea, even though their positions on cross-strait relations slightly differed

(Shubert 2004). The Campaign of Chen Shui-bian and former president Lee Teng-hui, however, mobilized the issue of national identity to move the focus of the election from bad economic conditions to other issues, specifically national identity (Wu 2002).

As in the two previous elections, party identification and education levels significantly affected individual vote choice in 2004. Party identification was measured on a five-point scale from “strongly lean to the pan-green” to “strongly lean to the pan-blue.” The more strongly voters leaned to the pan-blue, the more likely they were to vote for Lien. More educated voters tended to prefer the pan-blue candidate Lien to the pan-green candidate Chen. The more educated were more likely to vote for the challengers in both 1996 and 2004, while they were more likely to vote for the incumbent in 2000. In other words, the more educated were inclined to support the KMT (pan-blue) candidate Lien in 2000 and 2004. Contrary to the expectation, the shooting incident was not a determining factor in the election of 2004.

To conclude, witnessing power alternations between parties lessened the asymmetry of information between the dominant party and opposition parties and thus removed the uncertainty about parties that had never been tested. This facilitated sociotropic economic voting in 2004. A simplified two-way competition also helped voters better distinguish the candidates regarding national identity.

V. Conclusions

As expected, economic voting was not common in Taiwan before the 2004 presidential election. On the other hand, national identity significantly affected individual vote choice across the three presidential elections in Taiwan. Considering Table 5-1, the economy was one of the most important issues and tended to become more important over the years. National identity issues intertwined with the independence/unification issue and cross-strait relations were also important to Taiwanese voters, but the significance seemed to decrease over the three elections. The accessibility of economic conditions was not translated to their effects on individual vote choice in the first two elections. In other words, the accessibility or subjective importance of an issue does not guarantee its effect on later behaviors. Varying degrees of the distinctiveness between the alternatives produced different effects of economic conditions and national identity on individual vote choice in Taiwan. Unless candidates provided clear distinctions in terms of economic performance, there was no way for voters to evaluate the candidates and to vote based on economic conditions. For instance, sociotropic evaluation affected individual vote choice in the 2004 election. Experience with the DPP-controlled government between the years 2000 and 2004 provided voters with a basis for evaluating how the two parties, KMT and DPP, managed the economy. On the other hand, the candidates in 2000 did not offer clear alternatives in terms of economic performance. Not only did the opposition parties in 2000 not have experience of governing the nation but also the incumbent party candidate Lien tried to distance himself from the incumbent Lee

due to Lee's risky policies on national identity and cross-strait relations (Diamond 2001). That is, it is hard for voters to attribute economic success or failure to Lien.

In all three elections studied, attitudes toward national identity related with the independence-unification issue were available and accessible, and clearly differentiated the parties and their candidates (Chu and Lin 1996; Hsiao and Cheng 1999). Even though the parties tended to converge to the middle on the issue of independence/unification and strategically mobilized or demobilized national identity, national identity consistently showed a significant effect on individual vote choice over years. This indicates that national identity as a symbol triggering strong emotional responses was chronically accessible and distinctive, regardless of elites' strategic campaigns to lessen its importance.

Taiwanese voters had relied mostly on national identity and party identification for their electoral choice before they experienced a power alternation from the dominant KMT to the DPP. Without the risk of voting for an unknown, however, voters considered national economic conditions in casting their ballots in 2004. The parties' convergence on national identity issues and the increasing accessibility of economic conditions, along with worsening economic conditions, may further increase the significance of economic conditions on individual vote choice in future Taiwanese elections.

Chapter 6. Heterogeneity of the Electorate in Korea and Taiwan

I. Introduction

The two previous chapters examined the availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness of both economic conditions and identity issues and the effects of these issues on individual vote choice in Korea and Taiwan by utilizing and improving the information-processing approach. The main findings from the empirical analyses are: (1) that variations in the accessibility and distinctiveness between candidates produced diverse effects of retrospective economic evaluations; and (2) that regional identity in Korea and national identity in Taiwan, as chronically accessible and distinctive attitudes, consistently had a significant impact on individual vote choice in the countries. While the previous chapters sought to find the relevance of economic voting or identity-based voting in the two countries, this chapter investigates what types of individuals in these two countries are more likely to be involved in economic voting, either sociotropic or pocketbook.

Under information-processing models, individual characteristics greatly influence whether given factors are available, accessible, and distinctive. According to the post-election surveys conducted by the Institute for Korean Election Studies of 1993 and 1997, for example, slightly more than 50 percent of Korean respondents attributed responsibility for poverty and economic crisis to government institutions in Korea (see Table 4-1 in Chapter 4). The remaining respondents did not relate personal and national

economic well-being to governmental actions. The attitude accessibility of economic concerns also varied among individuals in Korea and Taiwan. Regarding the question of the most important problem, many of the respondents in each country named something other than the economy as the most important problem facing their countries (see Table 4-2 in Chapter 4 and Table 5-1 in Chapter 5). Less than 40 percent of the respondents in Taiwan, for instance, listed the economy as the most important problem that the nation faced in each of the three presidential elections studied in the previous chapter. In other words, the importance and thus the attitude accessibility of the economy differed among the electorate within each country.

This chapter examines how varying personal backgrounds, such as education and lifetime economic experiences, affected the salience of economic conditions and thus vote choice in Korea and Taiwan. The following sections present vote choice models for each election analyzed in the previous chapters. In each case, however, the primary interests are the interactions between education and economic evaluations and between lifetime economic experience and economic evaluations. The interactive relationships between these variables imply that the impact of economic evaluations on vote choice differs depending on education levels and lifetime economic experience (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Braumoeller 2004; Gomez and Wilson 2006). I examine not only the significance of the interaction terms but also the total effect of economic evaluations on vote choice at different points of the modifying variables. This is necessary because it is possible for the total effect of economic conditions on individual vote choice to be

significant for particular values of the conditioning variables even though the coefficients of the interaction terms are statistically insignificant (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).

II. Heterogeneity of the Electorate in Lifetime Economic Experience and Education

Much of the economic voting literature tends to treat the electorate as homogeneous in its response to economic fluctuations (Haller and Norpoth 1994; Mackuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992). Many individuals-level studies treat the voters as homogeneous (Fiorina 1978, 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988; Nannestad and Paldam 1994; Norpoth 1996). In particular, aggregate-level studies assume that macro-economic indicators reflect the economic perception of the whole population. Macro-economic indicators, however, might not accurately represent different perceptions of economic conditions among diverse groups in a particular society. Recent economic voting research has paid more attention to the heterogeneity of the electorate (Duch 2001; Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000; Gomez and Wilson 2001, 2006; Hibbs et al. 1982; Krause 1997; Weatherford 1983). These scholars have taken account of individual differences in class and trust in government, while paying particular attention to information (or sophistication). Duch, Krause, and Weatherford argue that less informed voters are more likely to be involved in pocketbook voting than in sociotropic voting, while Gomez and Wilson contend the exact opposite.

I argue that better educated voters engage in both sociotropic and pocketbook voting in Korea and Taiwan, while less educated voters are more likely to be involved in

only sociotropic voting. National economic conditions are generally more available and accessible than personal economic conditions. Linking the nation's well-being to governmental actions does not require sophisticated cognitive skills because the government decides economic policies and thus is responsible for the policy outcomes (Gomez and Wilson 2001). On the other hand, it is harder to recognize the political relevance of personal economic situations since personal needs or experiences are "morselized" or isolated from the public arena (Gomez and Wilson 2001, 2006; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Sears and Funk 1991; Sears and Lau 1983). Scholars who find a null effect of personal economic conditions on individual vote choice maintain that personal economic situations matter for individual lives but not for politics (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Sears and Funk 1991; Sears and Lau 1983). In this view, personal economic well-being plays a significant role in electoral decisions only when individuals can clearly see political relevance of their own economic conditions (Feldman 1982; Gomez and Wilson 2001, 2006; Lau and Sears 1981; Sears and Lau 1983). Therefore, voters with higher cognitive abilities will be more likely to be involved in pocketbook voting than voters with lesser cognitive abilities.

Lifetime economic experience is another intervening factor. Lifetime economic experience has particular importance in a country where voters have experienced one-party dominance. Voters who have experienced high economic prosperity under the dominant party are less likely to vote against the incumbent party, even when they witness a short-term economic downturn (Magaloni 1999). Closely correlated with age, lifetime economic experience captures not only different economic experiences but also

diverse social and political experiences across ages. For the Korean cases considered above the correlations between age and lifetime economic experience were $-.764$ in 1992, $-.776$ in 1997, and $-.395$ in 2002. For the Taiwanese case the correlations were $.037$ in 1996, $.453$ in 2000, and $.699$ in 2004. These correlations are all statistically significant. Lifetime economic experience was negatively related with age by indicating that the elderly witnessed a worse average economic growth than the young in Korea. On the other hand, positive correlations between the two suggest that the elderly enjoyed more economic prosperity than their counterparts in Taiwan.

III. Research Design: Data, Variables, and Models

To examine the heterogeneity of the electorate in Korea and Taiwan, I study two Korean presidential elections (1992 and 1997)³¹ and three Taiwanese presidential elections (1996, 2000, and 2004). I analyze the same post election survey data used in Chapters 4 and 5 using MNP regressions for the 1992 and 1997 Korean presidential elections, and the 1996 and 2000 Taiwanese presidential elections. I use a probit regression for the 2004 Taiwanese election. In addition to all the variables specified in the previous models, I include interaction terms between economic evaluations and lifetime economic experience, as well as between economic evaluations and education.

³¹ The 2002 Korean presidential election is excluded in the analyses since sociotropic and pocketbook evaluation variables are not available.

IV. Heterogeneity of the Electorate in Korea

1. The 1992 Korean Presidential Election

The 1992 election was the first presidential election with no soldier-turned-politician from previous authoritarian regimes running as a presidential candidate. Kim Young-sam, a previous opposition leader, ran for the election as the ruling party candidate and won the election against Kim Dae-jung, the main opposition candidate. Chapter 4 demonstrated little evidence of economic voting in the 1992 Korean presidential election. Even though sociotropic evaluation was statistically significant, the direction of the coefficient was negative, which indicates that voters who perceived the national economy as worsening were more likely to vote for the incumbent party candidate rather than the challengers. Table 6-1 shows the results of multinomial probit regression testing the interactive relationships between economic evaluations and both education and long-term economic experience. The results seem to support the null effect of economic evaluations. Neither sociotropic nor pocketbook evaluation is statistically significant. The coefficients and significance of both sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations themselves, however, are not very meaningful since they are valid only when education and economic experiences are zero, which is rarely true. The coefficients of the interaction terms identify the nature of interactive relationships. The insignificant coefficients of the interaction terms in Table 6-1 seem to indicate that interactive

relationships between lifetime economic experience and economic evaluations and between education and economic evaluations did not exist in this election.

Table 6-1. Multinomial Probit Estimates for the 1992 Presidential Election
(Economic experience and Educational Heterogeneity Model)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Kim Dae-jung (KDJ)/ Kim Young-sam (KYS)</i>	<i>Chung Ju-yung (CJY)/ Kim Young-sam (KYS)</i>
	M.L.E. (S.E.)	M.L.E. (S.E.)
<u>Economic Variables</u>		
Sociotropic	-.665(.819)	-2.046(1.088)
Pocketbook	.852(1.019)	.145(1.105)
Life economic experience	.459(.545)	-.784(.651)
<u>Regional Identity</u>		
Cholla	1.378(.353)**	-2.139(1.355)
Kyongsang	-.652(.301)*	-.206(.276)
<u>Control Variables</u>		
Ruling	-.301(.302)	-.398(.337)
Opposition	.610(.320)	.992(.443)*
KYS-KDJ (a)	-1.163(.145)**	.268(.192)
KYS-CJY (b)	.143(.128)	-1.271(.469)**
Unification 1 (c)	.166(.488)	.120(.457)
Unification 2 (d)	.522(.498)	.036(.463)
Age	.002(.015)	-.005(.016)
Education	-.067(.596)	-.094(.662)
Family income	.085(.071)	-.036(.069)
Three Party Merger	-.384(.130)**	-.178(.141)
<u>Interaction Terms</u>		
Economic experience*Socio	.125(.114)	.285(.155)
Economic experience*Pocket	-.203(.150)	-.102(.155)
Education*Socio	-.215(.136)	-.020(.150)
Education*Pocket	.287(.167)	.132(.198)
Constant	-2.867(4.031)	6.477(4.746)
Log Likelihood	-269.958	
N	938	

Note: 1. Coefficients for incumbent party candidate Kim Young-sam are normalized at zero. 2. Marginal effects (Δ) indicate the change in the predicted probability of Y at the means of the independent variables and discrete change of dichotomous variables from 0 to 1. 3. (a) Likeability difference between KYS and KDJ. 4. (b) Likeability difference between KYS and CJY.

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, the insignificance of interaction terms does not discard the possibility of interactive relationships between economic conditions and both education and lifetime economic experience until the total effects of economic conditions at different values of conditioning variables are examined. I pay particular attention to total effects of economic conditions, considering education and lifetime economic experience together. Tables 6-2 and 6-3 present the total effect of economic evaluations on individual vote choice in the 1992 election between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam, considering both lifetime economic experience and education together at their various points.

Table 6-2. Total Effects of Sociotropic Evaluation as a Function of Economic Experience and Education on Vote Choice between KDJ and KYS in 1992

<i>Level of Education Economic Experience</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>
Minimum (5.6)	-.179 (.296)	-.394 (.244)	-.609** (.260)	-.825** (.336)
-1 Standard Deviation (6.09)	-.118 (.276)	-.333 (.207)	-.548** (.214)	-.763** (.293)
Mean (7.26)	.029 (.272)	-.186 (.168)	-.402** (.139)	-.617** (.217)
+1 Standard Deviation (8.43)	.175 (.328)	-.040 (.223)	-.255 (.168)	-.470* (.209)
Maximum (9.32)	.287 (.400)	.071 (.300)	-.144 (.243)	-.359 (.255)

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

Even though there seems little evidence of interactive relationships between economic evaluations and the conditioning variables in Table 6-1, the results in Table 6-2

show that lifetime economic experience and education jointly mediated the effect of economic conditions. Voters who experienced worse economic conditions over their lifetimes and achieved higher education levels tended to be more likely to vote based on their sociotropic evaluation. As found in Chapter 4, however, they were more likely to vote for the incumbent candidate, Kim Young-sam, when they viewed the national economy as worsening, which is not an ordinary economic voting pattern. Considering their higher levels of education, however, they might have thought that electing Kim Young-sam could achieve two things. The first was that they felt they may have felt they were punishing the incumbent, since Kim Young-sam was an opposition candidate previously. The second was that they avoided the risk of electing an untested opposition party candidate. In other words, Kim Young-sam was a better choice for less economically fortunate but better educated voters under a dominant one-party system that hindered voters from penalizing the incumbent. Contrary to the expectations, there was no evidence of sociotropic effects among the less educated and economically less fortunate.

As expected, however, voters who witnessed worse economic conditions and attained higher education were more likely to undertake pocketbook voting in choosing between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam. Regarding their personal economic conditions, they behaved like ordinary economic voters who punish the incumbent for personal economic misfortune. There is no evidence of any pocketbook voting among the less educated but strong evidence of this phenomenon among the more educated.

Table 6-3. Total Effects of Pocketbook Evaluation as a Function of Economic Experience and Education on Vote Choice between KDJ and KYS in 1992

<i>Level of Education</i> <i>Economic Experience</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>
Minimum (5.6)	.001 (.339)	.287 (.299)	.574* (.346)	.860* (.453)
-1 Standard Deviation (6.09)	-.099 (.312)	.187 (.246)	.474* (.282)	.761* (.392)
Mean (7.26)	-.336 (.313)	-.050 (.185)	.237 (.163)	.523* (.272)
+1 Standard Deviation (8.43)	-.574 (.400)	-.287 (.264)	-.001 (.187)	.286 (.236)
Maximum (9.32)	-.755 (.499)	-.468 (.372)	-.182 (.288)	.105 (.288)

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

In selecting between Chung Ju-yung and Kim Young-sam, voters who experienced the worst economic conditions throughout their lifetime and attained middle levels of education tended to be engaged in sociotropic voting but in the opposite way than might be expected (Table 6-4). They were more likely to vote for the incumbent party candidate during the poor economic performance. The effect of pocketbook evaluation was not affected by lifetime economic experience or education. In other words, there was no substantial evidence of pocketbook voting across all levels of education and different lifetime economic experiences in selecting between Chung Ju-yung and Kim Young-sam.

Table 6-4. Total Effects of Sociotropic Evaluation as a Function of Economic Experience and Education on Vote Choice between CJY and KYS in 1992

<i>Level of Education</i> <i>Economic Experience</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>
Minimum (5.6)	-.471 (.339)	-.491* (.281)	-.511* (.296)	-.532 (.376)
-1 Standard Deviation (6.09)	-.331 (.307)	-.351 (.228)	-.372 (.233)	-.392 (.318)
Mean (7.26)	.002 (.302)	-.018 (.184)	-.038 (.145)	-.059 (.230)
+1 Standard Deviation (8.43)	.335 (.393)	.315 (.286)	.295 (.232)	.275 (.266)
Maximum (9.32)	.589 (.500)	.569 (.403)	.548 (.351)	.528 (.359)

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

In sum, the more educated and worse-off were more likely to be involved in pocketbook voting in 1992. There was no evidence of sociotropic or pocketbook voting among the less or the least educated, regardless of their lifetime economic experience. In addition, the coefficients of sociotropic evaluation are negative, indicating that voters rewarded the incumbent party candidate for a worse economic performance. The interpretation for sociotropic effects by education and lifetime economic experience is thus indefinite. The opposite sign of sociotropic evaluation may be a result of the unique circumstances of the 1992 presidential election, which involved choosing between a never-tested opposition party candidate and a previous opposition party leader running as the dominant party candidate.

2. The 1997 Presidential Election

The presidential election in 1997 occurred in the middle of an economic crisis. This election was the first election that turned the ruling party out of presidential power. The ruling party candidate, Lee Hoe-chang, lost the election against an opposition party candidate, Kim Dae-jung, by a narrow margin. More than 80 percent of the respondents to the post-election survey in 1997 listed the economy as the most important problem Korea faced (see Table 4-1 in Chapter 4). However, the results in Chapter 4 show that voters based their vote choice on neither their perception of short-term personal and national economic conditions nor long-term economic experience. Attribution of responsibility for the economic crisis was the only economy-related variable that influenced individual vote choice in 1997. Table 6-5 also suggests that no interaction terms are statistically significant, which indicates that there was no substantial interactive relationship between economic evaluations and education or between economic evaluations and lifetime economic experience in 1997.

Table 6-5. Multinomial Probit Estimates for the 1997 Presidential Election
(Economic experience and Educational Heterogeneity Model)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Kim Dae-jung (KDJ)/ Lee Hoe-chang (LHC)</i>	<i>Rhee In-je (RIJ)/ Lee Hoe-chang (LHC)</i>
	M.L.E. (S.E.)	M.L.E. (S.E.)
<u>Economic Variables</u>		
Sociotropic	.428(.832)	-.246(.862)
Pocketbook	.225(.775)	1.139(.891)
Economic experience	.269(.572)	.082(.115)
<u>Regional Identity</u>		
Cholla	1.401(.411)**	1.384(.432)**
Kyongsang	-.567(.231)*	-.054(.222)
<u>Control Variables</u>		
Ruling	-.740(.277)**	-.708(.277)*
Opposition	.666(.240)**	.730(.246)**
Likeability of LHC (e)	-1.605(.320)**	-1.501(.351)**
Likeability of KDJ (f)	1.879(.337)**	.408(.375)
Likeability of RIJ (g)	.163(.309)	1.617(.312)**
Ideology	-.048(.094)	.028(.095)
Age	-.003(.012)	-.019(.013)
Education	.022(.723)	-.078(.746)
Family income	-.049(.047)	.005(.049)
IMF	.657(.204)**	.556(.208)**
<u>Interaction Terms</u>		
Economic experience*Socio	.039(.109)	.082(.115)
Economic experience*Pocket	-.101(.111)	-.176(.122)
Education*Socio	-.181(.137)	-.111(.136)
Education*Pocket	.175(.127)	.104(.134)
Constant	-2.746(4.690)	-4.254(4.872)
Log Likelihood	-.439.155	
N	930	

Note: 1. Coefficients for incumbent party candidate Lee Hoe-chang are normalized at zero. 2. Marginal effects (Δ) indicate the change in the predicted probability of Y at the means of the independent variables and discrete change of dichotomous variables from 0 to 1. 3. (c) is a dummy for likeability of Lee Hoe-chang. 4. (d) is a dummy for likeability of Kim Dae-jung. 5. (e) is a dummy for likeability of Rhee In-je.

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

Similarly to the results in 1992, education and lifetime economic experience did not seem to individually alter the effect of economic evaluations but instead jointly

conditioned the effect. When I consider the effect of economic conditions on individual vote choice at different values of education and lifetime economic experience, Table 6-6 shows, voters who were less educated and experienced an average economic growth throughout their lifetimes were more likely to be involved in sociotropic voting. When they perceived the national economy as worsening in the previous two years, they were more likely to vote for the challenger, Kim Dae-jung, instead of the incumbent Lee Hoe-chang. Contrary to the results of sociotropic effects in 1992, there was a clear evidence of sociotropic voting among the less educated who experienced moderate prosperity but not among the more educated. The effect of pocketbook evaluation was not affected by education or lifetime economic experience in the choice between Kim Dae-jung and Lee Hoe-chang.

Table 6-6. Total Effects of Sociotropic Evaluation as a Function of Economic Experience and Education on Vote Choice between KDJ and LHC in 1997

<i>Level of Education Economic Experience</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>
Minimum (4.7)	.432 (.392)	.251 (.335)	.070 (.330)	-.110 (.378)
-1 Standard Deviation (6.39)	.498 (.320)	.317 (.217)	.136 (.171)	-.044 (.222)
Mean (7.47)	.540* (.325)	.360* (.202)	.179 (.119)	-.002 (.158)
+1 Standard Deviation (8.56)	.583 (.370)	.402 (.251)	.222 (.154)	.041 (.169)
Maximum (8.90)	.596 (.390)	.416 (.275)	.235 (.191)	.054 (.188)

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

To the contrary, different educational achievements and lifetime economic experiences made a difference in the effect of pocketbook evaluation on vote choice between Rhee In-je and Lee Hoe-chang in 1997. Consistent with the findings regarding the 1992 election, the more educated and less economically fortunate had a greater likelihood of voting on the basis of short-term personal economic conditions. If they perceived that their personal economic situations worsened over the previous two years, they were more likely to vote for the challenger (Rhee In-je) than the incumbent party candidate (Lee Hoe-chang). Sociotropic evaluation did not make much difference in candidate preference among individuals who differed in education and lifetime economic experience when they chose between Rhee and Lee.

Table 6-7. Total Effects of Pocketbook Evaluation as a Function of Economic Experience and Education on Vote Choice between RIJ and LHC in 1997

<i>Level of Education Economic Experience</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>
Minimum (5.6)	.418 (.400)	.522 (.360)	.626* (.374)	.730* (.430)
-1 Standard Deviation (6.09)	.122 (.301)	.226 (.213)	.330* (.189)	.434* (.250)
Mean (7.26)	-.069 (.305)	.035 (.188)	.139 (.116)	.243 (.166)
+1 Standard Deviation (8.43)	-.260 (.362)	-.156 (.246)	-.052 (.162)	.052 (.167)
Maximum (9.32)	-.319 (.386)	-.215 (.274)	-.111 (.193)	-.007 (.188)

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

The findings about the heterogeneity of Korean voters in the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections clearly support the hypothesis on pocketbook effects, while the findings on the effects of sociotropic evaluation partially hold up the sociotropic hypothesis. Education and lifetime economic experience, however, jointly affect the impact of economic evaluations. Only the better educated but economically less fortunate were involved in pocketbook voting in both elections. On the other hand, there was a strong sociotropic effect among the less educated with medium economic success over their entire lives, but not among the most educated, in 1997. Finally, even after introducing the interaction terms, regional identity played an important role in determining individual vote choice in both Korean presidential elections.

V. Heterogeneity of the Electorate in Taiwan

1. The 1996 Taiwanese Presidential Election

The 1996 presidential election in Taiwan was won by the incumbent Lee Teng-hui over the three challengers, Peng Ming-min, Lin Yang-kang, and Chen Li-an. Sociotropic evaluation was a significant factor determining vote choice between Lin Yang-kang and Lee Teng-hui, but not between Peng Ming-min and Lee Teng-hui in this election. Voters who thought the national economy was worsening over the previous year were more likely to vote for the challenger Lin than the incumbent Lee. There was no evidence of pocketbook voting in 1996. However, these results do not rule out the possibility that a certain group of voters considered national or personal economic

situations in their electoral choice between Peng and Lee. Even after accounting for the heterogeneity of the voters in Table 6-8, however, we see little evidence of either sociotropic or pocketbook voting. None of the interactions is statistically significant. In other words, neither education nor lifetime economic experience seemed to make any difference in the effects of economic evaluations on individual vote choice in the 1996 presidential election.

Table 6-8. Multinomial Probit Estimates for the 1996 Presidential Election

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Peng/Lee</i>	<i>Lin/Lee</i>
	M.L.E. (S.E.)	M.L.E. (S.E.)
<u>Economic Variables</u>		
Sociotropic	-.626(1.771)	1.512(2.086)
Pocketbook	2.917(1.959)	-.144(2.209)
Lifetime economic experience	.680(.914)	.056(1.068)
<u>Identity</u>		
National identity	-.435(.185)*	.155(.170)
<u>Control Variables</u>		
KMT	-2.125(.433)**	-.640(.289)*
DPP	1.943(.249)**	.336(.359)
NP	.297(.635)	3.528(.403)**
Age	-.017(.010)	.007(.009)
Education	.241(.467)	.249(.523)
<u>Interactions</u>		
Economic experience*Sociotropic	.107(.197)	-.167(.240)
Economic experience*Pocketbook	-.352(.216)	.064(.251)
Education*Sociotropic	-.087(.100)	.125(.111)
Education*Pocketbook	.125(.121)	-.139(.124)
Constant	-7.604(8.203)	-5.432(9.224)
Log Likelihood	-293.427	
N	890	

Note: Coefficients for incumbent Lee are normalized at zero.

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

As found in both Korean cases, however, education and lifetime economic experience might jointly result in significant variations in economic voting at their different values in the Taiwanese cases. Table 6-9 shows that the better educated who did not witness much prosperity were more likely to be involved in pocketbook, but not sociotropic, voting when they chose between Peng and Lee. When they perceived that their personal economic conditions worsened over the previous year, they were inclined to vote for challenger Peng. The more educated and economically least fortunate were even more inclined to do so. The risk associated with voting for a never-tested opposition candidate was much less for them than others who experienced higher prosperity under the dominant party.

Table 6-9. Total Effects of Pocketbook Evaluation as a Function of Economic Experience and Education on Vote Choice between Peng and Lee in 1996

<i>Level of Education Economic Experience</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>
Minimum (6.3)	.826 (.599)	.952* (.558)	1.077* (.542)	1.202* (.552)
-1 Standard Deviation (8.05)	.210 (.287)	.335 (.217)	.460* (.203)	.586** (.254)
Mean (8.68)	-.011 (.230)	.114 (.149)	.239* (.144)	.365* (.220)
+1 Standard Deviation (9.31)	-.232 (.246)	-.107 (.185)	.019 (.192)	.144 (.262)
Maximum (9.99)	-.474 (.333)	-.348 (.300)	-.223 (.311)	-.098 (.365)

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

On the other hand, Table 6-10 suggests that education and lifetime economic experience made a significant difference in sociotropic, but not pocketbook, voting when choosing between Lin and Lee. As expected, sociotropic voting was more common across different educational groups than pocketbook voting, which was limited to the more educated. However, the least educated were not even engaged in sociotropic voting, regardless of their economic experience. At the same time, the highly educated who had experienced the least amount of economic prosperity were most likely to vote based on their perception of the national economic conditions when they faced the alternative between Lin and Lee. As expected, insignificant coefficients of interaction and constitutive terms does not mean a null effect of economic conditions on individual vote choice. It is important to examine the effects of economic conditions at various points of modifying variables to study the heterogeneity of economic voting behavior.

Table 6-10. Total Effects of Sociotropic Evaluation as a Function of Economic Experience and Education on Vote Choice between Lin and Lee in1996

<i>Level of Education</i> <i>Economic Experience</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>
Minimum (6.3)	.583 (.597)	.708 (.578)	.832 (.580)	.957 (.603)
-1 Standard Deviation (8.05)	.290 (.258)	.414* (.203)	.539** (.202)	.663** (.255)
Mean (8.68)	.185 (.219)	.309* (.148)	.434** (.143)	.558** (.209)
+1 Standard Deviation (9.31)	.080 (.274)	.204 (.219)	.329 (.213)	.453* (.260)
Maximum (9.99)	-.035 (.396)	.089 (.358)	.214 (.353)	.338 (.382)

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

2. The 2000 Taiwanese Presidential Election

The KMT lost presidential power for the first time in the 2000 presidential election, which transferred presidential power to an opposition party, the DPP. Chen Shui-bian defeated the incumbent party candidate, Lien, receiving 39.3% of the votes, followed by James Soong who was an independent candidate and received 37.5% of the votes. The results in Chapter 5 suggest that short-term economic conditions did not significantly contribute to the power shift. Voters who enjoyed considerable prosperity under the KMT's fifty-year rule, however, were less likely to withdraw their support for the KMT.

Table 6-11. Multinomial Probit Estimates for the 2000 Presidential Election

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Chen/Lien</i>	<i>Soong/Lien</i>
	M.L.E. (S.E.)	M.L.E. (S.E.)
<u>Economic Variables</u>		
Sociotropic	-3.611(1.356)**	-2.078(1.279)
Lifetime economic experience	-1.663(.551)**	.243(.138)*
<u>Identity</u>		
National identity	-.256(.138)	.461(.132)**
<u>Control Variables</u>		
KMT	-2.497(.227)**	-1.499(.190)**
DPP	1.815(.240)**	-.248(.275)
PFP	-6.233(.878)	2.449(.371)**
NP	-7.527(.212)	1.444(.737)*
Age	.004(.008)	-.006(.007)
Education	-.675(.319)*	-.272(.297)
<u>Interactions</u>		
Economic experience*Sociotropic	.369(.145)*	.243(.138)*
Education*Sociotropic	.096(.084)	-.001(.078)
Constant	17.886(5.160)**	11.919(4.921)*
<u>Log Likelihood</u>	-601.239	
<u>N</u>	1082	

Note: Coefficients for incumbent party candidate Lien are normalized at zero.

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

After taking account of the heterogeneity of voters, the results of the interaction terms in Table 6-11 indicate that lifetime economic experience affected the impact of sociotropic evaluations on individual vote choice in 2000, while education did not.³²

Table 6-12. Total Effects of Sociotropic Evaluation as a Function of Economic Experience and Education on Vote Choice between Chen and Lien in 2000

<i>Level of Education</i> <i>Economic Experience</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>
Minimum (5.31)	-1.556** (.567)	-1.460** (.538)	-1.364** (.520)	-1.269** (.516)
-1 Standard Deviation (7.94)	-.587** (.226)	-.491** (.179)	-.395** (.164)	-.300 (.189)
Mean (8.72)	-.299* (.163)	-.203* (.108)	-.108 (.103)	-.012 (.154)
+1 Standard Deviation (9.50)	-.011 (.168)	.085 (.131)	.180 (.143)	.276 (.193)
Maximum (9.95)	.154 (.202)	.250 (.179)	.345* (.193)	.441* (.238)

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

However, Tables 6-12 and 6-13 show that education made a significant difference in sociotropic voting in conjunction with lifetime economic experience. First, when considering the alternatives between Chen and Lien, voters who witnessed less economic growth throughout their lives did not behave like ordinary economic voters. When they perceived that the national economy was worse, they were more likely to vote for the incumbent party candidate (Lien) rather than the challenger (Chen) across all education levels. The least educated who had witnessed the least economic growth were most likely

³² A pocketbook evaluation variable is not available in the 2000 presidential election survey. Therefore, I examine only interactive relationship between sociotropic evaluation and both education and life-time economic experience in 2000.

to vote for the incumbent party candidate. Meanwhile, voters who had experienced long-term prosperity and were more educated were more likely to punish the incumbent party candidate for a short-term economic downturn.

Table 6-13. Total Effects of Sociotropic Evaluation as a Function of Economic Experience and Education on Vote Choice between Soong and Lien in 2000

<i>Level of Education</i> <i>Economic Experience</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>
Minimum (5.31)	-.788 (.537)	-.789 (.511)	-.789 (.495)	-.789 (.491)
-1 Standard Deviation (7.94)	-.150 (.218)	-.151 (.172)	-.151 (.155)	-.151 (.175)
Mean (8.72)	.039 (.162)	.039 (.107)	.039 (.094)	.038 (.136)
+1 Standard Deviation (9.50)	.229 (.167)	.229* (.127)	.228* (.129)	.228 (.172)
Maximum (9.95)	.338* (.198)	.337* (.171)	.337* (.178)	.337 (.214)

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

Voters who witnessed a high average economic growth showed similar behavioral patterns when they chose between Soong and Lien as when they faced the alternatives between Chen and Lien (Table 6-13). Voters who witnessed higher economic growth throughout their lives were more likely to withdraw their support for the incumbent party due to a short-term economic recession. This phenomenon held true across all education levels except for the highest education group. These results contrast with the expectation that voters who witnessed higher economic growth under KMT dominance would be less likely to respond to short-term economic fluctuations. As Diamond (2001) pointed out,

Taiwanese voters might have a desire for a political change after they had experienced a long economic growth.

3. The 2004 Taiwanese Presidential Election

The 2004 election was the first presidential election after the opposition party, DPP, captured presidential power in 2000. Unlike in the previous elections, therefore, voters in 2004 could evaluate both parties, KMT and DPP, on the basis of economic performance in 2004. Even after experiencing an unprecedented economic recession during the first term of President Chen Shui-bian, Taiwanese voters reelected the incumbent over the challenger, Lien Chan. The significance coefficient of sociotropic evaluation as demonstrated in Chapter 5 suggests that voters considered national economic conditions for their electoral choice. I did not, however, observe any evidence of pocketbook voting in this election. Even after considering the heterogeneity of the electorate in education and lifetime economic experience, there was little sign of pocketbook voting. No interaction term involving pocketbook evaluation is statistically significant, which implies that even different lifetime economic experience and educational attainments might have not affected the impact of pocketbook evaluation on individual vote choice for this election. Meanwhile, the interaction term between sociotropic evaluation and lifetime economic experience is statistically significant, indicating that lifetime economic experience conditioned the effect of sociotropic evaluation on individual vote choice.

Table 6-14. Multinomial Probit Estimates for the 2004 Presidential Election

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Lien/Chen</i>
	M.L.E. (S.E.)
<u>Economic Variables</u>	
Sociotropic	-.971(.842)
Pocketbook	-1.147(1.124)
Lifetime economic experience	-.411(.240)
<u>Identity</u>	
National identity	.340(.058)**
<u>Control Variables</u>	
PID	1.835(.110)**
Age	.001(.007)
Education	-.067(.269)
Shooting incident	.198(.151)
<u>Interactions</u>	
Economic experience*Sociotropic	.162(.083)*
Economic experience*Pocketbook	.076(.110)
Education*Sociotropic	-.036(.093)
Education*Pocketbook	.180(.131)
Constant	-3.338(2.361)
Log Likelihood	-256.964
LR χ^2	1118.698**
Pseudo R^2	.685
% Predicted Correctly	90.4%
% Reduction in Error	79.4%
N	1182

Note: Coefficients for incumbent Chen are normalized at zero.

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

Table 6-15 also shows that there is a significant difference in sociotropic voting across different lifetime economic experiences. Changes in the effects of sociotropic evaluation across different education levels indicate that education was also a conditioning factor of sociotropic voting when considered with lifetime economic experience. As with the results from 2000, voters who witnessed higher economic growth throughout their lives were more likely to be involved in sociotropic voting across all

education levels but more so among the less educated. In other words, the higher the economic prosperity voters experienced, the more responsive they were to short-term economic declines. The national economic conditions Taiwanese voters experienced throughout most of their lives were attributed to the KMT government, since the KMT was the only party that had governed until 2000. Therefore, if voters witnessed higher economic growth during the KMT rule but worse economic conditions after the DPP took over, they were more likely to punish the incumbent Chen. In other words, voters who have been through a power alternation between parties are able to clearly differentiate those parties in terms of economic performance and vote accordingly. As expected, sociotropic voting was common to all educational groups that witnessed more prosperity in their lives but was most likely among the least educated who had experienced the highest economic growth.

Table 6-15. Total Effects of Sociotropic Evaluation as a Function of Economic Experience and Education on Vote Choice between Lien and Chen in 2004

<i>Level of Education</i> <i>Economic Experience</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>
Minimum (2.58)	-.589 (.572)	-.625 (.510)	-.662 (.460)	-.698 (.424)
-1 Standard Deviation (5.63)	-.093 (.340)	-.130 (.270)	-.166 (.217)	-.203 (.198)
Mean (8.20)	.325* (.192)	.289** (.118)	.252** (.091)	.216 (.142)
+1 Standard Deviation (9.41)	.522** (.177)	.485** (.133)	.449** (.147)	.413* (.207)
Maximum (9.90)	.600** (.186)	.564** (.158)	.528** (.180)	.491* (.240)

*Significant at $p \leq .05$ **Significant at $p \leq .01$

The Taiwanese cases also show that education and lifetime economic experience jointly affected the impact of economic evaluations on individual vote choice. The only evidence of pocketbook voting existed among the more educated, who went through less than mediocre economic growth in 1996. On the other hand, sociotropic voting occurred across different educational groups and diverse lifetime economic experiences in all three elections. Sociotropic voting was stronger among the more educated who had enjoyed less long-term economic growth in the 1996 election, whereas it was stronger among the less educated who had witnessed higher long-term economic growth in both the 2000 and 2004 elections.

VI. Conclusions

This chapter studied what types of voters were more likely to be involved in sociotropic or pocketbook voting in both Korea and Taiwan by focusing on how education and lifetime economic experience affected the impact of economic evaluations on individual electoral choices. Even after taking account of population heterogeneity, there seems little evidence of pocketbook and sociotropic voting in either Korea or Taiwan. The various effects of economic evaluations across different groups were only evident when the two modifying variables of education and lifetime economic experience were considered together at their different values. Pocketbook voting occurred only among the more educated who experienced less than average economic growth in both countries. Sociotropic voting was much more common than pocketbook voting among

both more- and less-educated voters, even though the effects were also conditioned by lifetime economic experience. These results tend to support the argument that pocketbook voting requires more cognitive skills to link personal economic conditions to governmental actions, while sociotropic voting does not (Gomez and Wilson 2001, 2006). Therefore, personal economic conditions are significant in politics only when individuals are aware of the connection between their personal economic situations and politics.

Chapter 7. Conclusions

Based on the assumption that attitudes must be available, accessible, and distinctive to have relevance to political behavior, particularly vote choice, the previous chapters have answered the following questions.

- (1) How did preexisting social cleavages based on social identity in Korea and Taiwan influence the attitude availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness of both economic conditions and identity issues—regional identity in Korea and ethnic/national identity in Taiwan?
- (2) How did the attitude availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness of economic conditions and identity issues influence the relevance of those factors for individual vote choice in the two countries?
- (3) How did individuals who vary in their educational and lifetime economic experiences respond to short-term economic fluctuations?

Social divisions by regional identity in Korea and national identity in Taiwan were translated into political party systems after democratization. Political parties in Korea were founded by regional leaders, based on one-sided support from their regions, Cholla and Kyongsang in particular. Even though the ruling party changed its name from election to election, all the parties were based in the Kyongsang region and had political leaders from Kyongsang. The Taiwanese party system was structured by the issue of national identity. As the KMT, which was led by mainlanders from China, monopolized

political power for over 40 years, the DPP proclaimed itself as the Taiwanese party and supported Taiwan's independence from China. The main cause of the intra-party splits of the KMT during the 1990s was political leaders' conflicts on national identity. As political parties in both countries clearly represented social and political cleavages, attitudes toward those cleavages were not only available and accessible but also distinctive to voters. Therefore, regional identity in Korea and national identity in Taiwan have determined individual vote choice in each country.

However, the effects of social identity have also depended on how distinctive the candidates were in terms of identity issues. National identity in Taiwan, for example, did not influence the vote choice between the KMT candidate Lee and the independent candidate Lin in 1996, while significantly affecting vote choice between Lee and the DPP candidate Peng. Even in 2000, national identity had a greater effect in selecting between the KMT candidate, Lien, and the independent Soong than in choosing between Lien and Chen, which was due to Chen's and Lien's moderate positions on national identity. In other words, the major differences between the DPP and the KMT were blurred in 2000. After Lee Teng-hui defected from the KMT and the two camps—the "pan blue" and the "pan-green"—were formed, however, voters clearly distinguished the two camps in terms of national identity and the issue of Taiwan independence in the 2004 election.

On the other hand, economic conditions were available and accessible but not distinctive in the first two elections considered in each country. Voters in both countries tended to be very concerned about the economy, but they did not have a clear alternative to the dominant party. Not only was the economy under the dominant party in both

countries was very successful for over 40 years but voters also did not know much about the opposition parties' ability to govern. This prevented voters from evaluating parties on the basis of economic performance even after they experienced a short-term economic downturn. The 1997 Korean presidential election and the 2000 Taiwanese presidential election brought the first alternation of power in the highest position in the nation. The opposition parties got a chance to be tested and prove their governability until the next election, when voters could have a record of the performance of both the previously dominant and the opposition parties. Therefore, voters could assess and compare each party's performance and vote based on their assessment.

As expected, there was little evidence of either sociotropic or pocketbook voting in the first two elections in both countries. Voters could not distinguish the parties in terms of their economic performance since there had been only one party in power. Furthermore, uncertainty about the capability of opposition parties increased the risk of casting out the incumbent based on a short-term economic decline. Once voters witnessed long-time opposition parties in power and could differentiate parties by economic performance, however, they voted based on the evaluation of short-term economic change. Sociotropic evaluation affected individual vote choice in the 2002 Korean presidential election and in the 2004 Taiwanese presidential election. Even then, there was no sign of pocketbook voting.

Another economic variable controlled was lifetime economic experience measured by the average economic growth experienced by each individual from age 10. While long-term economic experience influenced individual voting behavior in Taiwan,

it did not in Korea. Voters who enjoyed high economic growth during the KMT rule in Taiwan were more likely to support the KMT in the 1996 and 2000 Taiwanese presidential elections. While voters did not reward or punish the incumbent for a short-term economic change, they rewarded the incumbent for long-term economic success. When the DPP became the incumbent in 2004, lifetime economic experience did not have a significant effect on individual vote choice. Once Taiwanese voters experienced an opposition party in power, they relied on short-term economic changes to make their electoral choices.

Even though Korean party system was categorized as a one-party dominant system, the succession of the ruling parties was confusing. Every ruling party in Korea was launched as an effort to detach itself from a former leaders' mishap, while there was no substantial change in their personnel or policy platforms. The ruling parties also made coalitions with opposition parties for electoral advantage. Compared with Taiwanese voters, who had only one ruling party, the KMT, Korean voters found it difficult to assign the responsibility for long-term economic conditions to the ruling party. In short, the different effects of lifetime economic experience in Korea and Taiwan imply that the clarity of responsibility mediated the effect of long-term economic experience on individual vote choice.

This study found heterogeneous economic voting behavior across elections in both countries. We can also expect heterogeneous economic voting behavior among individuals because individuals also have varying degrees of attitude availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness of economic conditions. Chapter 6 examined how

education and lifetime economic experience interact with economic evaluations to influence individual vote choice. Education and lifetime economic experience did not influence the effect of economic conditions independently, but they jointly affected the significance of economic voting. As expected, the more educated who did not witness much prosperity were more likely to be engaged in pocketbook voting in both countries. On the other hand, the less educated were more likely to be involved in sociotropic voting in Korea. The more educated voters who had experienced smaller economic growth were more likely to be involved in sociotropic voting in the 1996 Taiwanese presidential election. To the contrary, Taiwanese voters who enjoyed higher economic growth across all education levels were more likely to vote based on short-term economic recessions in 2000 and 2004. In sum, when the population is regarded as homogeneous, there was little evidence of economic voting, pocketbook voting in particular, in the first two elections of both countries. Considering individual differences in education and lifetime economic experience together, I found that a certain subset of the population was more likely to vote based on short-term economic evaluations than others.

My dissertation finds that economic voting was far less generalizable in Korea and Taiwan, even though recent elections showed some evidence of economic, particularly sociotropic, voting. As symbolic politics argues, individuals are not all egocentric and materialistic rather “public regarding” in the public arena (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Sears and Funk 1991; Sears and Lau 1983). When individual voters are emotionally attached to symbols, such as their own identity, a region, or the nation, individual political preferences tend to be formed by individual political values

embedded in a society and affective responses to salient symbols, not personal needs or self-interest. Voters in Korea and Taiwan learned emotional or affective responses to regional/national identity early in life. These learned responses persist through adult life and influence the adult's attitudes toward politics, in much the same way as party identification in the United States. Social identity cues compete with other conflicting or confirming cues such as issues and candidates. Individuals, however, tend to interpret issues and candidates in terms of strong symbolic predispositions, keeping cognitive and affective consistency, as shown by the fact that attitudes toward social identity in both countries are closely linked to other attitudes. Attitudes about social identity in Korea and Taiwan have been the more accessible and distinctive than attitudes about economic conditions so that social identity had the better chance of affecting individual candidate preferences.

The higher accessibility of economic problems produced the significance of sociotropic evaluation in recent elections in both countries after just one-term of the previous opposition party candidate in office. This result implies that we might observe more economic voting in future elections in both countries since voters now can distinguish parties in terms of economic performance. On the other hand, since the accessibility and distinctiveness of national identity are decreasing in Taiwan, we can expect a marginal effect of identity issues. Whenever military threats from China become an issue, however, national identity can be the most accessible and distinctive issue again since the parties still differ in their final objectives for Taiwan's destiny and will try to take advantage of the issue to win elections. For regional identity in Korea, when all the

“three Kims” retired from politics along with a generational change of both political figures and the electorate, many scholars expected the end of regionalism. Contrary to this expectation, regionalism seemed more significant than ever in the 2002 presidential election. New political cleavages around new issues, such as the country’s relationship with North Korea, overlapped with the existing regional cleavage rather than crosscut it. However, individual positions of new issues are much more vulnerable to changing environments. Therefore, once individual opinions on new issues and regional identity become separated, regional identity might lose its significance for individual electoral decisions since the salience of regional identity itself started to die out with the departure of charismatic regional leaders and generational replacement.

Previous voting behavior models have sought to find generalizable effects of particular variables, overlooking their varying effects across countries, elections, and individuals. Utilizing the fundamental assumption of information-processing models, this dissertation has taken account of variations in the availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness of attitudes to help explain when and why certain variables have had a significant effect on individual vote choice in a specific context. I paid particular attention to the distinctiveness between the candidates in terms of an issue. Finally, incorporating social and political contexts, such as the existence of ethno-cultural cleavages, I have provided a better understanding of why given factors are available, accessible, and distinctive for individual voters. This research also sheds new light on the sociological and the economic voting model by providing new interpretations through social cognitive psychology.

Appendix I. Tables

Table AI-1. Presidential Candidates' Vote Shares by Regions in Korea (1952-2002)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Candidate</i>	<i>Seoul</i>	<i>Kyunggi</i>	<i>Kangwon</i>	<i>Chung-buk¹</i>	<i>Chung-nam²</i>	<i>Chun-buk³</i>	<i>Chun-nam⁴</i>	<i>Kyong-buk⁵</i>	<i>Kyong-nam⁶</i>	<i>Cheju</i>	<i>Std</i>	<i>Mean</i>
1952	Lee, SM	82.3	88.0	92.4	86.7	82.4	65.9	73.6	75.0	55.4	75.7	11.2	74.6
	Cho, BA	10.3	6.0	2.7	5.8	7.3	15.4	8.9	10.6	23.0	6.4	5.8	11.4
1956	Lee, SM	63.3	77.1	90.8	86.1	77.1	60.2	72.1	55.3	62.3	81.9	12.0	70.0
	Cho, BA	36.7	22.9	9.2	13.9	22.9	39.8	27.9	44.7	37.7	12.1	11.6	27.6
1963	Park, CH	30.2	33.1	39.6	39.8	40.9	49.4	57.2	55.6	57.6	69.9	12.4	46.4
	Yun, BS	65.1	56.9	49.1	48.2	49.4	41.5	35.9	36.1	35.3	22.3	13.2	45.1
1967	Park, CH	45.2	41.0	51.3	46.6	45.4	42.3	44.6	64.0	67.3	56.5	9.8	48.8
	Yun, BS	51.3	52.6	41.7	43.6	46.8	48.9	46.6	26.4	25.5	32.1	10.3	40.9
1971	Park, CH	40.0	48.9	59.8	57.3	53.5	35.5	34.4	75.6	66.9	56.9	13.5	51.1
	Kim DJ	59.4	49.5	38.8	40.7	44.4	61.5	62.8	23.3	32.1	41.4	13.1	45.3
1987	Roh, TW	29.9	41.0	59.3	46.9	26.2	14.1	7.3	68.1	36.6	49.8	20.3	36.6
	Kim, YS	29.1	28.1	26.1	28.2	16.1	1.5	1.0	26.5	53.7	26.8	16.4	28.0
	Kim, DJ	32.6	22.1	8.8	11.0	12.4	83.5	91.3	2.5	6.9	18.6	33.5	27.0
1992	Kim, YS	36.4	36.6	41.5	38.3	36.3	5.7	3.5	62.5	72.8	40.0	22.5	42.0
	Kim, DJ	37.7	31.9	15.5	26.0	28.6	89.1	93.4	8.8	10.9	32.9	30.4	33.8
1997	Kim, DJ	44.9	39.1	23.8	37.4	46.7	92.3	95.9	13.1	13.7	40.6	20.4	40.3
	Lee, HC	40.9	35.7	43.32	30.8	26.4	4.5	2.5	67.3	54.2	36.6	16.4	38.7
2002	Roh, MY	51.3	50.5	41.5	50.4	53.4	91.6	94.1	20.2	29.4	56.1	23.5	48.9
	Lee, HC	44.3	44.3	52.5	42.9	40.1	6.2	4.1	75.5	65.3	39.9	22.4	46.6

Source: Central Election Management Committee, *The History of Elections in Korea* (www.nec.go.kr/content.jsp).

Note: 1. Chungbuk is the northern party of Chungchong. 2. Chungnam is the southern part of Chungchong. 3. Chunbuk is the northern part of Cholla. 4. Chunnam is the southern part of Cholla. 5. Kyongbuk is the northern part of Kyongsang. 6. Kyongnam is the southern part of Kyongsang.

Table AI-2. Regimes and Party System Change in Korea (1948-current)

<i>Regimes</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>President</i>	<i>Ruling Party</i>	<i>Opposition Party</i>
The First Rep.	1948-1960	Syngman Rhee	Liberal Party (LP)	Democratic Party (DP)
The Second Rep.	1960-1961	Myon Jang	Democratic Party (DP)	Socialist Mass Party (SMP)
The Third Rep.	1961-1973	Chung- Hee Park	Democratic Republican Party (DRP)	New Democratic Party (NDP)
The Fourth Rep.	1973-1979	Chung-Hee Park	Democratic Republican Party (DRP)	New Democratic Party (NDP)
The Fifth Rep.	1981-1988	Doo-Hwan Chun	Democratic Justice Party (KDJP)	Democratic Korean Party (DKP) Korean National Party (KNP) New Korean Democratic Party (NKDP)
The Sixth Rep.	1988-1993	Tae-Woo Roh	Democratic Justice Party (KDJP)	Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) New Democratic Republic Party (NDRP) Democratic Party (DP)
	1993-1998	Young-sam Kim	Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) New Korean Party (NKP)	Democratic Party (DP) Unification National Party (UNP) New Politics Reform Party (NPRP)
	1998-2000	Dae-jung Kim	National Conference for New Politics (NCNP) Federation for Liberal Democracy (FLD)	New Korean Party (NKP)
	2000-2003	Dae-jung Kim	New Millennium	Grand National Party

	2003-2008	Moo-Hyun Roh	Democratic Party (NMDP) Open Uri Party (OUP)	(GNP) Grand National Party (GNP) Democratic Labor Party (DLP) New Millennium Democratic Party (NMDP)
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Source: Choe, Yonhyok. 2003. p. 31 (Table 3-1) from 1948 to 2000. Updated by the author from 2000 to 2008.

Table AI-3. History of Party Systems in Taiwan

<i>Time Period</i>	<i>Majority Party</i>	<i>Minority Party</i>	<i>Configuration of Parties and Event</i>
1949-1972	Kuomintang (KMT)	No opposition party allowed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KMT total hegemony
1972-1986	KMT	Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KMT dominant • DPP formed in 1986
1986-1993	KMT	DPP New Party (NP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KMT dominant • NP formed in 1993
1993-1998	KMT	DPP NP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KMT lost dominance • Two and a half parties
1999-2000	KMT	DPP NP People First Party (PFP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Two highly competitive parties • PFP formed in 2000
2001	Pan-blue: a coalition of KMT, NP, and PFP	Pan-green: a coalition of DPP and TSU (Taiwan Solidarity Union)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Short-lived multiparty system • TSU formed in 2001
2001-2004	Pan-blue	Pan-green	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Movement toward a two party system?

Source: Clark, Cal. 2001. p. 93 (Figure 4.1). Revised by the author.

Table AI-4. Vote Shares by Party in Legislative Yuan Elections in Taiwan (1992-2004)

<i>Election Year</i>	<i>KMT</i>	<i>DPP</i>	<i>NP</i>	<i>PFP</i>	<i>TSU</i>	<i>Other</i>
1992	60.0%	31.0%	N/A	N/A	N/A	9.0%
1995	46.1	33.2	13.0	N/A	N/A	7.8
1998	46.4	29.6	7.1	N/A	N/A	17.0
2001	28.6	33.4	2.6	18.6	7.8	9.1
2004	34.9	38.0	.1	14.8	8.3	4.0

Source: Taiwan Central Election Commission

Table AI-5. The Result of the 1992 Korean Presidential Election

<i>Candidate</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Vote %</i>
Kim Young-sam	DLP	42%
Kim Dae-jung	PPD	34
Chung Ju-yung	UPP	16

Source: Central Election Management Committee, *The History of Elections in Korea* (www. nec.go.kr/content.jsp).

Table AI-6. Regional Differences in Support for the Three-Party Merger in the 1992 Korean Presidential Election

<i>Region</i>	<i>Mean (Std.)</i>
Cholla	2.277 (1.051)
Kyongsang	3.069 (1.119)
Other regions	2.900 (1.115)
	F = 40.73 (p = .000)

Note: The differences between Cholla and other regions, including Kyongsang, are significant at .01 level, while the difference between Kyongsang and other regions is not statistically significant even at .05 level.

Table AI-7. Regional Differences in PID in the 1992, 1997, and 2002 Korean Presidential Elections: Proportion of Respondents Who Were Closer to Government-Party Orientation

<i>Region</i>	<i>Mean (S.E.) in 1992</i>	<i>Mean (S.E.) in 1997</i>	<i>Mean (S.E.) in 2002</i>
Cholla	.092 (.290)	.041 (.199)	.500 (.501)
Kyongsang	.554 (.498)	.408 (.492)	.166 (.373)
Other Regions	.379 (.486)	.263(.441)	.241 (.428)
F-TEST	F=76.93 (p= .000)	F = 58.33 (p= .000)	F = 56.93 (p= .000)

Note: All the differences between the regions are statistically significant at .01 level.

Table AI-8. The Result of the 1997 Korean Presidential Election

<i>Candidate</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Vote %</i>
Lee Hoe-chang	NKP	38.7%
Kim Dae-jung	NCNP	40.3
Rhee In-je	NPP	19.2

Source: Central Election Management Committee, *The History of Elections in Korea* (www. nec.go.kr/content.jsp).

Table AI-9. The Result of the 2002 Korean Presidential Election

<i>Candidate</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Vote %</i>
Roh Moo-hyun	NMDP	48.9%
Lee Hoe-chang	GNP	46.6

Source: Central Election Management Committee, *The History of Elections in Korea* (www. nec.go.kr/content.jsp).

Table AI-10. Distribution of Retrospective Economic Evaluations in the 1992 and 1997 Korean Presidential Elections

	<i>1992 (percent)</i>		<i>1997 (percent)</i>	
	Sociotropic	Pocketbook	Sociotropic	Pocketbook
Much better	2.90%	1.17%	.75%	1.66%
Better	7.62	14.42	2.24	2.57
About the same	27.20	58.00	14.04	30.90
Worse	30.38	16.67	34.30	33.80
Much worse	32.72	9.75	48.67	31.06
N	1195	1200	1204	1204

Note: No economic evaluation variables in 2002.

Table AI-11. Independence-Unification Stance by Party in Taiwan (1996-2004)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Candidate (Party)</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std.</i>	<i>Observation</i>
1996	Lee Teng-hui (KMT)	2.032	.816	918
	Peng Ming-min (DPP)	1.242	.626	971
	Lin Yang-kang (NP)	2.472	.718	790
	Chen Li-an (Independent)	2.388	.651	755
2000	Lien Chan (KMT)	2.317	.658	881
	Chen Shui-bian (DPP)	1.361	.651	932
	James Soong (Independent)	2.514	.644	885
2004	Lien Chan (KMT/pan-blue)	7.035	2.181	1497
	Chen Shui-bian (DPP/pan-green)	2.225	2.195	1544

Note: 1. A 3-point scale from independence (one) to unification (three) was used in 1996 and 2000. An 11 point scale from independence (zero) to unification (ten) was used in 2004. 2. All the paired mean differences are statistically significant. 3. Lin Yang-kang was an independent candidate but endorsed by the NP.

Table AI-12. The Result of the 1996 Taiwanese Presidential Election

<i>Candidate</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Vote %</i>
Lee Teng-hui	KMT	54.00
Peng Ming-min	DPP	21.13
Lin Yang-kang	Independent*	14.90
Chen Li-an	Independent	9.98

Source: Hsieh et al. 1998

*indicates endorsement by the New Party.

Table AI-13. The Result of the 2000 Taiwanese Presidential Election

<i>Candidate</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Vote %</i>
Lien Chan	KMT	23.10
Chen Shui-bian	DPP	39.30
James Soong	Independent	37.46

Source: <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/taiwan.election/>

Table AI-14. Distribution of Retrospective Economic Evaluations in the 1996, 2000, and 2004 Taiwanese Presidential Elections

	<i>1996 (percent)</i>		<i>2000*</i> <i>(percent)</i>	<i>2004 (percent)</i>	
	Sociotropic	Pocketbook		Sociotropic	Pocketbook
Much better	1.51%	1.44%	2.04%	N/A	N/A
Better	8.20	8.94	12.25	26.61%	9.79%
About the same	28.04	61.14	23.85	38.51	63.18
Worse	33.43	19.03	48.72	34.89	27.03
Much worse	28.83	9.44	13.13	N/A	N/A
N	1391	1387	1371	1682	1670

*No pocketbook evaluation variable in 2000.

Table AI-15. The Result of the 2004 Taiwanese Presidential Election

<i>Candidate</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Vote %</i>
Lien Chan	KMT	49.89
Chen Shui-bian	DPP	50.11

Source: <http://www2.nccu.edu.tw/>

Appendix II. Figures

Figure AII-1. The Annual GDP Growth Rate in Korea (1953-2005)





Figure AII-2. The Annual GPD Growth Rate in Taiwan (1951-2006)



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This dissertation was typed by Eunjung Choi.